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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores aspects of identity choice and change in an economic
context, and how choice of location can help predict “quality of life”.
The first chapter studies the malleability of race for those that are mixed-race.
Many modern surveys that collect demographic information now allow one or more
racial categories to be chosen for one person. I construct a simple model of racial
identity choice which implies that cultural and socioeconomic factors will influence
the racial choices of those with multiracial ancestry. I then use nationally represen-
tative data on Americans from the Census and the American Community Survey
(ACS) to show supportive evidence that factors such as region, year, age, employ-
ment, and wages are associated with race selection among this population. I claim
that these findings will be increasingly important as the mixed-race population grows,
since measuring socioeconomic outcomes of multiracial groups may be complicated
if these same socioeconomic outcomes influence self-reported race.
The second chapter examines relative group size, or whether a group is in the
minority, an aspect of social identity that is changeable. We study how laboratory-
created majorities and minorities interact, and how changing relative group size
affects behavior. Our novel design allows us to examine whether two groups of
unequal size exhibit differences in levels of trust and of trustworthiness and test
whether causing the majority group to become the minority group, and vice-versa,
changes behavior. We find that real-world majority race interacts with laboratory-
created minority identity. In a trust game, where two individuals are partnered
xi
and pass tokens with real money value back and forth once, White subjects in lab
minorities pass and return more when compared to White subjects in lab majorities
while the behavior of non-White subjects does not differ by relative group size. We
also find that subjects do not change their behavior when their relative group sizes
change; behavior is driven by initial group size differences.
In the third chapter we examine variation in local rents, wage levels, commuting
costs, household characteristics, and amenities for 2071 areas covering the United
States, within metropolitan areas, by density and central-city status. We demon-
strate the sensibility of estimating wage levels by workplace, not residence, and
recover decentralized rent gradients that fall with commuting costs. We construct
and map a willingness-to-pay index, which indicates the “quality of life” typical
households receive from local amenities, when households are similar, mobile, and
informed. This index varies considerably within metros, and is typically high in
areas that are dense, suburban, sunny, mild, safe, entertaining, and have elevated
school-funding.
xii
CHAPTER I
Mark one or more: Identity choice among multiracial
individuals
1.1 Introduction
The growing non-white populations and increasing prevalence of interracial marriage1
have led to changes in how race is viewed and categorized in the Unites States. These
demographic shifts have even changed how the government recognizes race. Starting with
the 2000 Census, in a change from previous years, individuals have been allowed to select
more than one major race category to report how they identify their race.2 Other government
surveys and documents, such as the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the US standard
birth certificate, now use this “check all that apply” method to measure race.3 Comparisons
of outcomes and characteristics across racial groups are complicated by these new, but more
informative, additional race combinations.
While there are many alternative ways to define the mixed-race population, all of the
various measures used in this paper support the fact that the mixed-race population is
growing in the US.4 Data from the 2000 census and the 2001-2013 American Community
1See Fryer, Jr. (2007) for a detailed exploration.
2Racial identity, how an individual views her own race, does differ from reported race, how an individual
declares that race, but for this work I follow convention and assume individuals intend to truthfully report
racial identity as there are no clear incentives to misreport race on informational surveys such as the Census.
3The CPS reflected this change starting in January 2003 and the US Standard Certificate of Live Birth
was updated that same year, although the new standard certificate is only as of 2015 being utilized in all 50
states.
4These alternative measures are defined and discussed in Section 1.3.
1
Survey (ACS) show that the population of non-Hispanic individuals who self-report as two
or more races has increased over the past decade.5 Figure 1.1 illustrates this by showing
the population of non-Hispanic individuals in the US who self-identify as biracial.6 The size
of this group is growing, in both relative and absolute size. A Pew Research Center report
(Wang, 2012), also using ACS data, shows that in 2010 “9% of Whites, 17% of Blacks, ...
and 28% of Asians married out [of their race]” so it is reasonable to expect the growth in
this population to continue.
This growing population presents a challenge beyond just augmenting existing race re-
lated analysis to include additional mixed-race categories. A further complication arises as
individuals with ancestors of different races may not choose to identify with or report all
their racial ancestries. Parents with races different from their partners may declare their
biological children to be the race of the mother, father, or a combination of both (Brunsma,
2005 and Xie and Goyette, 1997). Adults with ancestors from different racial groups have
also been shown to choose among all permutations of their racial ancestry when declaring
race (Goldstein and Morning, 2000). One particularly prominent example of this in America
is President Barack Obama, the son of an Black African immigrant and a White Ameri-
can from Kansas. Obama publicly identifies as Black; his spokesman famously announced
that the President had checked only “Black” in response to the race question on the census
(Roberts and Baker, 2010).
While race is generally viewed in the economics literature as an immutable trait, there
is some flexibility in this characteristic as race, through self-report, appears to vary among
individuals with multiracial ancestry. This study uses nationally representative data and
finds that cultural climate and socioeconomic status are strongly correlated with race se-
lection among mixed-ancestry Americans. I construct a model to explain how these factors
5I use the term “self-report” here even though responses may have been given by the head of household
or anther person filling out the survey on behalf of a household member. This is because the race question is
worded to elicit the self-identified race of the person being documented on the survey: “indicate what [race]
this person considers himself/herself to be.” See Figure 1.2.
6Latinos are not addressed in this work due to Hispanic identity being captured by a question separate
to racial identity. Bureau of the Census (2001) reports that an overwhelming majority of people who self-
reported as “some other race” in the 2000 Census also self-reported as Hispanic; this is believed to have
occurred because of the lack of a Hispanic race option. Of the 15.4 million individuals who declared “some
other race,” 97% of those also declared as Hispanic (Perez and Hirschman, 2009). 48% percent of Hispanics
self-reported as white alone while 42% percent self-reported as “some other race” alone.
2
may influence race selection and show empirical evidence that is consistent with this model.
Finally, I discuss limitations of the data and alternative explanations that could also be
driving these results.
1.2 Literature
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) brought social identity to prominence within the economics
literature. Their general model brings identity choice into the utility function through norms;
utility increases when an individual’s actions and characteristics more closely match with
the norms of the identity she chooses. Work like that of Darity, Jr. et al. (2006) elaborates
on how racial identities may be formed, recognizing that there are norms associated with
race.
The study of mixed-race identity is relatively new to economics, but has had a presence
in the sociology literature for some time. Goldstein and Morning (2000) point out many
of the difficulties in measuring the mixed-race population. They argue that the set of self-
reported multiracial individuals is a subset of individuals who are aware of their mixed-
race ancestry, and that this set of people that are aware of their mixed-race ancestry is
itself a subset of the entire mixed-race population. Continuing in this vein, Gullickson
and Morning (2011) go beyond self-report and attempt to identify a more complete sample
of the mixed-race population by looking at ancestry responses on the 2000 Census. The
authors categorize heads of households by mapping ancestry to “biological” race and then
examine how different mixed-ancestry household heads report their race, finding that a
larger proportion of individuals with Black/White ancestry declare as Black rather than
Black/White or White. I follow their technique of mapping ancestry to race and use this
mixed-ancestry population as a proxy for the mixed-race population in the US.
Recent economic work has examined how ethnic identity and economic factors are re-
lated. Work on identity choice among ethnic minorities and immigrants finds that identity
choice is correlated with experiences. Constant (2014) provides an overview of the economic
research on the relationship between immigrant ethnic identity and labor market outcomes.
She summarizes some theoretical and empirical work that hypothesizes that ethnic identity
3
choice has an effect on labor market outcomes through choice of job, choice of career, and
job networking opportunities. Battu and Zenou (2010) find that “oppositional identities,”
identities that reject the local dominant culture, and employment are negatively correlated
for ethnic minorities. Constant et al. (2009) describe a one dimensional “ethnosizer,” a con-
structed measure of five elements that describes an individual’s ethnic identity. At one end
is commitment to an immigrant’s host country and at the other is commitment to country of
origin. This setup is similar to the model I use here, but I replace differing ethnic identities
with differing racial identities.
Beyond general economic factors, significant life events can also shape racial perceptions.
Saperstein and Penner (2010) provide evidence that incarceration strongly shapes the an-
swers to self-reported identity questions, and also how an individuals’ race is perceived by
others. They use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and
find that respondents who have been incarcerated are both more likely to be seen by others
as Black as well as self-identify as Black. Although spending time in prison is quite a signif-
icant life event, this work provides strong evidence that self-reported race, and even race as
perceived by others, is malleable.
Changes in culture and policy outside of an individual’s direct control have also been
shown to influence self-identification of race. Mason and Matella (2014) find that individuals
of Arab ancestry in the US were less likely to self-report as White after 9/11. Antman and
Duncan (2014) find evidence that self-identified race can be affected by changes in state-level
affirmative action policies for education and employment.
The wage and skin tone literature also relates to this study, as phenotype is one factor
that may plausibly influence mixed-race and monoracial identity choice as well as economic
outcomes. The literature is quite consistent in the finding that darker skin color does lead
to lower wages, both among African-Americans (Goldsmith et al., 2007) and immigrants of
all races (Hersch, 2008 and Hersch, 2011).
However, Francis and Tannuri-Pianto (2013) use data from college students in Brazil and
find that conditional on skin tone, socioeconomic status does have an influence on racial
self identification, particularly for those on the skin tone continuum near racial boundaries.
Brazil’s standard race question, used by Brazil’s Census equivalent, includes five categories:
4
Branco (White), Pardo (Brown), Preto (Black), Amarelo (Yellow or Asian), and Indigenous.
The largest two race categories in 2010 were Whites and Browns. While the Brazilian
racial climate may differ significantly from that of the US, this work shows that racial self-
categorization depends on more than phenotype and skin tone. This work also finds an effect
of affirmative action on racial self-categorization, with darker skinned Brazilians more likely
to declare as Black after the implementation of Affirmative-action racial quotas.
There are also some works in the economics literature examining how the endogeneity
of self-reported race and ethnicity and may affect measures of outcomes in certain groups.
Duncan and Trejo (2011a) examine this issue in the US, focusing on Mexican identity and
education. They use Current Population Survey (CPS) data which has information about
parents’ country of birth, and use this to identify “true” race and ethnicity, rather than
relying on self-report of race and ethnicity. They examine the intergenerational transmis-
sion of ethnic identity among Mexican Americans, coming to the conclusion that selective
intermarriage causes the achievement gap between Mexicans and Whites to be overstated, as
highly educated Mexicans are less likely to maintain their Mexican ethnic identity. For their
purposes they treat all individuals with some Mexican ancestry as fitting into the Mexican-
American group, which certainly makes sense in the context of assimilation (where different
groups intermarry and assimilate into American society). However, there is an implicit as-
sumption in this work that having some Mexican ancestry defines an individual as Mexican.
I take a different approach and recognize that some individuals may specifically choose a
mixed categorization.
Duncan and Trejo (2012) apply their previous methodology for looking at ethnic attrition
among Mexicans to racial attrition among Asians. The authors report that after the after
the 2003 change to the CPS race question, allowing for selection of more than one category
for race, Asian racial attrition decreased. Like the work on Mexican ethnic attrition, their
definition of racial attrition is different from the idea of race mixture we look at here. The
authors characterize the choice of individuals with any degree of Asian ancestry to not self-
report as Asian race as attrition, but do not apply the same thinking to the majority White
group.
Biracial Black/Whites adolescents have received particular attention in recent economic
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work. Fryer, Jr. et al. (2012) use a “strict” definition of biracial identity7 and find that
biracial children engage in more risky behaviors in order to fit in with monoracial groups.
Ruebeck et al. (2009) recognize the potential endogeneity of biracial identity, and use a
definition of mixed-race based on racial ancestry. They find that biracial adolescents take
actions that fit with both White and Black groups, and that the variance in their behavior
is greater than that of either monoracial group.
Fairlie (2009) is one of the first economics papers to examine wage gaps for biracial
people in the United States. Using data from the 2000 Census, the author finds that wages
for biracial Blacks and monoracial Blacks are roughly 12% and 14% lower, respectively,
than those of Whites. Although the gap between biracial Blacks and monoracial Blacks is
statistically significant, biracial Black wages are lower than the average of monoracial Black
and monoracial White wages. Fairlie presents this finding as evidence for the “one-drop”
rule. However, this study uses only self-reported race from the Census and results may be
affected by selection into or out of biracial Black identity.
Economics work on factors that may influence identity choice and affect measures of labor
market outcomes of mixed-race individuals is relatively new; this population is young and
individuals are hard to identify without large data sets. While there is one paper, Fairlie
(2009), that explicitly looks at mixed-race wages, much of the other work deals solely with
the endogeneity of identity choices. This paper attempts to bridge between the two together,
but first it is necessary to discuss how new category choices may change how we speak about
race.
1.3 Defining Race
The change of Census racial categorization, such as this recent change in the 2000 Census
to accommodate mixed-race groups, is not without precedent. Hochschild and Powell (2008)
document the volatility of Census racial categorization from 1890 to 1930. During this
period, race categorization changed often. There were once measures of racial mixture on
the Census based on antiquated terminology like Mulatto, Quadroon, and Octoroon. A
7The authors use panel data and their “strict” measure defines an individual as multiracial if she identifies
as such each time she is observed in the data.
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particularly interesting case is that of South Asians, who started out being classified as
White, then as a separate category, “Hindus,”8 and finally grouped with Asians as they are
today. This volatility in race categorization lasted until the 1930 Census, where the major
racial categories that we now use (White, Black, Native American, as well as various Asian
nationalities) were implemented. Prior to 2000, respondents were asked to choose only one
race category, making it difficult to record self-reported racial mixture.
For the purposes of this paper, I treat race as a social construct. While an individuals’
continent of ancestry can be identified with some degree of accuracy from genetic markers
(Jorde and Wooding, 2004), socially accepted categorizations of race can change often, as
illustrated above, and do not align perfectly with genetic differences. Bamshad et al. (2004)
find that when grouping a diverse sample of individuals into the five race categories used by
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)9, a person will be genetically more similar to
a randomly chosen person from the same race group than to a randomly chosen person from
a different race group only two-thirds of the time, and that this chance would likely have
been lower had they used more genetically admixed populations like African-Americans and
South Asians in their sample.
Although not precisely categorized according to genetic differences, racial groups are still
important as people actively use these groups to define themselves and others. In addition,
questions about how these categorizations may relate to labor market outcomes has lead to
an important literature in economics on discrimination.10 When I speak about race mixture
I speak about individuals crossing over these socially constructed boundaries that are passed
on by birth. An individual’s race categorization is a complex product of societal attitudes, life
experiences, and phenotype, and it is important to understand how the growing population
of multiracial individuals, or individuals who are born of two (or more) racial groups, exist
within or outside of these boundaries. This work sheds some light onto the complexities
8Hochschild and Powell point out that the majority of the South Asians in the United States at this time
were actually Sikhs.
9This categorization guides the collection of data on race and ethnicity for all Federal data. While OMB
encourages the collection of greater detail, the minimum five race categories are: American Indian or Alaska
Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and White (Office of
Management and Budget (1997))
10Please refer to the seminal work of Becker (1971) or a more recent overview by (Charles and Guryan,
2011)
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of the taxonomical challenges that economics work on discrimination, Charles and Guryan
(2011), is beginning to seriously consider.
In order to discuss these issues I need to be clear about the terminology I will be using
in this study. First, I will define different distinct monoracial groups. Similar to the current
Census classification, these categories will be White, Black, Native American, Asian, and
Other.11 I recognize that race is a social construct, and one that changes in definition over
time. For this study I use these aforementioned accepted modern American definitions to
classify race. Starting with these distinct monoracial groups, it is possible to construct
various definitions of multiracial individuals.
One way to define an American as multiracial is to rely solely on their self-reported race
and classify individuals as multiracial only if they choose to self-identify as such.12 As race
is a subjective identity category, I make no claim about how individuals of mixed-ancestry
should identify, only that this population is one where racial classification seems to be more
flexible (Khanna, 2011). This definition is the easiest to measure, especially with recent
changes to the Census and other surveys that allow for more than one racial category to be
chosen simultaneously. The main issue with reporting group characteristic differences based
on this definition of multiracial is that individuals may select into multiracial identity because
of plausibly mutable factors like racial climate or labor market outcomes. In other words,
this potential endogeneity of race complicates how outcomes by race may be measured.
Alternatively, multiracial individuals can be defined as those who have ancestors that
would be considered to be from at least two different monoracial groups. This definition
seems useful when thinking about individuals with monoracial parents from different races,
but this definition also captures individuals with some distant racial ancestry that may not
relate to the person’s current racial identity at all. From genetic studies, many African-
Americans are found to have some European ancestry,13 but it may not make sense to think
11I collapse the various specific Asian and Pacific Islander nationalities into one category, Asian. Everything
that doesn’t fit into White, Black, Native American, and Asian is put into the Other category; this includes
write-in values that cannot easily be mapped to a race category using the method described in Appendix B
12The way questions are constructed may greatly influence responses that are collected. Surveys that
allow for multiracial self-identification can be worded in different ways. Voluntary self-identification through
an “other” or write-in category, as in the 1990 Census, may result in lower counts of multiracials than
self-identification through a “mark one or more” method, used by the 2000 Census.
13Tishkoff (2009) sample different urban African-American populations and find that the average percent
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of this group as multiracial in the same way we think of an individual with parents of two
different races as multiracial. Being African-American implies Black race in the US and the
two terms are used interchangeably, even on the Census. This definition of multiracial based
on racial ancestry is of course difficult to use, as it requires having information on the races
of all of an individual’s ancestors.
For this study, I use a definition of mixed-race based on who it would be currently socially
acceptable to identify as mixed-race in America. A person with solely European racial
ancestry would not be thought of as Black by today’s American definition of race. Likewise,
a person with only Chinese ancestors would be viewed as monoracial Asian. However, an
individual with one Asian and one White parent could be considered by others in America
as Asian, White/Asian, or White (Xie and Goyette, 1997). While socially acceptable seems
like an ill-defined criteria, the entire concept of race is really defined in this way.14 The
time component of this definition is particularly important, as evidenced by changes in the
Census categorization of race over the past 100 years.
1.4 Data and Measuring Race
For the main analysis I use data from the 2001-2013 American Community Survey (ACS)
compiled by Ruggles et al. (2010). This survey represents approximately 0.4% of the pop-
ulation from 2001-2004 and 1% of the population from 2005 and on. The large sample size
and high response rate on ancestry15 make this data ideal for my research method. The large
sample size is needed to pick up enough mixed-race respondents for analysis, smaller surveys
tend not to have many mixed-race subjects because of the relatively small size of the pop-
ulation, and the ancestry question is key to my strategy of counting additional mixed-race
individuals. For the bulk of the analysis, I restrict the sample to non-Hispanic, native-born
of European ancestry is 14% among these groups.
14Modern humans originated in Africa around 200,000 years ago and began to spread out over the globe
about 70,000 years ago (Klein, 2009). Current racial definitions could be described as groupings based
on where the majority of ones’ ancestors lived after this migration, and as research on historical Census
categorizations of race show, these groupings have changed within the United States over time (Hochschild
and Powell, 2008).
15There is am 89.1% response rate to the ancestry question for these years of the ACS compared to 78.4%
on the 2000 Census.
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adults, ages 25-54.16
With my definition of mixed-race, it is clear that relying on self-reported race alone will
not provide the multiracial population I wish to study. The Census and ACS measure race
by asking “What is this person’s race? Mark one or more races to indicate what this person
considers himself/herself to be”(Figure 1.2). Individuals may choose to select into and out
of multiracial identity based on many different factors, so the population that self-identifies
and self-reports as multiracial is only a subset of the population of those for whom it would
be socially acceptable to classify as mixed-race.
While race is a potentially subjective category for certain groups, ancestry, particularly
as it is collected on the Census and ACS, can be viewed as a more objective measure. The
question in these surveys is “What is this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?” (Figure 1.3).
This question asks for an objective answer, rather than the race question which uses the
subjective language “considers himself/herself to be.” I follow the ideas set forth in the
sociology literature by Gullickson and Morning (2011) and use ancestry data as a way to
capture a larger mixed-race population.
An important note on the ancestry data is that prior to 2010, the Census Bureau only
accepted race and ethnicity related responses, such as “White/Caucasian,” as ancestry re-
sponses if these were the only ancestry answers provided. This means that an individual who
responded with two ancestries such as “Chinese” and “White/Caucasian” would only have
“Chinese” recorded for their ancestry. In order to make the data comparable across all years
of the 2001-2013 sample, I continue to censor “White/Caucasian” when used in combination
with other ancestry responses for 2010-2013. This is discussed in detail in Appendix B.
In order to translate ancestry answers into measures of racial background, I classify
ancestry in the same way that the Census classifies write-in answers to the race question.
The major difficulty comes from responses like “American” which are not strongly associated
with any one race. Answers that cannot be mapped cleanly to a certain race are categorized
as “Other” when calculating racial ancestry.
One concern with this technique is that ancestry may not be strongly associated with
16As discussed earlier, Hispanic status is elicited separately from race, see Figure 1.4. Immigrants may
have different norms attached to race than native born Americans.
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race in each individual case. For example, a Black American, with two Black parents who
emigrated from Ireland, may be incorrectly identified using ancestry as a proxy for race.
This individual may self-report race as Black while listing “Irish” and “African” ancestries.
According to the ancestry coding method used here, this individual would be classified as self-
identified Black race with Black/White mixed-ancestry even if her parents also self-identified
as Black. This should not be a significant problem because the question about ancestry is
worded so that the answer is an objective measure, and there is a strong tie between the
ancestry categories used here and race.
To illustrate this connection between declared ancestry and race, Table 1.1 shows the
race categorizations of individuals in three monoracial ancestry categories, White, Black,
and Asian, and the two combinations of White with Black and Asian ancestries.17 For
individuals who declare solely White ancestry, 99.5% declare their race to be White; among
those who declare solely Black ancestry, 98.6% declare their race to be Black; and finally
83.7% of individuals that self-report solely Asian ancestry also declare Asian race. This is
strong evidence that the mapping of ancestry categories to race that I use is accurate. For
the biracial ancestry categories of Asian/White and Black/White there is great variation
in race responses, but this is expected as self-reported race is flexible for the multiracial
population.
Additionally, to address concerns that that particular ancestry responses may be driving
self-reported race among the mixed-ancestry population, Table 1.2 shows the top ten an-
cestry responses of those with Black/White ancestry, split by racial category.18 The table
shows that combinations of responses for Black/White ancestry are quite similar across these
three major race responses. “African-American” in combination with “English,” “French,”
German,” “Irish,” and “Italian,” are the five most frequent ancestry combinations for each
race category. Furthermore, across the native-born, non-Hispanic sample of adults from the
2001-2013 ACS, close to 100% of those that declare only “English,” “French,” “Italian,”
“German,” or “Irish” ancestry declare their race as White and only slightly less of those
that declare only “African-American” or “African” ancestry declare their race as Black.
17Appendix Table F.1 provides some further comparisons of race with Hispanic ethnicity, “Other” ancestry,
and those who do not declare any ancestry.
18Recall that ancestry is adjusted for 2010-2013 to make the data comparable across all years.
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Table 1.3 repeats the exercise for those that declare Asian/White ancestry. Although
there is more diversity in these responses, five of the ten most common ancestry combinations
for each race are the same: “Filipino and German,” “Filipino and Irish,” “German and
Japanese,” “Hawaiian and Portuguese,” and “Irish and Japanese.”
Using ancestry to capture a larger set of multiracial individuals by separating self-
identified race from socially-acceptable race, I can explore how cultural and socioeconomic
factors may be associated with racial choice. I next describe a model to illustrate how these
factors may actually influence racial choice.
1.5 Modeling Multiracial Choice
Work by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) has led to a class of models where utility depends
on actions and a chosen identity. For the general identity model, utility is given by
Uj = Uj(aj, a−j, Ij). (1.1)
Here the utility of individual j depends on self-image, Ij, a vector of j’s actions, aj, and a
vector of others’ actions, a−j. Self-image, Ij, is defined as
Ij = Ij(aj, a−j; cj, j,P).
Identity depends on the actions of the individual, j, and others, −j, as before, as well as on
j’s social categories (assigned or chosen), cj, and how individual j’s own characteristics, j,
match with the ideals of the social categories, P. For our purposes, the social categories cj can
be thought of as different racial categories, including combinations of two racial categories.
The prescriptions, P, would then have to do with traits that “fit” with being a member
of a specific racial group. Utility increases with how well individuals’ characteristics match
with the prescriptions of their chosen identity, so there are costs to not fitting prescriptions.
Individuals choose actions, aj, and identity, cj, to maximize their utility.
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1.5.1 A Specific Multiracial Choice Model
I apply some structure to Akerlof and Kranton’s general identity model (AK) and apply
it to explain how individuals with multiracial ancestry may choose a multiracial identity. I
split utility into the sum of an action payoff, G, an identity payoff, Q, and an action/identity
interaction payoff, H, as follows:
Uj(aj, cj; sj, vj, pL, pR,CX) = Gj(aj; vj) +Qj(cj; sj, pL, pR)−Hj(aj, cj; CX). (1.2)
In this setup, similar to AK, individuals choose an action and an identity to maximize
utility. There are two possible actions, aj ∈ (1, 0). Although there are two races, L and R,
an individual can choose one of these two or a combination of the two, making her identity
choice set cj ∈ (L,R, LR). The individual’s endowed characteristics (j in AK) are ability,
vj ≥ 0, and skin tone/phenotype, 0 < sj < 1. The prescriptions, P, or norms for how traits
“fit” with being a member of a specific racial group, are characterized in this setup through
pL and pR, skin tone norms, and CX, behavior norms.
The action payoff, Gj, depends on the individual’s endowed ability and choice of action.
If the individual chooses action 1, she receives an action payoff equal to her endowed ability,
vj. If the individual chooses action 0, she receives no action payoff. In other words, endowed
ability determines how large the payoff from action 1 is, and this varies by individual. These
action choices of 1 and 0 can be thought about as the decision between working in a high
paying industry or a lower paying one, or investing in education leading to a more lucrative
career or a less monetarily rewarding one, and individual differences in ability vary the
returns to this action. This return to an education or labor market decision is independent
of skin tone or choice of race in the current setup. The payoff from action choice can thus
be written as
Gj(aj; vj) =
 vj if aj = 10 if aj = 0.
The self-image component of utility, Ij from AK, is replaced here by the sum of an
identity payoff, Qj, and an action/identity interaction payoff, Hj. The identity payoff, Qj,
comes from how well chosen identity, cj, fits with endowed skin tone/phenotype, sj. The
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value of sj where an individual has equal identity payoff between L and LR (LR and R) is
denoted as pL (pR), with 0 < pL ≤ pR < 1. Together, pL and pR, are the exogenous skin
tone/phenotype norms that drive how physical characteristics affect self-image. The identity
payoff is then as follows:
Qj(cj; sj, pL, pR) =

−sj/(4 ∗ pL) if cj = L
−1
4
if cj = LR
(sj − 1)/(4 ∗ (1− pR)) if cj = R.
(1.3)
We can think of the three racial identities, L, LR, and R, as existing at the endpoints and a
middle range of the s number line, see Figure 1.5. The identity payoff can be thought of as
the psychic cost of deviating from the prescribed skin tone/phenotype norm for each identity.
These norms driven “ideal” values of s for identities L and R are 0 and 1 respectively, and
for identity LR are within the interval [pL, pR].
For example, in a location where skin tone is not strongly tied to race categories, we
might have pL ≈ 0 and pR ≈ 1 so that the identity payoff would be equal for all sj and
cj combinations. Alternatively, in a location governed by the “one-drop” rule,
19 we might
expect pL = pR ≈ 1 so that any skin tone sj < 1 is best associated with L identity, and
that there is essentially no value of sj that leads to an optimal LR, or mixed-race, identity
choice.
I also allow for there to be an interaction between identity and action. Whereas the iden-
tity payoff, Qj, captures the self-image component of utility driven by physical appearance,
this interaction payoff, Hj, captures the self-image component of utility driven by behavioral
norms associated with different identities. Modeling the association of particular actions
with racial identity is a sensitive issue. The intention here is not to validate stereotypes,
but rather to acknowledge these associations exist and may affect an individual’s choice of
identity. Papers such as Fryer, Jr. and Torelli (2010) address similar issues with Black and
White adolescents and the concept of “acting White,” where certain behaviors and human
capital investments come with additional costs, such as social exclusion, for this population.
19This refers to the historically prominent view of race in the United States where a person with one
ancestor of Black ancestry was considered Black.
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Creating this interaction payoff allows us to model cases where actions are positively or
negatively associated with certain identity choices. Let CX ∈ (CL, CLR, CR), where each of
these terms represents an identity, labeled by the subscript, and association with action 1. A
value of zero for CX would indicate no interaction between the action 1 and the identity X. A
positive value would indicate that the individual must pay a utility cost to choose associated
identity X and the action 1 simultaneously. The interaction payoff between identity and
action can then be written as
Hj(aj, cj; CX) =

aj ∗ CL if cj = L
aj ∗ CLR if cj = LR
aj ∗ CR if cj = R.
(1.4)
To take this model to data, I first restrict to the set of individuals with mixed-ancestry.
I assume that the distribution of endowed phenotype, sj, is uniform across (0, 1), and that
endowed ability, vj, is independent of phenotype. I restrict CL ≥ CLR ≥ CR making L the
identity most negatively associated with action 1.
This model describes choices of action and identity and illustrates how utility-maximizing
individuals with the same endowed phenotype may choose different identities based on en-
dowed ability and racial climate. From equation 1.2, we can simplify the payoffs to the
combinations of different actions (aj) and identity choices (cj), conditional on exogenous
characteristics (sj and vj) and exogenous cultural factors (pL, pR, and CX), written in short-
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hand as Uj(aj, cj) for individual j below:
Uj(0, L) =
−sj
4(pL)
(1.5a)
Uj(1, L) =
−sj
4(pL)
+ vj − CL (1.5b)
Uj(0, LR) =
−1
4
(1.5c)
Uj(1, LR) =
−1
4
+ vj − CLR (1.5d)
Uj(0, R) =
−(1− sj)
4(1− pR) (1.5e)
Uj(1, R) =
−(1− sj)
4(1− pR) + vj − CR. (1.5f)
First, individuals may compare identities L and LR in combination with actions 1 and 0.
For a given identity choice, cj, and skin tone, sj, the choice between action 1 and 0 depends
on the relationship between vj, CL, CLR, and CR. With CL ≥ CLR ≥ CR, I can consider
how ability, vj, varies relative to these values to determine an individuals’ utility maximizing
action and identity.
In the scenario where CLR > vj, an individual who chooses identity LR should certainly
choose action 0 rather than 1, as vj − CLR < 0, and if the individual chooses identity L she
should also choose action 0 rather than 1, as vj − CL < 0. This individual then chooses
identity LR rather than L if Uj(0, LR) > Uj(0, L), which reduces to sj > pL.
In the scenario where CL > vj > CLR, if the individual chooses identity LR she chooses
action 1, as vj − CLR > 0, but if the individual chooses identity L she should choose 0,
again since vj − CL < 0. This individual will then choose identity LR rather than L if
Uj(1, LR) > Uj(0, L), which reduces to sj > pL − 4(vj − CLR) ∗ pL.
Finally, in the scenario where vj > CL > CLR, no matter which identity the individual
chooses, she will choose action 1, since vj − CLR > vj − CL > 0. The individual will choose
identity LR rather than L if Uj(1, LR) > Uj(1, L), which reduces to sj > pL−4(CL−CLR)∗pL.
I can thus summarize the information for an individual given an endowed phenotype (sj)
and ability (vj), in an environment with racial climate parameters (CL, CLR, pL), making
a choice of identity between L and LR as follows. This individual will choose identity LR
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rather than L when:
sj > pL if CLR > vj (1.6a)
sj > pL − 4(vj − CLR) ∗ pL if CL > vj > CLR (1.6b)
sj > pL − 4(CL − CLR) ∗ pL if vj > CL > CLR (1.6c)
I can complete a similar exercise for comparing choices between the identities of LR
and R again using comparisons of 1.5a through 1.5f. To summarize, an individual with an
endowed phenotype (sj) and ability (vj), in an area with racial climate parameters (CLR,
CR, pR), will choose identity R rather than LR when:
sj > pR if CR > vj (1.7a)
sj > pR − 4(vj − CR)(1− pR) if CLR > vj > CR (1.7b)
sj > pR − 4(CLR − CR)(1− pR) if vj > CLR > CR (1.7c)
Thus, given parameter values of racial climate regarding behavior (CL, CLR, CR) and skin
tone (pR, pL), for any given combination of sj and vj, I can determine which identity and
action this individual will choose. When I plug some values in for the parameters and provide
a range for vj, I can clearly illustrate identity and action choices graphically.
1.5.2 Example 1
First, I consider a location where racial identity and actions are not tied and mixed-
race identity is common. This can be parameterized by setting CL = CLR = CR = 0 and
(pL, pR) = (.25, .75) in this location k. Further, let us assume that ability, vj, is uniformly
distributed (0, .25) across each value of skin tone, sj, which itself is uniformly distributed
(0, 1) for mixed race individuals. For simplicity, if individuals are indifferent between actions
1 and 0, I assume they choose action 1.
For an individual with vj = 0, I can illustrate utility from all combinations of identity
and action choice succinctly in Figure 1.6. Utils are on the y-axis and range from 0 to −.25,
and skin tone is on the x-axis and ranges from 0 to 1. The dotted line pointing down from
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zero maps the utility when choosing identity L for each value of s, the dashed horizontal line
illustrates the utility when choosing identity LR, and the dotted and dashed line pointing
down from one reflects the utility when choosing identity R. The utility maximizing identity
choice for every value of s is then shown from the upper envelop of these lines. Between
0 < sj < .25 the individual should choose L, for .25 < sj < .75 the individual should
choose LR, and for sj > .75 the individual should choose R. This individual with vj = 0,
is indifferent between actions 1 and 0 for all identity choices as the action payoff will be 0
regardless of the action chosen.
In this example, everyone with vj > 0, would choose action 1, but the ranges of s that
are associated with each identity would not change regardless of the individual value of vj.
The upper envelop from choosing action 1 would simply shift all utility lines up by vj, since
in this case, action and identity are not associated. Figure 1.7 shows the combination of
identity and action choices (cj, aj) mapped over possible values of ability, on the y-axis, and
skin tone, on the x-axis. With ranges of s tied to identity as described above, this results
in 25% of mixed race individuals choosing identity L, 50% choosing identity LR, and 25%
choosing identity R.
1.5.3 Example 2
Next, I consider a location where the racial bias can be captured through a strong negative
association between certain identities and actions, but where mixed-race identity is still
common. I parametrize this situation by having both L and LR negatively associated with
action 1; let CL = .2 > CLR = .1 > CR = 0. As in the previous example, I set the phenotype
range for mixed-race identity as (pL, pR) = (.25, .75) and allow ability, vj, to be uniformly
distributed (0,.25).
Plugging these values into equations 1.6a-1.6c and 1.7a-1.7c, I can illustrate the combi-
nations of skin tone and ability that lead to different race and action combinations in Figure
1.8. Once again, the y-axis shows endowed ability and the x-axis shows endowed phenotype.
Within each identity type, L, LR, and R, it is the value of CX which determines what
proportion of individuals choose action 1 instead of action 0. The negative association of
action 1 and identity L, means that ability, vj, must be greater than the interaction cost
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of CL = .2 in order to choose action 1, for those that select identity L. The same is true
for identity LR, although a larger set of ability values allow for action choice 1 in this case,
since CLR = .1. For race R where there is no interaction cost, all ability types can choose 1.
There is flexibility for identity choice in the boundary range of phenotype where .15 <
sj < .25. Conditional on a particular phenotype value within this range, individuals with
higher relative values of vj choose identity LR and those with lower relative values choose
identity L. This can be interpreted as positive ability selection into identity LR. In this
range, as the phenotype value, sj, increases, the cost of “switching” to identity LR decreases
meaning that lower ability types can pay this cost, increasing the range of ability, vj, that
an individual can possess where utility maximizing behavior will be to switch from L to LR.
Contrasting this with example 1, individuals with high ability and phenotypes close
to pL = .25 are “switching” from identity L into identity LR. This is driven by the larger
negative association of identity L with action 1, relative to the negative association of identity
LR with action 1. In other words, an individual taking action 1 has an incentive to change
identity to LR from L since the interaction cost is lower for LR. Therefore, close to this
phenotype border, the ability payoff and decreased interaction cost outweigh the identity cost
to switching, causing positive selection into LR. In other words, this describes a situation
where an individual’s behavior fits better with one identity while skin tone fits better with
another, and high ability types are more likely to choose an identity that fits better with
chosen behavior.
A similar situation occurs over the range of phenotype .65 < sj < .75 where individuals
now choose between identity R and LR. As with the boundary cases between L and LR,
it is the interplay of the reduced interaction costs, identity “switching” costs, and varying
payoff from taking action 1, that drives the decisions within this range of phenotype values.
This model makes several strong predictions for situations where actions are associated
differentially with identity. The first is that near the phenotype boundary between racial
groups, conditional on phenotype, higher ability types will choose a different identity than
lower ability types. The second is that holding identity constant, darker skinned individuals
should have higher ability than lighter skinned individuals on average. Third, when calculat-
ing average ability by identity group, identities where there is a greater negative association
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of identity and action will have lower average ability due to positive selection away from
that identity. This means that in the above example with CL > CLR > CR, I can now show
that ability averaged by identity choice, denoted v¯X , where X ∈ (L,LR,R), will follow this
ordering: v¯L < ¯vLR < v¯R.
20 Finally, the proportion of individuals who choose action 0 for
each identity increases with the value of CX for that identity. Therefore, the fraction of
individuals choosing action 1 is lowest for identity L, higher for identity LR, and highest for
identity R.
Figure 1.9 illustrates how selection into different identities leads to the overall ordering in
average ability by identity type. Trapezoid A shows the group with relatively high ability, vj,
that “switch” from identity L to identity LR, compared to example 1 in which there is no tie
between identity and action. This leads average ability of L to be lower than average ability
of LR. Likewise, Trapezoid B shows the group with relatively high ability that “switch”
from identity LR to identity R, leading the average ability of LR to be lower than that of
R.
In this setup, discrimination does not directly affect returns to the action but instead
operates through measures of local culture (pL, pR, and CI) which can reduce utility from
self-image (Qj and Hj of the utility function) of certain endowed skin tone levels and race
choices. The model could be could be modified so that the action payoff is directly affected by
discrimination by adding a multiplier, 0 < d(sj) < 1, to vj to dampen returns to the action,
so that the action payoff for action 1 is d(sj) ∗ vj. Here function d would be decreasing in
skin tone, sj. In such a case, returns to higher education or working in certain industries
would be directly affected by skin tone.
The model illuminates the central insight that when certain identities impose costs for
taking otherwise utility enhancing actions, only high ability types able to pay this self-image
cost will choose these actions. Furthermore, conditional on skin tone and other factors, high
ability types may find it beneficial to also change their identity to avoid self-image costs that
stem from the negative association of utility enhancing actions and certain identities.
This model provides a framework for thinking about how identity selection may be
broadly affected by endowed circumstance and the association of identity and chosen ac-
20See Appendix A for details.
20
tions. From this model, if certain characteristics are more strongly tied to one race than
another, this will influence how a multiracial individual chooses her race, and more broadly,
will influence the total count of multiracial individuals based on self-declared race.
1.6 Results
Without available data for skin tone of a large set of multiracial individuals, some of the
strongest predictions of the model cannot be tested. However, I can use the large population
of mixed-ancestry Americans to show that cultural and socioeconomic factors are associated
with the choice of race as the model suggests. The limitations of this evidence and alternative
explanations that could be driving these results are discussed after the empirical results are
presented.
I begin the empirical analysis by examining cultural and socioeconomic factors associated
with the choice of race by individuals with self-reported Black/White ancestry. The sample
is first restricted to native-born, non-Hispanic adults, ages 25-54. Recall that individuals
respond to ancestry on these surveys with write-in answers, up to two of which I can code
to racial categories. As the population of individuals who declare Black and White ancestry
is still relatively small, I first pool across 2001-2013. I examine the choice of race among
this population, limited to Black, Black and White, and White.21 Table 1.4 shows summary
statistics for this population by self-reported race. Overall, those that choose Black/White
race appear to be more educated and younger than their Black and White counterparts.
I run a multinomial logistic regression of these three race categories on census division,
year, age, and education, categories, as well as on employment fraction and gender. The
employment fraction measure is calculated by multiplying the usual hours reported having
worked each week last year by the number of weeks worked. The most common answer for
usual hours of work is 40 each week, and the most common answer for weeks worked per
year is the 50-52 week category, so I normalize the employment fraction measure by dividing
each value by 2, 040 hours. Standard errors are clustered by state (including Washington
DC) to address concerns that errors may be correlated by geography.
214% of individuals with Black/White ancestry declare race in some other way and are ignored in this
analysis.
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From the model presented above, I expect that factors such as education, local racial
climate, and labor market participation all may have systematic associations with race.
Column (1) of Table 1.5 shows the relative risk ratios for Black race, where the comparison
group is mixed Black/White race; column (2) has the relevant standard errors. Column (3)
of Table 1.5 shows this same information for White race compared again to Black/White
race with the relevant standard errors in column (4).
First, we see evidence that culture, or racial climate, is associated with racial self-
identification from the relative risk ratios on the three southern census divisions, South
Atlantic, East South Central, and West South Central, and from the relative risk ratios on
the year categories. Looking at Column (1), comparing Black to mixed Black/White in the
three southern divisions, these values and subsequent Wald tests reveal that individuals with
Black/White ancestry are significantly more likely to declare as Black compared to biracial
in these areas, when compared to any other division, including the omitted New England
division. This result fits with the history of Blacks in the south, where anti-miscegenation
laws and the “one-drop rule” have had a lasting effect on the concept of race so that those
with mixed ancestry are still much more likely to declare as Black only.
Also in Column (1), we see significantly decreasing odds of identifying as Black compared
to mixed Black/White as the year category increases.22 I cannot reject the hypothesis
that year category effects are the same from 2001-2002 through 2005-2006, but the odds
of declaring Black race drop precipitously after that and through the most recent period
of 2011-2013. These year effects operate separately from age, as I control for this to by
including 10-year age categories. The age effect works in the opposite direction, where older
individuals are more likely to declare as Black than mixed. These results indicate both a
time and cohort effect for cultural attitudes towards race; I interpret this result as evidence
of an increase in the social acceptability to declare as mixed for younger generations and
generally over time as well.
Education and employment are used here as indicators of socioeconomic status. I break
education down into six categories; the omitted category is bachelor’s degree. Wald tests
22I use combined 2-year periods here (the last category includes 2011, 2012, and 2013) to deal with degrees
of freedom and the limited 51 geographic clusters. Results are similar using a single linear coefficient for
year.
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indicate that while we see no differences between those with Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees,
individuals with those levels of education are significantly more likely to declare as Black
than those with a professional degree, but less likely to declare as Black compared those with
only a high school degree. This is evidence that more education, in general, is associated
with a higher likelihood of identifying as mixed-race.23 The employment fraction is also
associated with a lower likelihood of identifying as Black compared to mixed. With both
these pieces of evidence I claim that higher socioeconomic status is associated with mixed
race compared to Black race identification.
Column (3) presents the relative risk ratios of declaring race as White compared to
Black/White. Cultural factors as proxied by division, year, and age exhibit strong trends,
but socioeconomic status, as proxied by eduction and employment status, do not appear to.
There are differences in race declarations when comparing the southern divisions to the Mid
Atlantic, East North Central, and Mountain Divisions, and similar time and age patterns to
the Black and Black/White comparison. This shows that it has become increasingly likely
to declare as multiracial in recent years, with younger individuals exhibiting a more flexible
view of race, more often choosing multiracial rather than White identity.
Additional measures with finer geographic location, metropolitan resident status, and
method of interview (mail, telephone, or in person) are only available in the public use
data beginning in 2005. Starting with the 2012 ACS, geographic areas of residence were
switched over to 2010 Census area definitions, causing PUMAs and metropolitan areas to
have different boundaries in the 2005-2011 ACS compared to the 2012-2013 ACS. In light
of this, I restrict the sample to 2005-2011 to take advantage of these extra variables and
finer geographic data.24 In addition, as I can now identify the Public Use Microdata Area
(PUMA) of residence, I can construct measures of % Black and % Black/White in the local
area for each individual.25
23Individuals with doctorates seem to be a counter example here, but the observations are too few and
the error terms too large to draw any concrete conclusions.
24Running the initial specification while restricting years does not substantially affect the magnitudes of
relative risk ratios, however, notably I can no longer reject the null that the 0.878 relative risk ratio between
Blacks and Black/Whites for employment fraction is equal to 1 (p=0.106) for the 2005-2011 sample.
25Here the standardized measure of proportion Black (Black/White) is the percent of population in a
PUMA that is Black (Black/White) divided by the standard deviation of this proportion across all PUMAs.
This allows us to interpret a one unit change in standardized proportion Black as the effect of a one standard
deviation change in proportion Black and make a simpler comparison between standardized proportion Black
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I expect that the proportion Black and proportion Black/White in a person’s PUMA
of residence will influence her choice of race. Areas with more Blacks or more biracial
Black/Whites may have different racial climates due to increased minority presence. Like-
wise, metropolitan areas may also have different racial climates than more racially homoge-
nous, rural areas. I also expect method of interview, or whether the data was collected
by survey or computer assisted telephone interview/computer assisted in-person interview
(CATI/CAPI) to matter. As detailed in Appendix D, the latter two interview types are
only pursued when a person does not respond to the initial mailing. This behavior may be
associated with groups that are not as trusting of the government.
Table 1.6 shows the results of a multinomial logistic model again using Black, Black/White,
and White race as outcomes on employment fraction and an expanded set of division, year,
age, and education variables with additional controls for metropolitan resident status, lo-
cal percent Black, local percent Black/White, and phone/personal interview (CATI/CAPI).
Standard errors are clustered by metropolitan area for this sample.26
To further examine results of this specification, I offer graphs of the predicted probabili-
ties of declaring race according to various categories while holding all other variables at their
means. I begin with census division; in Figure 1.10 the probabilities of Black, Black/White,
and White race by census division are shown in the three plots from left to right. The in-
creased likelihood of declaring monoracial in the southern divisions compared to others can
be seen.27 The year dummies indicate an increasing likelihood to declare as multiracial vs
Black in recent years, but the difference levels off after 2008, as illustrated by predicted prob-
abilities in Figure 1.11. With extended age categories, now 5-year instead of 10-year groups,
the same pattern of older individuals being more likely to declare as monoracial, either Black
or White, compared to multiracial still holds. This is perhaps the most striking example, as
shown in Figure 1.12, with very strong trends towards more mixed-race identification among
and standardized proportion Black/White as these actual proportions are very different in magnitude.
26When clustered at the PUMA level, standard errors are roughly the same size as non-clustered standard
errors, perhaps indicating that there are too many PUMAs relative to observations. I choose to cluster
standard errors by metropolitan area as the size of the standard errors increases substantially when doing
so, suggesting that there is some within metropolitan area correlation of errors.
27While I can no longer claim individuals in East South Central or South Atlantic are more likely to
declare Black rather than Black/White in New England, there are still statistically significant differences
between the odds of declaring Black in the East South Central and South Atlantic with the Mid Atlantic.
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younger cohorts. Together these proxies for cultural climate indicate significant differences
in the likelihood of identifying as Black or mixed race.
In this specification I also expand education categories and break out “High School
Degree” into “High School Degree”, “Some College”, and “Associate’s Degree.” “No HS
Degree” is broken out into “Some High School” and “Less than High School.” Predicted
probabilities of race by expanded education categories are shown in Figure 1.13. From the
leftmost panel we see the major trend is the decreasing likelihood of declaring Black race
with increasing education above a HS Degree. The reverse pattern can be seen in the mid-
dle panel for the probability of declaring Black/White race. The coefficients on expanded
education categories in Table 1.6 quantify these differences and Wald tests verify that there
are differences between the odds of declaring Black among those with less than a Bachelor’s
Degree and those with a Professional Degree.
The addition of controls for being a metropolitan resident, proportion Black and pro-
portion Black/White, interview type (CATI/CAPI), and expanded categories, increase the
pseudo r2 to .171 compared to .066 in the previous 2001-2013 specification. Notably, the co-
efficient on employment fraction is no longer statistically significant. The additional controls
are strongly significant for the comparison between Black and Black/White racial identifica-
tion. The addition of metropolitan resident, proportion Black, and proportion Black/White
greatly reduce the magnitude of the geographic division effects, but still do not pull the
south in line with other areas of the country.
The broad patterns found in the original specification still hold for this second specifica-
tion, indicating that the cultural differences through location, time, and age are associated
with racial selection among those with mixed Black/White ancestry. The evidence is more
mixed for socioeconomic factors, as educational attainment differences still hold but employ-
ment fraction is no longer associated with choice of race for this group.
In order to look at another socioeconomic factor, wages, I repeat the above analysis but
use a sample of full-time (30+ hours a week, 27+ weeks per year) working adults rather than
the entire universe of adults with Black and White ancestry. Table 1.7 shows the relative
risk ratios of Black and White racial identification with Black/White racial identification as
the omitted category. The patterns for cultural factors, division, year category, and age on
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workers are the same as on adults. In the three southern divisions, individuals are more likely
to declare as Black compared to mixed-race. In more recent years the probability of declaring
mixed-race compared to either Black or White monoracial increases, and younger individuals
are also more likely to declare a mixed-race rather than either monoracial category.
With the restricted full-time workers sample, education shows slightly weaker differences
but individuals in the “High School Degree” education category are still more likely to
declare Black race than Black/White race relative to those in the “Bachelor’s Degree” ed-
ucation category (p = 0.041). Log hourly wages are strongly significant comparing Blacks
to Black/Whites. Together this evidence shows that shows that individuals with more ed-
ucation and higher wages are less likely to declare as Black and more likely to declare as
Black/White, as the model would suggest.
Again, to examine additional categories and controls we restrict our sample of full
time working adults to the years 2005-2011. This allows us to add proportion Black and
Black/White, metropolitan status, response type (survey or CATI/CAPI) and expand our
year, age, and education categories. The broad patterns of differences in predicted proba-
bility by race and division, year, age, and education are plotted in Figures 1.14, 1.15, 1.16,
and 1.17,respectively.
Again, patterns that hold in other specifications for differences by division also hold here,
with individuals more likely to choose a monoracial identity in the southern divisions rather
than a multiracial one. Individuals with higher levels of education are still less likely to
declare Black compared to Black/White. Table 1.8 shows the relative risk ratios, and Wald
tests reveal that those with Professional degrees and Master’s degrees are significantly less
likely to declare Black than those with just a “High School Degree” or “Some College”.
These education relative risk ratios are quite similar between the sample of adults compared
to the sample of full-time workers.
There continues to be a strong year effect, where it appears to have become more ac-
ceptable to choose a multiracial identity as the likelihood of those choosing Black compared
to Black/White has decreased in later years, but leveled off around 2008. Interestingly, the
pattern is weaker for the likelihood of declaring White race compared to multiracial. How-
ever, even for Whites I still can reject the joint hypothesis that the year coefficients should
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not be included in the model.
Differences in educational attainment remain significant although log hourly wages is now
marginally significant (p = 0.073). Thus, even with these detailed controls, socioeconomic
status is still somewhat associated with the choice of race between Black and Black/White.
The controls for metropolitan resident status, proportion Black, and proportion Black/White
are all significant here in the expected direction. In comparing Black racial identification
to Black/White racial identification, column (1), those that live in cities and are around
more monoracial Blacks are more likely to identify as Black, and those that are around more
multiracial Black/Whites are more likely to declare as multiracial.
Repeating the analysis but splitting by gender leads to some interesting results, particu-
larly with employment and wage measures. Table 1.9 repeats the analysis on the 2001-2013
sample of adults with Black/White ancestry, split by gender. For the choice between Black
and Black/White Race, columns (1) and (5) show similar significant differences by location,
year, and age in the expected directions, consistent with earlier results. However, employ-
ment fraction is only significant for males, and shows that males are much less likely to report
their race as Black as employment fraction increases (0.748 RRR compared to Black/White).
This same pattern holds with wages between males and females, as seen in Table 1.10. Again,
the results from columns (1) and (5) show that males are less likely to declare their race as
Black as their wages increase, relative to Black/White, but females don’t show this same
significant difference. This is an interesting finding that warrants more exploration. There
could perhaps be a tie between utility from gender identity and labor market attachment
since women, at least traditionally, have had less labor market attachment than men. This
could be interacting with the tie between labor market attachment and racial identity.
The population of individuals with Asian/White ancestry is also of interest as there are
potentially different associations between socioeconomic and cultural factors with this pop-
ulation, relative to the population of individuals with Black/White ancestry. I therefore
repeat some analysis with the sample of native-born, non-Hispanic adults, ages 25-54 that
report Asian/White ancestry. Table 1.11 shows results using data from 2001-2013. Inter-
estingly, factors appear to affect the choice between Asian/White and White as much as
between Asian/White and Asian. Differences in racial identification by geographic location
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are concentrated in the Mountain and Pacific divisions where individuals are much more
likely to identify as mixed-race than monoracial White. The time trend towards multi-racial
self-identification is also stronger comparing Whites to White/Asians, and this trend moves
in the same direction as it does for those of Black/White ancestry. Younger individuals
are again less likely to declare as monoracial. Higher levels of educational attainment move
racial identification towards Asian/White from both monoracial categories. The employment
fraction is marginally significant (p = 0.078) with individuals more likely to declare race as
monoracial Asian compared to mixed-race Asian/White as employment fraction increases.
As with Black/Whites, I further extend with additional categories and controls, but must
subsequently restrict years to 2005-2011. Table 1.12 shows the results of this specification.
All the patterns for the 2001-2013 sample hold, including that the employment fraction
remains marginally significant (p = 0.053) with the likelihood of declaring monoracial Asian
increasing in employment fraction relative to mixed-race Asian/White.
Table 1.13 shows the analysis for a sample of full-time working adults with Asian and
White ancestry. Patterns are similar to the analysis of adults over the same 2001-2013
time period; Asian/White race self-identification is much more likely in the Pacific division
compared to White race, year and age relative risk ratios show that youth and more recent
time periods increase the likelihood of declared mixed-race, and higher education is more
associated with Asian/White race than either monoracial category. I cannot reject the
hypothesis that the relative risk ratio of log hourly wages is equal across race categorization,
meaning that wages do not seem to be differentially associated with Asian, Asian/White,
and White race categorization among this population.
Extending to additional categories and controls, but restricting years to 2005-2011, the
results presented in Table 1.14 show that changes from the preceding full-time working
adults specification do not alter the broad patterns on year, age, education, or even wages.
Metropolitan residency and increased proportions of Asian/Whites in the PUMA of residence
make it more likely for an individual to declare as Asian/White.
Analysis on individuals with mixed Asian/White ancestry shows some similar patterns to
that on individuals with Black/White ancestry. The probability of identifying as mixed-race
compared to monoracial increases with year and decreases with age. Living in the south
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increases the likelihood of declaring as monoracial, although much less so for Asian/Whites.
However, there are also significant differences between Asian/White ancestry and Black/White
ancestry. While the coefficients on education seem to suggest higher levels of education are
more associated with mixed race identification for Black/Whites only compared to Blacks,
these coefficients show higher education being associated with mixed race identification for
Asian/Whites compared to both Asian and White monoracial groups. Other socioeconomic
factors such as employment fraction and wages seem to be less influential on the choice of
race for those with Asian/White ancestry than for those with Black/White ancestry.
The distribution of minority monoracial and biracial adults across the continental United
States helps to illustrate some of these findings. Figure 1.18 displays the percent of adults in
each PUMA by race and ancestry for Asians and Blacks. Each map has a separate quantile
scale with darker shades indicating higher concentrations of the applicable categoric popula-
tion. Subfigures 1.18a and 1.18b show the dispersion of individuals declaring only Asian race
and only Asian ancestry respectively. These populations are spread throughout the county,
but concentrated around metropolitan areas. Asian race and ancestry also strongly overlap
and that is reflected in the similarity in appearance between these two Subfigures.
Subfigures 1.18c and 1.18d show the dispersion of individuals declaring only Black race
and only Black ancestry respectively. Blacks reach a higher relative concentration in single
PUMAs than Asians do, and Black populations are concentrated in the South East. As with
Asians, Black race and Black ancestry concentrations overlap to a high degree.
Figure 1.19 repeats this exercise but with the biracial and biancestral population of
Asian/Whites and Black/Whites. For Asian/White race and ancestry, the maps look re-
markably similar to each other and also to those for Asian race and ancestry. This indicates
that PUMAs with higher concentrations of Asians also tend to have higher concentrations
of mixed-race and mixed-ancestry Asian/whites.
There is an interesting contrast between maps of Black/White race, Subfigure 1.19c, and
Black/White ancestry, Subfigure 1.19d. The south eastern area of the United States appears
much lighter for race than for ancestry, illustrating the difference in attitudes towards race in
the south. The darker shades in this area for Black/White ancestry compared to Black/White
race indicate that it is relatively more common to declare Black/White ancestry than it is
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to declare Black/White race. This difference is also reflected in the regression results where
individuals with Black/White ancestry are much more likely to report race as Black than as
Black/White in the southern census divisions. A comparison of the maps of Black/White
race and ancestry, Subfigures 1.19c and 1.19d, to maps of Black race and ancestry, Subfigures
1.18c and 1.18d, also shows an interesting difference with Black/White race and ancestry
being relatively less geographically concentrated than Black race and ancestry.
1.7 Specification Checks
Recall that due to how the Census chose to censor ancestry pre-2010 I manually coded
ancestry in the same way for data after 2009 so that the sample was comparable across
years. However, this means that individuals with Black/White ancestry that declared one
of their ancestries as “White/Caucasian” were recoded as Black Ancestry only. I cannot
identify these individuals in the data before 2010, but I can in later years. In Table 1.15, I
show summary characteristics of Black, Black/White, and White race individuals with “Ex-
cluded” Black/White ancestry, those with Black/White ancestry that declare one ancestry
as “White/Caucasian,” and “Adjusted” Black/White ancestry, those with Black/White an-
cestry that do not answer with “White/Caucasian.” Those with “Adjusted” ancestry appear
to be more educated, but no other differences between the samples stand out.
As a robustness check, I repeat regressions of choice of race on location, year, age, edu-
cation, and employment fraction for individuals in 2011-2013 with Black/White ancestry. I
choose this time frame because these are years where I can identify individuals who declared
Black/White ancestry using “White/Caucasian” as and ancestry response. Table 1.16 shows
the results for adults. Columns (1)-(4) display results for the “Excluded” sample, columns
(5)-(8) display results for the “Adjusted” sample, and columns (9)-(12) display results for a
“Combined” sample which includes everyone who declared Black/White ancestry in 2011-
2013. The results from the “Combined” sample are most directly comparable to Table 1.5
since the specification is the same and only the years in the sample differ. Comparing the
2011-2013 results to the 2001-2013 results, the difference that stands out the most is that
employed fraction is not significantly associated with race choice in the 2011-2013 sample,
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suggesting that the association is strongest in earlier years.
When comparing the “Excluded” and “Adjusted” samples for 2011-2013, relative risk
ratios tend to point in the same direction although magnitude and significance levels do
vary. Comparing column (1) to column (5), the education values indicate that, for both
samples, less educated individuals are more likely to declare as Black race. Consistent
with earlier findings, younger individuals are less likely to declare as monoracial Black only.
Individuals in the three southern divisions are more likely to declare as Black. Strangely,
there are strong opposing year effects. For the “Excluded” sample Wald tests indicate an
increase in the likelihood of declaring black from 2011 and 2012, while the “Adjusted” sample
shows the opposite. Perhaps these and other minor differences may be attributable to the
relatively small sample. These comparisons show that between individuals who do and do
not use “White/Caucasian” to report their Black/White ancestry do not differ greatly in
which factors are associated with their choice of race.28
One can make the argument that individuals may migrate to areas that align with their
racial declarations, meaning that attitude toward race may drive both division of residence
and choice of race. To examine this possibility I reran the above specifications for those with
Black/White ancestry using division of birth in place of division of residence. An individual
certainly has no choice on location of birth, however it is still possible that family attitudes
towards race could drive both an individual’s choice of race and location of birth. Replacing
place of residence with place of birth does not have a substantial effects on the estimates. As
an example I repeat the specification of Table 1.5 with the 2001-2013 sample of adults but
replace division of residence with division of birth. These results are shown in Appendix Table
F.2. Southern division effects for both Black and White race are stronger when using division
of birth rather than division of residence, in other words, both monoracial categories are more
likely in the three southern divisions relative Black/White race. Employment fraction for
Black compared to Black/White becomes marginally significant (p = 0.092) with the birth
28I also examined full time working adults in 2011-2013 with Black/White ancestry (not included here but
available upon request). One significant difference when comparing these results to Table 1.7, the 2001-2013
“Adjusted” sample, is that higher log hourly wages do not lead to choosing Black/White race relative to
Black in the “Excluded” 2011-2013 sample as it does in the “Adjusted” and “Combined” 2011-2013 samples.
Other results are similar between the “Excluded” and “Adjusted” 2011-2013 samples and are very similar
to results in Table 1.7.
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division specification compared to the residence specification (p = 0.038) but the effect is still
in the correct direction. In other regressions that repeat specifications shown in Tables 1.6 -
1.8, the stronger southern effects on division remain and significance levels on employment
fraction and log hourly wages remain the same when comparing division of birth and division
of residence.29
1.8 Conclusion
Race is typically viewed in the economics literature as an immutable trait. Recent work
has shown that large policy changes, such as bans in affirmative action (Antman and Duncan,
2014), and seminal life events, such as incarceration (Saperstein and Penner, 2010), can
change how individuals self-identify their race. However, other strong, but everyday factors
may also influence race selection. I presented a model here that can explain just how certain
cultural and economic factors could influence race and provided some empirical evidence
that these factors are indeed associated with the racial self-identification of a nationally
representative sample of mixed-ancestry Americans.
While these empirical results do establish a relationship between cultural and socioeco-
nomic factors with racial choice among mixed-ancestry Americans, under the current set-up
I cannot claim that a causal relationship exists with wages, educational attainment, or em-
ployment fraction influencing the choice of race. These associations are consistent with the
model, but there are also plausible alternative explanations for these findings.
The literature on skin tone and wages (Hersch (2008), Hersch (2011), Goldsmith et al.
(2007)) finds that skin tone and phenotype influence socioeconomic outcomes, as discrimina-
tion based on skin tone and phenotype can reduce wages. Skin tone and phenotype may also
dictate the choice of race, meaning that skin tone could be an omitted factor that influences
both socioeconomic outcomes and race. However, it is unlikely that skin tone drives all the
associations attributed to culture found here. For example, the mixed-race population is
probably not becoming light skinned as rapidly as the year effect differences between 2006
and 2011 would imply. Alternatively, both socioeconomic factors and racial choice could
29These tables not included here, but are available upon request.
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influenced by family background, as more educated parents may influence their children by
simultaneously passing along nuanced views of mixed-racial identity and encouraging human
capital development.
This work still contributes to the budding literature on mixed-race identity in several
ways. Previous work has shown that identifying the population of mixed-race individuals is
difficult, depending on the measure of multiracial identity, as self-report may only provide
a subset of the desired population. Using the technique utilized by Gullickson and Morning
to identify a larger set mixed-ancestry Americans, I present evidence that certain cultural
and socioeconomic factors are indeed associated with the choice of race. This shows how
even counting the mixed-race population through self-report can be systematically biased.
Individuals in the south will be undercounted, as well as older individuals. Metropolitan areas
and areas with higher concentrations of Blacks will also have an undercount of multiracials
by self-report. Mixed-race individuals with less education, lower wages, and less attachment
to the work force are more likely to identify as monoracial. These selection problems may
be larger for men than for women.
This evidence also shows that attempting to measure outcomes for multiracials is difficult
using measures of self-report. For the reasons stated above, measuring educational attain-
ment of multiracials may be biased up, as some lower educated multiracials may select out
of multiracial identity. Likewise, measures of employment and wages could be biased in the
same direction. As this mixed-ancestry population grows, these issues could even expand to
biasing socioeconomic measures of monoracial groups, as mixed-ancestry individuals select
into and out of monoracial identities in systematic ways.
This paper builds on ideas from Akerlof and Kranton’s general social identity model to
construct a framework that describes how selection into and out of multiracial identity might
be driven by the identity tie between actions and racial categories. This framework describes
how individuals near racial prescriptive boundaries may make their decisions, and shows how
this decision process could lead to biased overall measures of socioeconomic outcomes for
racial groups.
Future work could attempt to test the stronger predictions of the model with a large
data set of multiracials containing measures of skin tone. The model predicts that among
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mixed-ancestry individuals who declare as mixed race, those with darker skin tone should,
on-average, have more education and more labor force attachment than those with lighter
skin tone. This finding would lend strong support to the model, as it would show an identity
choice effect large enough to overcome the evidence of discrimination based on skin tone,
where lighter skinned individuals have higher wages than darker skinned individuals. Such a
data set could also test the prediction of the model that, holding skin tone and other factors
constant, a mixed-ancestry individual’s choice of race would vary with how her education,
wages, or more labor force attachment fit with prescriptions of racial norms.
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Table 1.1: Self-Identified Race by Ancestry
ANCESTRY
White Black Black/White Asian Asian/White
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
RACE
White 6,031,333 99.45 4,652 0.48 1,487 8.99 6,050 5.20 8,206 31.51
Black 6,936 0.11 962,172 98.61 6,841 41.38 449 0.39 57 0.22
Native 2,201 0.04 464 0.05 9 0.05 88 0.08 15 0.06
Asian 1,411 0.02 239 0.02 16 0.10 97,376 83.66 2,850 10.94
Other 1,639 0.03 560 0.06 315 1.91 190 0.16 181 0.70
White/Black 2,680 0.04 4,363 0.45 6,510 39.38 23 0.02 11 0.04
White/Native 13,173 0.22 40 0.00 22 0.13 24 0.02 25 0.10
White/Asian 2,773 0.05 18 0.00 14 0.08 8,219 7.06 13,378 51.37
White/Other 1,240 0.02 15 0.00 50 0.30 13 0.01 21 0.08
Black/Native 77 0.00 1,779 0.18 119 0.72 6 0.01 1 0.00
Black/Asian 19 0.00 351 0.04 13 0.08 337 0.29 18 0.07
Black/Other 15 0.00 313 0.03 47 0.28 3 0.00 1 0.00
Asian/Native 9 0.00 2 0.00 97 0.08 13 0.05
Asian/Other 19 0.00 8 0.00 3 0.02 140 0.12 30 0.12
Other/Native 13 0.00 4 0.00 2 0.01 1 0.00
Three or More 968 0.02 723 0.07 1085 6.56 3375 2.9 1234 4.74
Total 6,064,506 100 975,703 100 16,533 100 116,391 100 26,041 100
Source: Pooled 2001-2013 ACS
The sample consists of native-born, non-Hispanic adults, ages 25-54
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Table 1.2: Top Black/White Ancestry Responses By Race, 2001-2013
Ancestry Frequency Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Black/White Race
African-American and German 878 18.22 18.22
African-American and Irish 776 16.10 34.32
African-American and Italian 606 12.57 46.89
African-American and English 286 5.93 52.82
African-American and French 230 4.77 57.59
African-American and Polish 171 3.55 61.14
African-American and European, nec 149 3.09 64.23
African-American and Dutch 108 2.24 66.47
African and German 96 1.99 68.46
African-American and Scottish 89 1.85 70.31
White Race
African-American and French 140 10.89 10.89
African-American and German 108 8.40 19.28
African-American and Irish 106 8.24 27.53
African-American and Italian 72 5.60 33.13
African-American and English 53 4.12 37.25
African-American and Polish 21 1.63 38.88
Acadian and African-American 20 1.56 40.44
African and European, nec 20 1.56 41.99
English and Jamaican 20 1.56 43.55
African-American and Scottish 19 1.48 45.02
Black Race
African-American and Irish 1,026 18.68 18.68
African-American and French 809 14.73 33.41
African-American and German 588 10.70 44.11
African-American and Italian 545 9.92 54.03
African-American and English 368 6.70 60.73
African and Irish 226 4.11 64.85
African and French 142 2.59 67.43
African-American and Portuguese 139 2.53 69.96
African-American and European, nec 107 1.95 71.91
African and European, nec 104 1.89 73.80
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013
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Table 1.3: Top Asian/White Ancestry Responses By Race, 2001-2013
Ancestry Frequency Percent Cumulative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Asian/White Race
German and Japanese 779 6.85 6.85
Filipino and German 597 5.25 12.10
Irish and Japanese 566 4.98 17.08
Filipino and Irish 505 4.44 21.52
Hawaiian and Portuguese 433 3.81 25.32
English and Japanese 390 3.43 28.75
German and Korean 312 2.74 31.50
Chinese and German 298 2.62 34.12
Chinese and Irish 252 2.22 36.33
Irish and Korean 237 2.08 38.42
White Race
German and Japanese 578 7.50 7.50
Filipino and German 408 5.30 12.80
Irish and Japanese 375 4.87 17.66
Dutch and Indonesian 329 4.27 21.93
Filipino and Irish 324 4.21 26.14
English and Japanese 211 2.74 28.88
Filipino and Italian 184 2.39 31.27
Hawaiian and Portuguese 181 2.35 33.61
German and Hawaiian 174 2.26 35.87
Chinese and German 173 2.25 38.12
Asian Race
Hawaiian and Portuguese 265 10.12 10.12
Dutch and Indonesian 137 5.23 15.35
Filipino and German 136 5.19 20.54
German and Japanese 122 4.66 25.20
Filipino and Irish 110 4.20 29.40
Irish and Japanese 109 4.16 33.56
German and Hawaiian 90 3.44 37.00
Filipino and Portuguese 76 2.90 39.90
Filipino and Italian 57 2.18 42.08
German and Korean 53 2.02 44.10
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013
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Table 1.4: Demographics of Adults with Black/White Ancestry by Race, Ages 25-54, 2001-
2013 Sample
Black Black/White White
(1) (2) (3)
Years of Schooling 14.06 14.22 14.04
Fraction College Graduates 0.27 0.33 0.32
Age 37.95 33.81 37.30
Potential Experience 17.89 13.59 17.26
Married 0.36 0.36 0.51
Own Children in Household 0.99 0.89 0.95
Female 0.55 0.52 0.53
Phone/Personal Interview 0.36 0.32 0.26
Employed Last Week 0.74 0.78 0.76
Employment Fraction 0.76 0.79 0.80
Log Hourly Wages* 2.54 2.59 2.62
Number of Observations 5,493 4,820 1,286
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013. Values are population weighted.
*Log Hourly Wages only for those with some employment
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Table 1.5: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White, Adults Aged 25-54,
2001-2013 Sample
Black White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.955 (0.197) 0.630** (0.141)
East North Central 1.331 (0.256) 0.627** (0.137)
West North Central 1.037 (0.256) 0.854 (0.172)
South Atlantic 2.125*** (0.435) 1.273 (0.443)
East South Central 3.151*** (0.982) 1.498* (0.327)
West South Central 3.302*** (1.017) 1.768 (0.642)
Mountain 1.082 (0.253) 1.101 (0.243)
Pacific 0.857 (0.176) 0.673** (0.121)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.044 (0.136) 0.829 (0.175)
2005-2006 0.958 (0.190) 0.707 (0.173)
2007-2008 0.655** (0.124) 0.427*** (0.095)
2009-2010 0.516*** (0.084) 0.444*** (0.101)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.474*** (0.074) 0.391*** (0.085)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.520*** (0.039) 0.658*** (0.065)
45-54 1.888*** (0.151) 2.089*** (0.202)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 1.101 (0.203) 1.257 (0.200)
High School Degree 1.303*** (0.102) 0.965 (0.097)
Master’s Degree 1.009 (0.159) 0.730 (0.174)
Professional Degree 0.695* (0.134) 1.098 (0.318)
PhD 1.057 (0.228) 0.982 (0.365)
Employment Fraction 0.868** (0.059) 1.029 (0.102)
Female 1.061 (0.074) 1.015 (0.095)
Observations 11,599
Pseudo R2 0.0659
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.6: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White, Adults Aged 25-54,
2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
Black White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.752 (0.165) 0.912 (0.229)
East North Central 1.054 (0.222) 0.913 (0.245)
West North Central 1.123 (0.224) 1.128 (0.298)
South Atlantic 1.347* (0.228) 2.062*** (0.553)
East South Central 1.379 (0.303) 0.915 (0.323)
West South Central 1.934*** (0.426) 2.141** (0.748)
Mountain 1.157 (0.268) 1.120 (0.319)
Pacific 0.932 (0.174) 1.007 (0.292)
Year (2005 Excluded)
2006 1.024 (0.145) 1.246 (0.248)
2007 0.744** (0.093) 0.721 (0.145)
2008 0.646*** (0.081) 0.703* (0.138)
2009 0.537*** (0.069) 0.807 (0.159)
2010 0.555*** (0.079) 0.716* (0.142)
2011 0.602*** (0.085) 0.768 (0.147)
Age (35-39 Excluded)
25-29 0.587*** (0.060) 0.758* (0.125)
30-34 0.665*** (0.073) 0.801 (0.134)
40-44 1.375** (0.184) 1.654** (0.324)
45-49 1.716*** (0.253) 2.540*** (0.489)
49-54 2.992*** (0.429) 3.525*** (0.640)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
Less than High School 1.485 (0.635) 2.060 (0.908)
Some High School 1.298 (0.234) 1.490 (0.393)
High School Degree 1.361*** (0.161) 1.298 (0.255)
Some College 1.320*** (0.135) 0.887 (0.157)
Associate’s Degree 1.233* (0.156) 0.905 (0.183)
Master’s Degree 0.977 (0.124) 0.695 (0.169)
Professional 0.718 (0.178) 0.846 (0.251)
Doctorate 1.186 (0.371) 1.002 (0.441)
Employment Fraction 0.910 (0.070) 1.078 (0.132)
Female 0.994 (0.066) 1.045 (0.101)
Metropolitan Resident 1.444*** (0.142) 0.835 (0.156)
Phone/Personal Interview 2.271*** (0.177) 1.206* (0.117)
Proportion Black (Standardized) 1.507*** (0.067) 0.732*** (0.064)
Proportion Black/White (Standardized) 0.555*** (0.026) 0.380*** (0.030)
Observations 7,569
Pseudo R2 0.171
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by metropolitan
area. Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2011.
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Table 1.7: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White, Full Time Workers 25-54,
2001-2013 Sample
Black White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.938 (0.178) 0.791 (0.266)
East North Central 1.381* (0.266) 0.777 (0.205)
West North Central 0.977 (0.216) 1.146 (0.301)
South Atlantic 2.058*** (0.400) 1.533 (0.570)
East South Central 3.443*** (0.859) 1.662* (0.464)
West South Central 3.248*** (1.120) 1.962* (0.801)
Mountain 0.983 (0.238) 1.077 (0.350)
Pacific 0.821 (0.150) 0.678 (0.167)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.241 (0.183) 0.925 (0.239)
2005-2006 1.126 (0.245) 0.866 (0.268)
2007-2008 0.704 (0.184) 0.475** (0.155)
2009-2010 0.565*** (0.105) 0.529** (0.140)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.520*** (0.094) 0.455*** (0.130)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.497*** (0.042) 0.654*** (0.070)
45-54 2.062*** (0.166) 2.209*** (0.276)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 0.857 (0.197) 0.969 (0.312)
High School Degree 1.264** (0.145) 1.030 (0.119)
Master’s Degree 1.132 (0.187) 0.855 (0.196)
Professional Degree 0.778 (0.177) 0.918 (0.273)
PhD 1.026 (0.235) 0.727 (0.347)
Log Hourly Wages 0.797*** (0.047) 0.994 (0.077)
Female 1.073 (0.096) 0.878 (0.119)
Observations 7,735
Pseudo R2 0.0717
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.8: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White, Full Time Working
Adults 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
Black White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.820 (0.249) 0.911 (0.264)
East North Central 1.091 (0.307) 0.877 (0.261)
West North Central 1.155 (0.315) 1.181 (0.408)
South Atlantic 1.395 (0.347) 1.931** (0.557)
East South Central 1.678* (0.516) 1.007 (0.427)
West South Central 2.143*** (0.604) 1.808* (0.649)
Mountain 1.217 (0.364) 1.008 (0.368)
Pacific 0.951 (0.262) 0.890 (0.277)
Year (2005 Excluded)
2006 1.045 (0.152) 1.224 (0.280)
2007 0.748* (0.111) 0.670* (0.161)
2008 0.593*** (0.088) 0.655* (0.147)
2009 0.508*** (0.079) 0.799 (0.188)
2010 0.552*** (0.092) 0.741 (0.169)
2011 0.536*** (0.095) 0.692* (0.145)
Age (35-39 Excluded)
25-29 0.613*** (0.085) 0.731 (0.141)
30-34 0.703** (0.101) 0.672* (0.142)
40-44 1.435** (0.247) 1.324 (0.297)
45-49 1.862*** (0.371) 2.211*** (0.537)
49-54 3.032*** (0.448) 3.075*** (0.708)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
Less than High School 2.917* (1.791) 1.236 (0.731)
Some High School 1.174 (0.321) 1.945* (0.684)
High School Degree 1.585*** (0.231) 1.553* (0.366)
Some College 1.343** (0.176) 1.014 (0.219)
Associate’s Degree 1.253 (0.193) 1.183 (0.291)
Master’s Degree 1.173 (0.173) 0.823 (0.212)
Professional 0.871 (0.228) 0.898 (0.309)
Doctorate 1.099 (0.348) 0.574 (0.308)
Log Hourly Wages 0.880* (0.063) 1.045 (0.111)
Female 1.065 (0.091) 0.871 (0.109)
Metropolitan Resident 1.476*** (0.187) 0.834 (0.154)
Phone/Personal Interview 2.220*** (0.202) 1.002 (0.122)
Proportion Black (Standardized) 1.481*** (0.073) 0.766*** (0.077)
Proportion Black/White (Standardized) 0.571*** (0.036) 0.376*** (0.035)
Observations 5,052
Pseudo R2 0.168
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by metropolitan
area. Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2011.
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Table 1.9: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White by Gender, Adults Aged 25-54, 2001-2013 Sample
Males Females
Black White Black White
RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.788 (0.249) 0.807 (0.106) 1.140 (0.219) 0.523* (0.182)
East North Central 1.053 (0.250) 0.847 (0.161) 1.636** (0.315) 0.491*** (0.129)
West North Central 0.883 (0.196) 0.902 (0.175) 1.210 (0.409) 0.829 (0.230)
South Atlantic 1.678** (0.408) 1.602 (0.539) 2.638*** (0.535) 1.076 (0.394)
East South Central 2.096** (0.638) 1.709*** (0.275) 4.544*** (1.622) 1.405 (0.429)
West South Central 3.157*** (0.856) 2.942*** (0.762) 3.564*** (1.360) 1.158 (0.574)
Mountain 0.987 (0.287) 0.859 (0.270) 1.145 (0.248) 1.319 (0.374)
Pacific 0.799 (0.172) 0.873 (0.112) 0.925 (0.223) 0.543** (0.131)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.242 (0.238) 0.652* (0.147) 0.898 (0.164) 1.006 (0.288)
2005-2006 0.961 (0.245) 0.574** (0.143) 0.980 (0.208) 0.821 (0.283)
2007-2008 0.687* (0.156) 0.363*** (0.075) 0.646* (0.149) 0.472** (0.146)
2009-2010 0.519*** (0.096) 0.344*** (0.066) 0.523*** (0.121) 0.541* (0.200)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.488*** (0.099) 0.305*** (0.065) 0.469*** (0.089) 0.474** (0.141)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.562*** (0.061) 0.602*** (0.080) 0.489*** (0.046) 0.697** (0.103)
45-54 2.101*** (0.241) 2.092*** (0.383) 1.725*** (0.175) 2.110*** (0.269)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 0.841 (0.172) 1.021 (0.224) 1.393 (0.305) 1.575** (0.335)
High School Degree 1.103 (0.132) 0.794* (0.096) 1.501*** (0.108) 1.129 (0.172)
Master’s Degree 0.940 (0.232) 0.702 (0.224) 1.095 (0.150) 0.740 (0.229)
Professional Degree 0.406*** (0.090) 0.685 (0.274) 0.993 (0.235) 1.543 (0.551)
PhD 0.989 (0.430) 0.850 (0.452) 1.112 (0.286) 1.165 (0.476)
Employed Fraction 0.748*** (0.053) 1.326** (0.169) 0.979 (0.100) 0.834 (0.126)
Observations 5,198 6,401
Pseudo R2 0.0679 0.0729
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Ancestry adjusted
for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.10: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White by Gender, Full-time Workers Aged 25-54, 2001-2013
Sample
Males Females
Black White Black White
RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.711 (0.217) 0.720* (0.122) 1.298 (0.273) 0.852 (0.467)
East North Central 1.026 (0.225) 0.798 (0.188) 1.940*** (0.401) 0.725 (0.315)
West North Central 0.798 (0.151) 0.945 (0.215) 1.288 (0.411) 1.331 (0.550)
South Atlantic 1.565** (0.334) 1.375 (0.435) 2.856*** (0.603) 1.670 (0.785)
East South Central 2.153*** (0.498) 1.452 (0.483) 5.958*** (1.692) 1.959 (0.953)
West South Central 3.401*** (0.963) 2.961*** (0.742) 3.554*** (1.503) 1.246 (0.866)
Mountain 0.805 (0.226) 0.643 (0.189) 1.257 (0.296) 1.785 (0.794)
Pacific 0.798 (0.144) 0.757* (0.113) 0.899 (0.200) 0.576 (0.237)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.489* (0.352) 0.832 (0.222) 0.988 (0.255) 1.010 (0.430)
2005-2006 1.082 (0.279) 0.786 (0.235) 1.177 (0.319) 0.894 (0.399)
2007-2008 0.730 (0.207) 0.468** (0.142) 0.693 (0.231) 0.451* (0.187)
2009-2010 0.573*** (0.117) 0.442*** (0.081) 0.568** (0.163) 0.597 (0.283)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.536*** (0.124) 0.397*** (0.110) 0.512*** (0.123) 0.495* (0.190)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.598*** (0.068) 0.575*** (0.095) 0.421*** (0.047) 0.763* (0.122)
45-54 2.582*** (0.336) 2.346*** (0.498) 1.689*** (0.199) 2.190*** (0.374)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 0.645 (0.188) 0.732 (0.314) 1.176 (0.300) 1.297 (0.472)
High School Degree 1.023 (0.164) 0.798 (0.129) 1.569*** (0.173) 1.341* (0.212)
Master’s Degree 1.016 (0.308) 0.727 (0.254) 1.268* (0.174) 0.991 (0.264)
Professional Degree 0.505*** (0.132) 0.536 (0.230) 1.022 (0.310) 1.365 (0.630)
PhD 1.018 (0.462) 0.660 (0.441) 1.068 (0.290) 0.873 (0.447)
Log Hourly Wages 0.732*** (0.061) 1.050 (0.087) 0.892 (0.070) 0.916 (0.117)
Observations 3,686 4,049
Pseudo R2 0.0714 0.0839
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Ancestry adjusted
for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.11: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Asian/White, Adults Aged 25-54,
2001-2013 Sample
Asian White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.983 (0.273) 0.927 (0.089)
East North Central 1.026 (0.252) 0.788 (0.130)
West North Central 0.952 (0.270) 0.795 (0.158)
South Atlantic 0.950 (0.241) 1.010 (0.148)
East South Central 0.928 (0.257) 1.325 (0.249)
West South Central 1.095 (0.283) 1.043 (0.162)
Mountain 1.165 (0.307) 0.810** (0.082)
Pacific 0.866 (0.212) 0.386*** (0.120)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.343* (0.225) 1.003 (0.095)
2005-2006 1.403*** (0.175) 0.951 (0.071)
2007-2008 1.070 (0.127) 0.709*** (0.074)
2009-2010 0.839 (0.094) 0.615*** (0.056)
2011-2012 0.819 (0.129) 0.578*** (0.064)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.892* (0.056) 0.811*** (0.040)
45-54 1.026 (0.076) 1.189*** (0.075)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 1.661*** (0.264) 2.266*** (0.428)
High School Degree 1.434*** (0.086) 1.511*** (0.133)
Master’s Degree 0.791** (0.081) 0.812*** (0.063)
Professional Degree 0.876 (0.132) 0.643*** (0.097)
PhD 0.893 (0.189) 0.467*** (0.087)
Employment Fraction 1.148* (0.090) 1.034 (0.036)
Female 0.887** (0.054) 0.968 (0.032)
Observations 21,697
Pseudo R2 0.0370
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.12: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Asian/White, Adults Aged 25-54,
2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
Asian White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.816 (0.146) 1.033 (0.094)
East North Central 1.003 (0.190) 0.750** (0.099)
West North Central 0.708 (0.183) 0.638** (0.119)
South Atlantic 0.805 (0.156) 1.101 (0.136)
East South Central 0.897 (0.204) 1.321* (0.214)
West South Central 1.022 (0.225) 1.088 (0.146)
Mountain 1.061 (0.220) 0.928 (0.110)
Pacific 0.773 (0.140) 0.725** (0.096)
Year (2005 Excluded)
2006 1.167 (0.141) 0.970 (0.077)
2007 0.889 (0.107) 0.790** (0.072)
2008 0.716*** (0.079) 0.661*** (0.060)
2009 0.591*** (0.068) 0.619*** (0.055)
2010 0.655*** (0.084) 0.631*** (0.067)
2011 0.637*** (0.075) 0.597*** (0.053)
Age (35-39 Excluded)
25-29 0.871 (0.076) 0.958 (0.063)
30-34 0.739*** (0.067) 0.853** (0.061)
40-44 1.104 (0.100) 1.231** (0.110)
45-49 0.983 (0.106) 1.290*** (0.100)
49-54 1.421*** (0.177) 1.872*** (0.189)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
Less than High School 3.818** (2.253) 3.312*** (0.998)
Some High School 1.430 (0.313) 2.037*** (0.256)
High School Degree 1.467*** (0.154) 1.819*** (0.156)
Some College 1.470*** (0.133) 1.325*** (0.090)
Associate’s Degree 1.343** (0.169) 1.347*** (0.130)
Master’s Degree 0.916 (0.107) 0.804** (0.081)
Professional 0.865 (0.152) 0.659*** (0.096)
Doctorate 1.152 (0.333) 0.551*** (0.119)
Employment Fraction 1.200* (0.113) 1.032 (0.059)
Female 0.931 (0.063) 1.006 (0.044)
Metropolitan Resident 0.878 (0.110) 0.795** (0.079)
Phone/Personal Interview 2.264*** (0.256) 1.819*** (0.160)
Proportion Asian (Standardized) 1.083** (0.042) 0.962 (0.030)
Proportion Asian/White (Standardized) 0.907*** (0.033) 0.752** (0.095)
Observations 14,164
Pseudo R2 0.0846
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by metropolitan
area. Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2011.
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Table 1.13: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Asian/White, Full Time Workers
25-54, 2001-2013 Sample
Asian White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 1.109 (0.287) 0.935 (0.119)
East North Central 1.231 (0.308) 0.852 (0.170)
West North Central 0.956 (0.324) 0.804 (0.179)
South Atlantic 1.153 (0.293) 1.106 (0.186)
East South Central 0.941 (0.306) 1.447** (0.243)
West South Central 1.195 (0.310) 1.051 (0.193)
Mountain 1.357 (0.379) 0.847 (0.117)
Pacific 0.995 (0.257) 0.405*** (0.132)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.191 (0.186) 1.022 (0.104)
2005-2006 1.329** (0.171) 0.922 (0.069)
2007-2008 1.026 (0.094) 0.695*** (0.069)
2009-2010 0.767** (0.088) 0.588*** (0.053)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.782 (0.130) 0.548*** (0.055)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.870** (0.060) 0.846** (0.060)
45-54 1.030 (0.079) 1.253*** (0.091)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 1.827*** (0.351) 2.292*** (0.513)
High School Degree 1.477*** (0.113) 1.515*** (0.146)
Master’s Degree 0.787** (0.079) 0.839** (0.069)
Professional Degree 0.818 (0.163) 0.640*** (0.106)
PhD 0.968 (0.240) 0.500*** (0.084)
Log Hourly Wages 1.045 (0.053) 1.011 (0.058)
Female 0.927 (0.046) 0.942* (0.034)
Observations 15,204
Pseudo R2 0.0379
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2013.
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Table 1.14: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Asian/White, Full Time Working
Adults 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
Asian White
RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.936 (0.144) 1.090 (0.153)
East North Central 1.051 (0.182) 0.805 (0.131)
West North Central 0.668 (0.173) 0.662* (0.163)
South Atlantic 0.962 (0.155) 1.183 (0.182)
East South Central 0.837 (0.185) 1.370 (0.295)
West South Central 1.036 (0.200) 1.200 (0.198)
Mountain 1.081 (0.249) 0.951 (0.135)
Pacific 0.936 (0.137) 0.807 (0.139)
Year (2005 Excluded)
2006 1.203 (0.188) 0.973 (0.107)
2007 0.889 (0.127) 0.816* (0.100)
2008 0.728*** (0.088) 0.656*** (0.070)
2009 0.560*** (0.077) 0.598*** (0.066)
2010 0.640*** (0.088) 0.623*** (0.081)
2011 0.640*** (0.089) 0.552*** (0.062)
Age (35-39 Excluded)
25-29 0.825* (0.092) 0.991 (0.075)
30-34 0.750** (0.087) 0.845** (0.071)
40-44 1.193 (0.131) 1.283** (0.133)
45-49 1.009 (0.133) 1.349*** (0.124)
49-54 1.482** (0.232) 2.069*** (0.223)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
Less than High School 1.862 (0.965) 2.635* (1.364)
Some High School 1.477 (0.374) 1.902*** (0.406)
High School Degree 1.350** (0.168) 1.799*** (0.174)
Some College 1.447*** (0.136) 1.280*** (0.103)
Associate’s Degree 1.256 (0.180) 1.381*** (0.155)
Master’s Degree 0.929 (0.112) 0.828* (0.093)
Professional 0.934 (0.196) 0.716** (0.119)
Doctorate 1.166 (0.386) 0.644* (0.145)
Log Hourly Wages 0.972 (0.073) 0.966 (0.038)
Female 0.970 (0.071) 0.984 (0.054)
Metropolitan Resident 0.777* (0.104) 0.744*** (0.080)
Phone/Personal Interview 2.383*** (0.302) 1.817*** (0.179)
Proportion Asian (Standardized) 1.074** (0.039) 0.961 (0.032)
Proportion Asian/White (Standardized) 0.891*** (0.032) 0.735** (0.106)
Observations 9,978
Pseudo R2 0.0880
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered by metropolitan
area. Ancestry adjusted for 2010-2011.
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Table 1.15: Demographics of Adults with Black/White Ancestry by Race and Excluded and
Adjusted Status, Ages 25-54, 2011-2013 Sample
Black Black/White White
Excl Adj Excl Adj Excl Adj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years of Schooling 13.81 14.07 13.89 14.32 13.41 14.21
Fraction College Graduates 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.33 0.20 0.31
Age 38.08 37.75 34.16 34.52 36.73 37.56
Potential Experience 18.26 17.68 14.27 14.20 17.31 17.35
Married 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.48
Own Children in Household 1.07 0.99 0.93 0.88 0.76 0.86
Female 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.44 0.56
Phone/Computer Assisted 0.59 0.72 0.31 0.55 0.66 0.59
Employed Last Week 0.71 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.74
Employment Fraction 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.80 0.78
Log Hourly Wages* 2.51 2.46 2.48 2.56 2.41 2.52
Number of Observations 665 1,703 1,112 1,935 82 379
*Log Hourly Wages only for those with some employment
Excluded sample consists of individuals with Black/White ancestry, where one
ancestry response is “White/Caucasian.” Adjusted sample consists of all other
individuals with Black/White ancestry that do not fit into the this category.
Values are population weighted.
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Table 1.16: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Comparing Excluded, Adjusted, and Combined Black/White Ancestry, Adults Aged
25-54, 2011-2013 Sample
Excluded Adjusted Combined
Black White Black White Black White
RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 0.673 (0.186) 0.125*** (0.097) 1.022 (0.188) 0.413** (0.167) 0.917 (0.171) 0.351*** (0.111)
East North Central 0.735 (0.183) 0.584 (0.391) 1.206 (0.161) 0.451* (0.199) 0.997 (0.124) 0.447** (0.150)
West North Central 0.969 (0.273) 0.499 (0.498) 0.758 (0.220) 0.412** (0.178) 0.789 (0.204) 0.429** (0.165)
South Atlantic 1.994*** (0.481) 0.389 (0.266) 2.144*** (0.301) 1.083 (0.528) 1.996*** (0.300) 0.828 (0.310)
East South Central 2.381* (1.119) 0.266 (0.250) 2.607*** (0.853) 1.228 (0.523) 2.393** (0.853) 0.791 (0.236)
West South Central 2.027*** (0.493) 1.330 (0.850) 3.161*** (0.967) 1.341 (0.517) 2.665*** (0.724) 1.254 (0.330)
Mountain 0.633 (0.182) 0.575 (0.406) 0.963 (0.184) 1.122 (0.517) 0.814 (0.138) 0.893 (0.301)
Pacific 0.624** (0.120) 0.440 (0.279) 0.812 (0.172) 0.509 (0.226) 0.731** (0.117) 0.456*** (0.137)
Year Category (2011 Excluded)
2012 1.386** (0.215) 0.739 (0.346) 0.813** (0.081) 1.019 (0.212) 0.950 (0.060) 0.987 (0.163)
2013 1.220 (0.204) 0.943 (0.326) 0.719*** (0.065) 0.759* (0.107) 0.852** (0.053) 0.813 (0.105)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.484*** (0.068) 0.616 (0.244) 0.670*** (0.076) 1.042 (0.168) 0.606*** (0.051) 0.924 (0.138)
45-54 1.448* (0.274) 1.327 (0.488) 1.911*** (0.265) 2.941*** (0.572) 1.759*** (0.196) 2.540*** (0.453)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 1.730** (0.406) 1.796 (0.873) 1.225 (0.372) 1.362 (0.488) 1.345 (0.287) 1.414 (0.407)
High School Degree 1.413** (0.210) 1.809 (0.657) 1.370** (0.196) 1.102 (0.245) 1.358*** (0.151) 1.160 (0.218)
Master’s Degree 0.787 (0.234) 1.243 (0.681) 1.088 (0.277) 0.770 (0.219) 0.989 (0.177) 0.831 (0.200)
Professional Degree 0.688 (0.423) 1.984 (1.586) 0.684 (0.204) 1.340 (0.766) 0.709 (0.228) 1.351 (0.664)
PhD 1.138 (0.797) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.449 (0.238) 1.518 (0.768) 0.567* (0.181) 1.465 (0.776)
Employed Fraction 0.981 (0.139) 1.400 (0.392) 0.964 (0.086) 1.151 (0.161) 0.985 (0.073) 1.209 (0.165)
Female 1.201 (0.154) 0.701 (0.231) 1.066 (0.092) 1.140 (0.159) 1.100 (0.069) 1.035 (0.146)
Observations 1,859 4,017 5,876
Pseudo R2 0.0866 0.0583 0.0578
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level.
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Figure 1.1: US Biracial Population, 2000-2013
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Figure 1.2: Census/American Community Survey Race Question
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Figure 1.3: Census/American Community Survey Ancestry Question
Figure 1.4: Census/American Community Survey Hispanic Origin Question
Figure 1.5: Skin Tone/Phenotype Identity Line
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Figure 1.6: Utility for Identity and Action Choices (cj, aj) when vj = 0
Figure 1.7: Identity and Action Choices (cj, aj) with CL = CLR = CR = 0
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Figure 1.8: Identity and Action Choices (cj, aj) with CL = .2, CLR = .1, and CR = 0
Figure 1.9: Identity “Switching” Areas
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Figure 1.10: Predictions of Race by Division, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Adults
Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.11: Predictions of Race by Year, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Adults
Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.12: Predictions of Race by Age, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Adults Aged
25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.13: Predictions of Race by Expanded Education, Conditional on Black/White
Ancestry, Adults Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.14: Predictions of Race by Division, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Full
Time Working Adults Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.15: Predictions of Race by Year, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Full Time
Working Adults Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.16: Predictions of Race by Age, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Full Time
Working Adults Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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Figure 1.17: Predictions of Race by Education, Conditional on Black/White Ancestry, Full
Time Working Adults Aged 25-54, 2005-2011 Sample, Expanded Categories
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(a) Asian Race (b) Asian Ancestry
(c) Black Race (d) Black Ancestry
Figure 1.18: Percentage of Monoracial Adults, Quantile Scale, Summarized by PUMA, 2005-2011
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(a) Asian/White Race (b) Asian/White Ancestry
(c) Black/White Race (d) Black/White Ancestry
Figure 1.19: Percentage of Biracial Adults, Quantile Scale, Summarized by PUMA, 2005-2011
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CHAPTER II
Intergroup relations with changing social identities
(Co-authored with Roy Chen)
2.1 Introduction
The US Census Bureau projections of 2014 indicate that while non-Hispanic Whites
make up 62% of the population today, they will make up 44% of the population in 2060.
Meanwhile, nearly every other group will increase its share of the population by 2060.1 This
will mark the first time since the United States has conducted the decennial census (starting
in 1790) that the non-Hispanic White population will not constitute a majority in the US
(Gibson and Jung, 2005). If these trends continue, Hispanics, who are projected to make up
31% of the population in 2060, will eventually become the majority group in the US.
This phenomenon of majority groups becoming minority groups and vice-versa is not
uncommon in recent history. In the US, within certain occupations, such as pharmacists
and accountants/auditors (Hegewisch and Hartmann, 2014), female workers have gone from
minorities to majorities. The 2010 census shows that fewer than half of all adults are married
for the first time in at least a century. Even more recently, supporters of gay marriage in the
US have quickly gone from being a minority (35% in 2001) to a majority (54% in 2014).2 The
reasons for these shifts are varied and include demographic, cultural and economic changes.
1Source: http://www.census.gov/population/projections/files/summary/NP2014-T10.xls, re-
trieved on 1/1/2015.
2Source: http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/10/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-
gay-marriage/, retrieved on 9/11/2014.
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The effects of these shifts are potentially of great importance. Groups are defined by
some shared characteristic, for example race. Through these shifts, an individual who starts
in a majority group, such as non-Hispanic Whites in the US, would not have to change her
group membership to eventually become a member of a minority group. Prislin, in several
studies, uses confederates to examine the psychological effects of these shifts in relative group
size, finding that “loss of majority position decreased perception of group-self similarity,
group attraction, and expectations for positive interactions with the group,” while, in certain
circumstances, gaining majority position made subjects “more likely to engage in out-group
hostility” (Prislin et al., 2000, 2011). In this study, we expand upon this work by providing
monetary stakes to examine how behavior rather than just attitudes, in particular intergroup
trust, are affected by these types of shifts.
We approach this topic using the framework of social identity. Social identity is the
part of a person’s sense of self that comes from her membership in social groups. Social
identity and group membership are important parts of economic decision making. There
is a great deal of work in both social psychology and economics examining how individuals
treat members of their group (ingroup) and others outside of their group (outgroup). We
study how changes in group size affect individuals’ interactions with members of both their
ingroup and their outgroup; specifically we explore how trust may change as a minority
group becomes a majority group and vice versa.
We first recognize that a group can define a social identity. This social identity can come
from any sort of shared characteristic, from shared beliefs to physical traits. The similarity
or dissimilarity of individuals along these dimensions help define the social identity. The
concept of majorities and minorities deals with the relative sizes of these groups. Therefore,
majorities and minorities exist only in the presence of social identities that separate people
into different groups. Clearly, majorities and minorities cannot exist without some social
identity that creates multiple groups.
Majority and minority identities are more easily changeable than social identities such
as race or gender. While an individual cannot easily change many of her social identities,
majority and minority identities change automatically with shifts in relative group sizes.
The demographic shift in the population of non-Hispanic White Americans discussed earlier
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is an example of this. This kind of change can also result from changing views and cultural
norms, such as attitudes toward gay marriage, as discussed earlier.
To explore the effects of relative group size shifts on intergroup relations, we run a lab-
oratory experiment with unequally sized groups, separating subjects into these laboratory-
created majority and minority groups. We use an incentivized trust game as decisions from
both parties can easily lead to equitable or inequitable payoffs which addresses issues of “fair-
ness” that often accompany real-world majority and minority interactions. Subjects interact
with their own groups (ingroup members) and subjects in other groups (outgroup members),
giving us measures of trust and trustworthiness of subjects in majority and minority groups.
We find that White subjects who are placed into minority groups are both more trusting
and more trustworthy than White subjects in majority groups. We also change the group
sizes during the experiment and find that subjects’ initial relative group sizes predict their
behavior better than their new relative group sizes.
This project adds to the economics literature of social identity by showing how changes
in relative group size affect individuals’ interactions with members of their ingroup and their
outgroup. We also find an interesting interaction between laboratory-induced and real-world
social identities. For a specific subset of our subject population, the relative size of their
group has a large effect on their trust and trustworthiness, and this effect persists even when
their group sizes are changed.
2.2 Literature Review
This work explores the interaction between majority and minority groups (which relates
to the literature on social identity) and changing group size. Both the social psychology and
economics literatures have previously dealt with these topics.
Majorities and minorities are defined by relative group size. In a population split into
two groups, the larger group is the majority, and the smaller group is the minority. If the
population is split into more than two groups, and the largest group constitutes more than
half of the population, then that group is the majority and all other groups are minorities. In
the ethnicity example described previously, since non-Hispanic Whites made up 63% of the
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population in 2012, this is currently the majority ethnic group in the US while all others are
minority groups. Notice that majorities and minorities exist only in the presence of groups
with different social identities.
The concept of social identity was first explored in social psychology. Tajfel et al. (1971)
presented evidence of ingroup bias, or the tendency for people to treat their fellow group
members better than non-group members.3 Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986) subsequently
formalized the concept of social identity. After the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) introduced these ideas to economics, other work such as that of Eckel and Grossman
(2005), Charness et al. (2007), and Chen and Li (2009) showed that induced group identity
in a laboratory setting can affect strategic decision making.
In other fields, groups with less influence and power are often simply referred to as
“minority groups.” In this paper, however, we refer to groups with different sizes as majority
and minority groups, which define majority and minority identities. We refer to groups with
different levels of influence and power as having high or low statuses.
Tanaka and Camerer (2013) explore the interaction between status and relative group size
by looking at a region in South Vietnam where over 90% of the population is Vietnamese, and
the Chinese and Khmer together make up less than 10% of the population. With an average
income that is twice that of the Vietnamese, the Chinese in the area are considered high
status, even though they make up a relatively small proportion of the population. The Khmer
are a low-income, low-status minority group in the same area. Tanaka and Camerer separate
effects of trust and patronizing behavior and find that the relatively positive treatment of
the Chinese towards the Khmer is mainly patronizing, as this positive relationship does not
extend to a task that would require trust of the Khmer.
Tsutsui and Zizzo (2013) examine how status interacts with relative group size in a
laboratory setting. They assign status to one of the groups by giving only that group a name,
the “blue” group, and telling other subjects they are not in the “blue” group. This status
difference results in more individuals with status showing more trust of others. They also
create differently sized groups, of eight and four members, to create majority and minority
3In the economics literature, treating fellow group members better refers to taking actions that increase
their payoffs, in the pyschology literature, this extends to positive evaluations of and attribution of positive
personality traits to group members.
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groups, but find no difference in their behavior. One thing to note is that they do not make
this group size difference particularly salient; they just let subjects know how many members
were in each group.
Using Tsutsui and Zizzo (2013) as a baseline, we first explore whether relative group
size can affect trust in a laboratory setting. Because they do not see any effect of relative
group size on behavior, we adjust their experimental design. First, we ensure that each
subject plays only one role (either sender or receiver) during the experiment to prevent the
potentially confounding effects of role reversal. Next, we strengthen the groups by allowing
group members to communicate with each other in order to solve a task before they are
aware of the trust game. Finally, we focus on relative group size by not creating status
differences between the subjects. The details of this design are described in the next section.
We next explore how changing relative group sizes affects behavior. Weber (2006) shows
that groups that grow slowly and with sufficient information about past group behavior can
maintain coordination (using a minimum effort game) from the smaller group that would
not otherwise be expected. In social psychology, Prislin et al. (2000) examine how group
interactions change when groups change from majorities to minorities and vice-versa. Their
assignment of group status is achieved through the use of confederates, or fake participants
working for the experiment. The experimenters have confederates change their opinions to
make subjects feel they are part of the majority or the minority group, and they record
differences in self-reported opinions. They find asymmetric effects in that a loss of majority
identity has a stronger effect on subjects’ perceived group similarity than does a gain of that
identity.
This paper examines whether and how changing relative group sizes such that the ma-
jority group becomes the minority group, and vice versa, affects trust between and among
these groups. We now explain our methods in detail.
2.3 Experimental Design
We employ a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design, as shown in Table 2.1. In one di-
mension, we vary whether group sizes change during the experiment. In the other dimension,
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Table 2.1: Experimental Design
Sender No. of No. of No. of
Treatment group size sessions subjects in lab subjects total
No Change Majority 9 8 12
minority 9 4 4
Change Majority 9 8 8
minority 9 4 8
we vary whether the groups are larger (majorities) or smaller (minorities). Since our group
sizes are defined relative to the sizes of the other group, we run the majority and minority
treatments simultaneously. We are primarily interested in how changing a subject’s group
from a minority to a majority, and vice versa, affects behavior. We therefore designate the
“No Change” treatment as a control. The experimental instructions that the subjects read
through before the experiment are included in H. This experiment was conducted in the Be-
havioral and Experimental Economics Lab at the University of Michigan in July and August
of 2013. All sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Each subject is a member of one of two groups, which we label “Green” and “Red.” For
the first half of the experiment, one of these groups is randomly chosen to be the majority
group. Then, depending on the treatment, either eight (Change) or twelve (No Change)
subjects are randomly assigned to this group, and all others are assigned to the other group,
the minority group.
We recruit sixteen subjects for each session. At all times we have twelve subjects in
the lab with eight in the majority group, four in the minority group, and four sitting out
in the waiting room. The four subjects sitting out are rotated in halfway through the
experiment and a different set of four subjects are rotated out. This is displayed in Figure
J.1. The subjects rotated out are all members of the initial majority group. Depending on
the treatment, the four subjects rotating in for the second half of the experiment are either
all added to the same group as the four that left (No Change treatment - the group sizes
do not change) or all added to the other group (Change treatment - the group sizes switch).
This way, we can change group sizes without having individual subjects change groups during
the experiment: in the Change treatment, the subjects who were in the majority become
the minority and vice versa. We refer to subjects who participate in both halves of the
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experiment as “20-period subjects.”
In order to reinforce subject identification with their teams, we have the subjects perform
a group puzzle-solving task.4 Subjects are shown six photographs from two different named
locations, three from each location. Subjects are then asked to identify which photographs
match which locations. For instance, subjects are shown photographs labeled “A1,” “A2,”
“A3,” “B1,” “B2,” and “B3,” and are told that all of the photographs labeled “A” are either
all from the USA or all from Australia. Those labeled “B” are from the other location. They
are then asked to identify where the “A” photographs are from. The subjects therefore have
a 50% chance of guessing the correct answer. To help answer this question, subjects are
allowed to discuss the task with members of their own group using a computer-based group
chat, which allows for free text communication between the subjects in a group. Subjects
participating in this task know that all other subjects they are chatting with are members of
their ingroup, but they do not know any other information about these other subjects. This
task is similar to the painting task used in Chen and Li (2009), in which subjects are asked
to guess the artists of two paintings after being shown other paintings by the same artists,
and it is designed with the same goal of enhancing group identity.
We use trust and trustworthiness as our outcome measures. Each subject is randomly
chosen to be a sender or receiver and plays a two-person trust game with her match, a person
with the opposite role. In the trust game, the sender is given an endowment of 20 tokens.
Then she chooses how many, if any, tokens to pass to the receiver. Before reaching the
receiver, the tokens passed are multiplied by 4. The receiver then chooses how many of these
tokens to pass back to the sender. The number of tokens the sender passes can be viewed
as a measure of the amount of trust the sender places in the receiver. The number of tokens
the receiver passes back to the sender can be seen as a measure of the trustworthiness of the
receiver. Exactly half of our subjects are senders and half are receivers, and no one changes
roles during the experiment. Of the four subjects who do not participate in the first half,
we always assign two to be senders and two to be receivers. The same is true for the four
4Tajfel and Turner (1979) identify three processes that are important for group identity to affect behavior:
(1) Categorization, or the assignment of individuals to groups, (2) identification, or the internal process
through which individuals associate themselves with groups, and (3) comparison, the act of comparing an
individual’s group to other groups.
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subjects they replace. When subjects play the trust game, they know the group membership
(“Green” or “Red”), but no other identifying information, of their match.
A session consists of 22 periods. In the first period, all subjects are read the instructions
and then four subjects are asked to leave the computer lab and return to the waiting room.
Next, subjects are randomly assigned to either the “Green” or the “Red” group. They
participate in the photograph identification task while chatting with their group members.
In the second period, subjects’ roles in the trust game are revealed and each subject plays
the trust game with a random match of the other role. The subjects are then randomly
rematched nine more times for a total of 10 periods, each time with another person of the
opposite role from their own. In each period, a subject in the majority group has a two-
thirds chance of being matched with a member of their own group and a one-third chance
of being matched with a member of the other group. The opposite is true for a subject in
the minority group. As there are majority and minority groups with ingroup and outgroup
matching, this creates four match categories between senders and receivers. When majority
(minority) senders are matched with majority (minority) receivers we refer to this as a
majority (minority) ingroup match. When majority (minority) senders are matched with
minority (majority) receivers we refer to this as a majority (minority) outgroup match.
Halfway through the experiment, the four subjects who did not participate in the first
half return to the computer lab and replace four others, who return to the waiting room.
The old and new subjects then repeat the first half of the experiment, first completing the
photograph identification task (with new photographs) and then playing the trust game for
10 periods. Afterward all subjects return to the lab and fill out a 13-question survey.
Subjects are paid at a rate of one dollar per 50 tokens. Subjects who do not participate
in one half of the experiment are paid the average amount earned by the other subjects in
who did participate in that half of the experiment.
Subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee in addition to their earnings for the experiment,
which were rounded up to the next nearest dollar. The average payment was $16.43 per hour,
close to the standard rate for experimental economics study participants at the University
of Michigan.
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2.4 Hypotheses
Let s denote the proportion of an endowment sent by a sender. We use superscripts xy
to describe the relative sizes of the sender’s own group, x, and of the receiver’s group, y. The
induced minority group is denoted m, and the induced majority group is denoted M . For
example, the proportion of the endowment sent by a sender who is a member of the minority
group and is matched with a receiver who is a member of the majority group is written as
smM . For receivers, we use the same superscripts to describe relative group sizes, but use
r to refer to the proportion of the received amount returned to senders. For example, the
proportion returned by a receiver who is a member of the majority group to a sender who is
a member of the minority group would be written as rMm. Once group sizes change, we use
n to denote new minority and N to denote new majority.
For the following hypotheses, we give predicted orderings for various group comparisons.
For receivers, we assume that these orderings are conditional on the amounts they were sent
by the senders.
First, we note that the social psychology literature indicates that minorities form more
tightly knit groups than majorities (Leonardelli and Brewer, 2001). This yields the following
prediction:
Hypothesis 1 (Ingroup minority effect) Subjects in minorities will send and return more
to members of their own groups than their majority counterparts.
smm > sMM , rmm > rMM (2.1)
Other work in social psychology and economics finds that majorities value minorities’ pay-
offs more than minorities value majorities’ payoffs (Gupta et al., 2013; Tanaka and Camerer,
2013):
Hypothesis 2 (Outgroup majority effect) Subjects in majorities will send and return
more to members of other groups than their minority counterparts.
sMm > smM , rMm > rmM (2.2)
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Next, we want to consider changing group sizes. In particular, we will focus on how we
expect the proportions sent and returned to change when the minority group becomes the
majority group and vice versa. We present two competing hypotheses. One possibility is
that subjects will immediately adopt their new majority and minority identities. This would
result in an ordering of the new amounts sent and returned that are identical to the original
orderings:
Hypothesis 3 (Change) Subjects who change their majority or minority identity will change
their behavior; they adopt the predicted behaviors of their new identities. Assuming that Hy-
potheses 1 and 2 are correct, this predicts the following orderings:
snn > sNN , rnn > rNN (ingroup new minority effect) (2.3a)
sNn > snN , rNn > rnN (outgroup new majority effect) (2.3b)
Another possibility is that subject behavior persists after induced group sizes are changed.
In this case, we expect that the ordering will be altered such that new majorities act like old
minorities, and new minorities act like old majorities. In this case, we expect the proportions
sent and returned to have the following orderings for individuals who are switched from
minority to majority and vice versa:
Hypothesis 4 (Persistence) Subjects who change their majority or minority identity will
not change their behavior; they follow the predicted behaviors of their original identities.
Assuming that Hypotheses 1 and 2 are correct, this predicts the following orderings:
sNN > snn, rNN > rnn (ingroup new majority effect) (2.4a)
snN > sNn, rnN > rNn (outgroup new minority effect) (2.4b)
It is also possible that subjects will initially follow their original behavior (Hypothesis
4), but will slowly converge towards behavior that fits their new identities (Hypothesis 3).
However, it is unclear whether we will be able to observe or test for this shift in the time
frame of the experiment.
71
2.5 Results
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
All Subjects 20-Period Subjects
Control Treatment Control Treatment
Age 22.16 21.91 22.00 22.14
Race
Asian Pct 0.42 0.47 0.40 0.54
Black Pct 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.06
Hispanic Pct 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
Native Pct 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Other Pct 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01
White Pct 0.44 0.42 0.50 0.36
Education
Undergrad Pct 0.72 0.72 0.75 0.69
Graduate Stud Pct 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.24
Not Student Pct 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07
Siblings 1.43 1.46 1.44 1.38
Observations 144 144 72 72
We run 18 sessions (9 “Change” treatment sessions and 9 “No Change” treatment ses-
sions) with 16 subjects each. Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for all subjects as well as
for the 20-period subjects. We focus on 20-period subjects for our analysis unless otherwise
specified. Whites and Asians make up the bulk of our subject pool with very few identifying
as Black, Hispanic, Native American, or another race.5 72% of our subjects are undergradu-
ate students, 20% are graduate students, and 10% are not students. The average age of our
subjects is 22.
We first explore both sender and receiver behavior using random effects regressions. Re-
call that our “Change” treatment switches majority and minority group membership for
20-period subjects in the second half of the experiment. We wish to compare not only
majority/minority groups with ingroup/outgroup matching but also potential changes in
behavior when majority groups become minority groups and vice versa. Therefore, we cat-
egorize individuals who change from majority (minority) to minority (majority) groups in
5Though “Hispanic” is not a race according to the census, we treat it as a separate race in our survey
(I). For example, subjects cannot state that they are both Hispanic and Black.
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Figure 2.1: % tokens passed by minority/majority senders (top) and receivers (bottom),
including standard errors.
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the second half as new minority (new majority). As we compare ingroup and outgroup
matching for these two groups, we thus have four more match categories to consider for
each regression. Figure 2.1 shows the average percentage of tokens sent and returned by all
subjects in (original) minority and majority groups. This figure also shows standard error
bars for the subsamples. These averages are also shown in Table 2.3, separated by half,
majority/minority identity, and treatment. This includes the behavior of all subjects in the
first half of the experiment and subjects in the second half of the control sessions.6
Table 2.3: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Senders and Receivers
Senders Receivers
All Control Treatment All Control Treatment
First Half 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.24 0.26 0.21
Majority Ingroup 0.49 0.58 0.40 0.24 0.25 0.23
Majority Outgroup 0.39 0.50 0.29 0.23 0.26 0.19
Minority Ingroup 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.29 0.23
Minority Outgroup 0.41 0.45 0.37 0.22 0.25 0.18
Second Half 0.43 0.49 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.22
Majority Ingroup 0.53 0.62 0.45 0.24 0.28 0.19
Majority Outgroup 0.37 0.45 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.22
Minority Ingroup 0.50 0.59 0.41 0.30 0.34 0.25
Minority Outgroup 0.32 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.22
Observations 1440 720 720 983 547 436
Receivers only include those who start with more than 0 tokens.
2.5.1 Full Sample
First, we examine the participants of all races, which we refer to as the full sample (we
later split the sample according to race). On the full sample, we first regress the percentage
6We group together the individuals who do not switch majority/minority identities in the regressions that
follow. This means that the minority category includes the behavior of all minority-group members in the
first half of the experiment and the behavior of minority-group members in the second half who were also
members of the minority group in the first half. As these particular minority-group members in the second
half start in the minority group and remain in the same minority group, we do not expect their behavior
to differ between halves of the experiment. However, we include a variable denoting the second half of the
experiment to control for changing behavior over time. We also describe an alternative specification for
categorizing and comparing changing majority/minority identities in G. Results from this specification are
almost identical to the specification described in the results below.
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of tokens sent on seven dummy variables representing the eight match categories described
above with “majority ingroup” as the omitted category. We also include dummy variables
for gender, second half, and race, with “White” as the omitted category and all non-White
races grouped together.7 The results for the full sample are presented in column 1 of Table
2.4. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the session level.
Similarly, we regress the percentage of tokens returned by receivers on the same variables
used in the sender regression. The results for the full sample of receivers are presented in
column 1 of Table 2.5, with standard errors adjusted for clustering at the session level. These
regressions yield the following result:
Result 1 (Sending and returning by all subjects) In the full sample, senders and re-
ceivers who participate in all 20 periods of the trust game are approximately equally trusting
and trustworthy regardless of whether they are in a majority or minority group.
While Hypothesis 1 predicts that subjects in minority groups will send and return more
to ingroup members than their counterparts in majority groups, we do not see evidence
of this in the full sample. Senders in minority groups send about 5% more tokens to other
members of the minority group than senders in majority groups send to other members of the
majority group, which is about one more token of their 20-token endowment. This difference
is not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.550). Similarly, receivers in minority groups send
about 3% more tokens to their ingroup members than receivers in majority groups send to
their ingroup members. This difference is also not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.570).
For the full sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis in favor of Hypothesis 1.
Also, while Hypothesis 2 predicts that subjects in majorities will send and return more to
outgroup members than their counterparts in minority groups, we again do not see evidence
of this in the full sample. Senders in majority groups actually send approximately 3% fewer
tokens to members of the minority group than senders in minority groups send to members
of the majority group, though this difference is not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.680,
Wald test). Receivers in majority groups return about 5% more of their tokens to outgroup
7Results are similar if all races other than White and Asian are excluded from the analysis. Results are
also similar if we create three categories, White, Asian, and all other races. We cannot examine any other
races separately as we do not have enough non-White, non-Asian participants in the experiment.
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members than receivers in minority groups return to outgroup members. This difference is
also not significant at the 10% level (p = 0.284, Wald test). For the full sample, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis in favor of Hypothesis 2.
2.5.2 Restricted Samples
To further explore these (lack of) results, we will now separately analyze subsets of
our sample. First, we examine separately the behavior of White and non-White subjects.
We justify this exploration by the fact that subjects of different races experience natural
majority and natural minority identities differently in day-to-day life. Asians, Blacks, and
Whites make up 92% of our experimental subjects. Population estimates of racial groups in
the US and in Ann Arbor, MI along with enrollment figures from the University of Michigan
indicate that Whites are the majority race while Asians and Blacks are minority races for
the population from which we pull our experimental sample.8 Therefore, in our experimental
sample, Whites have a natural majority identity while Asians and Blacks, like other minority
races, have natural minority identities. It is possible that these natural identities interact
with our laboratory-induced majority and minority identities. The coefficient on “Non-
White” in the full-sample sender regression is −0.277 (p = 0.001) suggesting that there are
at least level differences in trust. Our separate analyses will be able to detect any interaction
differences.
Next, for receivers, we analyze the behavior of those who received a large number of
tokens from the senders. In contrast to senders, who are all endowed with the same 20
tokens in each period, receivers start with different amounts ranging from 0 to 80 tokens
(since the tokens sent are multiplied by 4) depending on the behavior of the senders with
whom they are randomly matched. Table 2.6 shows that the average percent returned is
higher for those subjects who receive at least 41 tokens.
To explore the possibility that receiver behavior differs according to the initial amount
received, we split the receiver sample into four parts. We examine separately subjects who
8The 2012 American Community Survey estimates that Whites make up 72.8%, Asians make up 16.4%
and Blacks make up 7.0% of the population in Ann Arbor. These patterns hold for the student population
at the University of Michigan as well. Data from the University of Michigan Office of the Registrar show
that in the Fall semester of 2013, 66.6% of enrolled students were White, 13.3% were Asian, and 4.8% were
Black.
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receive 1-20, 21-40, 41-60, and 61-80 tokens from the senders. We exclude subjects who
receive 0 tokens since they do not make any choice regarding how many tokens to return to
the senders. We present results from regressions on the sample of subjects who receive 61-80
tokens.9 These receivers are trusted by their senders, as evidenced by the high number of
tokens received. We can therefore more easily examine the trustworthiness of this group.
For receivers who begin with fewer tokens, their behavior might be affected by negative reci-
procity, resulting in fewer returned tokens due to retaliation. These effects would attenuate
any minority or ingroup effects. In fact, our results show that, for those receivers who begin
with fewer tokens, similar to the full sample of receivers, we find no differences in behavior
between induced minority and majority groups.
From this point on, we will therefore separately analyze White and non-White subjects.
In addition, we will focus only on receivers who receive more than 60 tokens (i.e., to whom
the senders sent more than 15 out of 20 tokens). We will refer to these receivers as our
preferred sample of receivers.
2.5.3 Ingroup minority effect
In our restricted sample, we first examine Hypothesis 1. Figure 2.2 shows the average
amounts sent and returned by White subjects in the (original) induced minority and majority
groups. The two bars on the left of each graph show the ingroup matches. To explore the
possibility of a minority effect in both sending and returning behavior, we run random
effects regressions separately for White and non-White subjects. These results are displayed
in columns 2 and 3 of Tables 2.4 and 2.7.
Result 2 (Ingroup minority effect among Whites) White subjects in minority lab groups
are more trusting and trustworthy when matched with ingroup members compared to White
subjects in majority lab groups when matched with ingroup members. For White members of
minority lab groups, this holds for both senders and preferred receivers:
smmW > s
MM
W , r
mm
W > r
MM
W .
9Regressions for samples of receivers starting with 60 tokens or fewer are available in J.
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Figure 2.2: % tokens passed by White minority/majority senders (top) and receivers with
61-80 tokens (bottom), including standard errors.
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Column 2 of Table 2.4 displays the regression of sending behavior for White senders.
Here we see that White minority ingroup sending is significantly higher than White majority
ingroup sending (p = 0.001). The coefficient on “Minority Ingroup” implies that Whites in
minority groups, when matched with subjects in their own group, send 36% more, or about
7.2 more tokens of their 20-token endowment, to receivers than their counterparts in majority
groups.
Column 2 of Table 2.7 displays returning behavior for Whites in our preferred sample of
receivers. We again see that minority ingroup returning is significantly higher than majority
ingroup returning (p = 0.040). The coefficient on “Minority Ingroup” here implies that
Whites in minority groups who receive 61-80 tokens return 14% more, or roughly 8 more
tokens, to ingroup matches than Whites in majority groups.
For our sample of White senders and preferred receivers, we can reject the null hypothesis
of no difference in behavior in favor of Hypothesis 1. We find that Whites in induced minority
groups treat ingroup members better than Whites in induced majority groups, indicating
greater trust and trustworthiness among minority group members.
Result 3 (No ingroup majority/minority effect among non-Whites) Non-White sub-
jects in minority and majority lab groups exhibit no differences in behavior towards ingroup
members. There are no differences found among senders or preferred receivers in this group.
We examine non-White sending in column 3 of Table 2.4. We cannot reject that minority
ingroup sending is the same as majority ingroup sending (p = 0.487) among non-Whites.
Column 3 of Table 2.7 shows the regression for non-White preferred receivers. We again
cannot reject that minority ingroup returning is the same as majority ingroup returning
(p = 0.154). Therefore, for non-White subjects, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
no differences in behavior towards ingroup members in favor of Hypothesis 1. We find no
evidence of an ingroup minority effect as we do with White subjects.
2.5.4 Outgroup minority effect
Having examined behavior towards ingroup members, we now examine behavior towards
outgroup members. The two bars on the right of each graph in Figure 2.2 show the average
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amounts sent and returned by White subjects in outgroup matches. As before, the results
for senders are summarized in Table 2.4, and results for the preferred sample of receivers are
summarized in Table 2.7. From Hypothesis 2 we expect to find an outgroup majority effect
such that minority group members will be more cohesive and thus treat outgroup members
worse than majority group members treat outgroup members. We find the opposite result:
Result 4 (Outgroup minority effect among Whites) White subjects in minority lab
groups are more trusting and trustworthy when matched with outgroup members compared
to White subjects in majority lab groups when matched with outgroup members. For White
members of minority lab groups this holds for both senders and preferred receivers:
smMW > s
Mm
W , r
mM
W > r
Mm
W
Column 2 of Table 2.4 displays sending behavior for White senders. Comparing White
minority outgroup sending to White majority outgroup sending, we see that White minority
outgroup sending is significantly higher (p = 0.019, Wald test). The coefficients imply that
Whites in minority groups, when matched with subjects in the other group, send 28%, or
5.6, more tokens to receivers than their counterparts in majority groups.
Column 2 of Table 2.7 displays returning behavior for Whites in our preferred sample
of receivers. We again see that minority outgroup returning is significantly higher than
majority outgroup returning (p = 0.035, Wald test). The coefficients here imply that Whites
in minority groups return 14%, or roughly 8.5, more tokens to outgroup matches than Whites
in majority groups.
With these results from senders and receivers, we can reject both Hypothesis 2 and the
null hypothesis for Whites matched with outgroup members. Instead, these results imply
the reverse of Hypothesis 2. We find that Whites in induced minority groups treat outgroup
members better than Whites in induced majority groups. Instead of observing our prediction
that minority groups would be more cohesive, we instead see that White subjects in minority
groups are more trusting and trustworthy overall.
Along with Result 2 for ingroup behavior of Whites in induced minority groups, we now
have the result that Whites in induced minority groups are both more trusting and trust-
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worthy, for both ingroup and outgroup matches, than Whites in induced majority groups.
We refer to this higher level of sending and returning by White minority group members as
the minority effect among Whites.
Result 5 (No outgroup minority/majority effect among non-Whites) Non-White sub-
jects in minority and majority lab groups exhibit no differences in behavior towards outgroup
members. There are no differences found among senders or preferred receivers in this group.
Column 3 of Table 2.4 shows non-White sending behavior. We cannot reject that minority
outgroup sending is the same as majority outgroup sending (p = 0.444) among non-Whites.
Examining column 3 of Table 2.7, we see the same result among our preferred sample of
non-White receivers. We cannot reject that minority outgroup returning is the same as
majority outgroup returning (p = 0.221). Therefore we cannot reject the null, that there is
no majority outgroup effect in this sample of non-Whites. We find no evidence of a minority
outgroup effect as we do with White subjects.
With both ingroup and outgroup matches, the similarity in behavior of Whites in induced
minority groups indicates that White subjects have a particularly strong reaction to being
placed into an induced minority group. For both White ingroup and outgroup matches, this
results in more tokens sent and returned. This cannot be interpreted as some form of ingroup
same-race bias as senders and receivers are blindly matched with other subjects; they interact
through the computer interface and are not able to communicate during rounds of the trust
game. In addition, regressions were constructed to show that this induced minority effect
is separate from ingroup bias; Whites in induced minority groups send and return more to
both ingroup and outgroup matches than Whites in induced majority groups.
2.5.5 Persistence
Having looked at differences between initial induced groups, we now turn to examin-
ing behavior when relative group sizes change. We have two competing hypotheses for
behavior among treated individuals. Recall that we treat subjects by changing their rel-
ative group sizes after 10 periods. Hypothesis 3 predicts that when an individual changes
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Figure 2.3: % tokens passed by White new minority/new majority senders (top) and receivers
with 61-80 tokens (bottom), including standard errors.
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minority/majority identity, she will adopt the behavior of the new identity immediately. Hy-
pothesis 4 predicts that an individual will carry the behaviors of her initial minority/majority
identity even after changing identity, i.e., when her group changes from a minority (majority)
to a new majority (new minority).
We can only differentiate between these two hypotheses when differences exist in initial
induced group behavior. When these differences do not exist, both Hypothesis 3 and 4
predict that there will also be no differences in behavior once the relative group sizes are
changed. Therefore, we focus on cases in which we do see differences in initial induced group
behavior, namely, White ingroup and outgroup matching for both senders and preferred
receivers. Figure 2.3 shows the average amounts sent and returned by White subjects in new
minority and new majority groups.
Result 6 (Persistence in behavior among Whites) White subjects who change from
minority to new majority exhibit persistence by continuing to be more trusting and trust-
worthy than their counterparts who change from majority to new minority:
sNN > snn, rNN ≥ rnn (ingroup new majority effect)
sNn = snN , rNn > rnN (outgroup new majority effect)
From Results 2 and 4, we see that Whites in induced minority groups send and return
more tokens than Whites in induced majority groups. Here, Hypothesis 3 (change) predicts
that new majority group members should behave differently than they did when they were
induced minority group members, sending and returning fewer tokens than new minority
group members. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 (persistence) predicts that new majority
group members should behave the same as they did when they were induced minority group
members, sending and returning more tokens than new minority group members. We see
evidence that supports Hypothesis 4 (persistence) for White subjects.
First, examining White new majority senders, we see in column 2 of Table 2.4 that new
majority ingroup sending is 28%, or 5.5 tokens, higher than new minority ingroup sending
(p = 0.030), but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are no differences between
new majority and new minority outgroup sending (p = 0.244).
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Next, column 2 of Table 2.7 shows that, for our preferred sample of receivers, new majority
ingroup sending is weakly higher (14%, or roughly 8.6 tokens) than new minority ingroup
sending (p = 0.098). In addition, new majority group members return 14.6%, or roughly
8.9 tokens, more than new minority group members when matched with outgroup members
(p = 0.024). This gives the ordering provided in Result 6. This ordering is mostly consistent
with the persistence hypothesis in which the minority effect among Whites carries over to
a new majority effect among Whites. The signs of the differences in new majority and new
minority sending and receiving are inconsistent with the change hypothesis, as the minority
effect found among Whites does not carry over to a new minority effect among Whites.
When White subjects begin in an induced minority group, they trust more and are
more trusting than their induced majority group counterparts. When these White subjects
are treated and their relative group size switches from induced minority to induced new
majority, they still maintain the behavior of induced minority group members, showing high
levels of trust and trustworthiness even after their groups become the new majority groups.
This indicates that the initial sorting of White subjects into induced minority and majority
groups has a strong effect on behavior but that the switch, halfway through the experiment,
is not enough to alter this effect.
2.6 Discussion
We find two unexpected results. First, our effects are only present among White sub-
jects. This could be caused by an interaction of real-world majority identity with our lab-
created minority identity. There are several studies that directly examine differences be-
tween real-world identities. Much of the experimental literature on gender shows differences
in preferences for competition (e.g., Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2009) and
cooperation (e.g. Charness and Rustichini, 2011).10 Differences are also found by race (e.g.,
Benjamin et al., 2010; Tanaka and Camerer, 2013). Other studies find an interaction between
real-world and lab identities. Salmon and Serra (2013) find that subjects from “high rule of
law” countries are more likely than subjects from “low rule of law” countries to reduce rule-
10Croson and Gneezy (2009) provide a more complete survey on this literature.
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breaking behavior (theft, bribery, and embezzlement) when their actions can be observed by
others in the lab. Similar to this, our results suggest that being from a majority group in
the real world can affect a subject’s behavior when she is in a minority group in the lab. On
the other hand, Tsutsui and Zizzo (2013) find no differences between majority and minority
groups in their experiment, but the racial make-up of their subject pool is unknown.11 It is
possible that subjects who are not used to being in a minority group in real life respond to
being placed in a minority group differently than those who are used to being in a minority
group. This may drive our result.
Our other unexpected result is that, instead of an outgroup majority effect (Hypothesis
2), we instead see an outgroup minority effect (Result 4). That is, among White subjects,
sending and returning to outgroup members is higher from minority members than from
majority members. One possibility is that the effect that we see among White subjects
overpowers our hypothesized outgroup majority effect, resulting in higher sending and re-
turning by minority group members to majority group members. Notice that in column 3
of Table 2.4, which gives results for non-White subjects only, majority outgroup sending is
higher than minority outgroup sending, though the difference is not significant (p = 0.444).
This mirrors the finding of Tanaka and Camerer’s (2013) that high-status minorities treat
majorities well.
2.7 Conclusion
Many economists have studied the effects of social identity on various behaviors, but most
have focused on static identities. Identities such as gender and race are, for the most part,
fixed and unchanging over time for an individual.12 In this study, we instead examine the
effects of more malleable social identities, majorities and minorities, and provide evidence
that a real-world majority identity interacts with a lab-created minority identity, causing
White subjects to be more trusting and trustworthy when placed in a lab minority group.
11We contacted Tsutsui and Zizzo, who provided their data. While they collect the subjects’ countries of
origin, they do not record the racial background of their subjects. Since many subjects’ country of origin is
the UK, where the experiment was run, this does not necessarily indicate race.
12Certain race categories may actually be malleable. See Lue (2015) for an examination of the racial
identification choices of individuals with mixed ancestry.
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Changing subjects’ lab identities during our experiment does not appear to shake the initial
lab minority group effect. If taken literally, this would indicate that, in the real world,
members of minority groups who are originally more trusting and trustworthy in interactions
with others will not change this behavior when they gain majority identity.
This interaction of race and minority identity was an unexpected, but robust, finding in
our experiment and one that deserves further exploration. While most White subjects have
majority identity in the US, perhaps race is correlated with another factor that is interacting
with lab minority group identity. Future work could explore if these results are driven in
part by an overlap between White racial identity and religious belief (as 78% of White
US citizens identify with some denomination of Christianity13) or some other demographic
factor such as wealth or social status. The interaction between real-world group-size identity
and lab group-size identity could perhaps be captured by measuring whether an individual
feels a sense of belonging to a real-world majority or minority group before assigning a lab
group-size identity.
Research has shown that social identity has an effect on individuals’ economic decisions,
but researchers are only beginning to explore the effects of altering malleable social identities.
As changing demographics and attitudes continue to shape these malleable social identities,
the study of the dynamics of changing social identities is an important natural extension of
the current literature. The study of these changes will better prepare researchers and policy
makers as these changes inevitably occur in the real world.
132007 Pew Report: http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-landscape-study-
chapter-3.pdf, page 40.
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Table 2.4: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Senders
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.277***
(0.084)
Female -0.094 0.044 -0.066
(0.071) (0.110) (0.093)
Second Half -0.016 0.012 -0.031
(0.040) (0.067) (0.044)
Majority Outgroup -0.143*** -0.086* -0.195***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.072)
Minority Ingroup 0.054 0.359*** -0.093
(0.091) (0.110) (0.134)
Minority Outgroup -0.115 0.194 -0.263**
(0.080) (0.124) (0.110)
New Majority Ingroup -0.022 0.337** -0.208
(0.094) (0.136) (0.141)
New Majority Outgroup -0.168 0.089 -0.288**
(0.120) (0.181) (0.143)
New Minority Ingroup -0.011 0.060 -0.052
(0.075) (0.076) (0.094)
New Minority Outgroup -0.092 -0.157 -0.067
(0.070) (0.138) (0.073)
Constant 0.732*** 0.500*** 0.533***
(0.083) (0.130) (0.103)
Observations 1440 560 880
R-squared 0.1476 0.1559 0.0813
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors
clustered at the session level. Non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Table 2.5: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.029
(0.035)
Female -0.025 -0.031 -0.020
(0.038) (0.050) (0.038)
Second Half 0.013 0.007 0.021
(0.016) (0.020) (0.027)
Majority Outgroup 0.011 0.026 -0.002
(0.035) (0.031) (0.049)
Minority Ingroup 0.026 0.116* -0.057
(0.045) (0.069) (0.053)
Minority Outgroup -0.036 0.054 -0.117***
(0.031) (0.052) (0.042)
New Majority Ingroup -0.016 0.097 -0.124***
(0.034) (0.061) (0.046)
New Majority Outgroup -0.032 0.111 -0.165***
(0.047) (0.088) (0.062)
New Minority Ingroup -0.002 -0.031 -0.009
(0.028) (0.054) (0.030)
New Minority Outgroup -0.011 0.003 -0.029
(0.030) (0.040) (0.041)
Constant 0.268*** 0.218*** 0.275***
(0.042) (0.057) (0.035)
Observations 983 491 492
R-squared 0.0228 0.0384 0.0742
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors
clustered at the session level. non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
Table 2.6: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers By Endowment
Endowment Percent of Endowment Passed Observations
0 n/a 457
1-20 0.09 211
21-40 0.21 216
41-60 0.30 118
61-80 0.32 438
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Table 2.7: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers with 61 to 80 Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.050
(0.044)
Female -0.009 -0.044 0.022
(0.051) (0.059) (0.064)
Second Half -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.020
(0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Majority Outgroup -0.028 -0.004 -0.042
(0.030) (0.031) (0.044)
Minority Ingroup 0.015 0.140** -0.096
(0.047) (0.068) (0.067)
Minority Outgroup 0.006 0.135** -0.105*
(0.046) (0.066) (0.058)
New Majority Ingroup 0.017 0.099 -0.066
(0.044) (0.076) (0.071)
New Majority Outgroup 0.024 0.136 -0.091
(0.065) (0.092) (0.076)
New Minority Ingroup 0.030 -0.042 0.082*
(0.044) (0.039) (0.045)
New Minority Outgroup 0.010 -0.010 0.013
(0.030) (0.061) (0.040)
Constant 0.353*** 0.308*** 0.328***
(0.048) (0.071) (0.050)
Observations 438 212 226
R-squared 0.0225 0.1081 0.0589
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the session level. non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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CHAPTER III
Driving to opportunity: Local rents, wages,
commuting, and sub-metropolitan quality of life
(Co-authored with David Albouy)
3.1 Introduction
Households face many trade-offs when they decide where to live, as areas close to high-
paying jobs or with desirable amenities are often expensive. Below, we consider how local
wage levels, housing costs (or “rents”), and commuting costs vary both within and across
metropolitan areas, using the most detailed level of geography in public-use Census files.1 We
then use these measures to construct a local willingness-to-pay index for a typical household
based on how high housing and commuting costs are relative to available wages. Under
strong conditions, such as household mobility and homogeneity, this index provides the
value households place on local amenities, otherwise known as local “quality of life” (QOL).
Given how households are imperfectly mobile and heterogeneous, this one-dimensional
quality-of-life index can only provide a limited perspective on the relative desirability of
neighborhoods. The index is transparent and provides an economically intuitive complement
to other measures of neighborhood quality or “livability” that abound in popular literature.
It ranks beautiful areas along the Pacific the highest and areas rife with urban decay the
1We often allude to “housing costs” which are either a rent or an imputed rent for housing. We find it
important to distinguish land rents from housing rents because construction costs may vary across metro
areas.
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lowest, lending it some plausibility. It is also positively correlated with various neighborhood
amenities such as mild climate, safety, entertainment, and well-funded schools – typically
thought of as desirable. While regression methods may be used with this index to try to value
specific amenities, these methods are subject to potentially important omitted variable and
simultaneity problems, such as household sorting. Indeed, the residents of a neighborhood
will not only influence the amenities it provides, but may also be considered an amenity
themselves.
Although this work focuses on constructing a single index of neighborhood quality, its
elements are pertinent to more complex analyses of hedonic markets and household sorting,
e.g. Bajari and Kahn (2005), Yinger (2014), which measure willingness-to-pay through rents
alone. Our index makes it easier to compare neighborhoods across metropolitan areas. In
particular, we make several adjustments beyond the last similar study of sub-metropolitan
quality of life by Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988). First, following Albouy (2008) – who
estimates willingness-to-pay across metro areas – we down-weight the benefit of wage levels
to account for federal taxes, and up-weight rent levels to account for unobserved non-housing
costs. Second, we add commuting costs to rents to provide a fuller measure of the “urban
costs” faced by households. Third, we estimate local wage levels by place of work, rather
than place of residence, to mitigate potential biases from unobserved skills. Fourth, we cover
the entire United States including non-metro areas, and areas within counties whenever
possible.
To complement and contextualize the analysis on willingness to pay, we also describe
patterns in local rents, wages, and commuting costs, as well as household characteristics and
observable amenities. These patterns involve variation within and across metros, between
suburbs and central cities, and across communities of varying densities. Using regression
methods, we distinguish how much raw variation in wages, rents, and commutes are ex-
plained by the observed characteristics of workers or housing units, as opposed to the loca-
tions themselves. We find that rent and wage-predicting characteristics vary more strongly
within metros than across them, indicating stronger household sorting. Meanwhile, rent and
(especially) wage levels due to location vary much more across metro areas than within.
Controlling for local wages, rents fall with commutes in a manner consistent with standard
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theories of rent gradients.
Section 3.2 motivates our analysis in the context of existing research on local amenities
and commuting. We synthesize relevant theories in section 3.3 to provide the basis for the
quality-of-life index. Section 3.4 describes the data at the Public Use Microdata Area, or
“PUMA,” level of geography. We present our measure of quality of life in section 3.5 using
maps for for the continental United States, as well as New York, San Francisco, Detroit, and
Atlanta. These maps reveal as much disparity in willingness-to-pay within Manhattan as
across the most and least desirable states. In section 3.6, we document how a few amenities
predict much of the variation in quality of life, and how their estimated values are consistent
with existing research, while being subject to numerous caveats and limitations.
3.2 Motivation and Related Literature
Our methodology combines insights from two lines of research on how local wages and
rents are determined: the first on local amenities, the second on commuting. Beginning with
Oates (1969), the empirical literature on amenities (including local public services) builds
off of the theory of Tiebout (1956) by assuming that workers are mobile, have access to the
same labor market, and that commutes can be ignored or controlled for. In this framework,
amenities may be valued by examining how they co-vary with rents inside a metro area,
holding other factors constant.
Rosen (1979) adapts this framework to examine amenity differences across metro areas
with separate labor markets, arguing that low wages as well as high rents signal amenity
values. He and his student, Roback (1982), use several measures of individual amenities as
independent variables in wage and rent regressions. The quality-of-life index is then given by
the annualized difference in rents to wages predicted by those amenities. One concern with
such an index is that it is sensitive to which amenities the researcher considers relevant.2
Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (2003) factor in non-housing costs-of-living in addition to
2A more artificial approach is seen in various popular scores of quality of life, often termed “livability.”
Detailed scores, often at the neighborhood level, are available on websites such as Areavibes.com and Stree-
tadvisor.com. Nate Silver (2010), of election polling fame, provides quality-of-life rankings for neighborhoods
in New York City. Streetadvisor.com relies on crowd-sourced user reviews for streets, neighborhoods, and
cities. Areavibes.com and Silver (2010) apply weighting algorithms to various observable amenities. For
further details see Appendix O.
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rents, albeit only at the state level. Not taking a stand on what amenities belong in the
quality-of-life index, Beeson and Eberts (1989), Gabriel and Rosenthal (2004), and Chen
and Rosenthal (2008) construct indices at the metro level based on how high wages are
compared to rents, controlling only for worker and housing characteristics. This “agnostic”
index implicitly includes the value of observed and unobserved amenities together.3 Albouy
(2008) incorporates federal taxes and missing non-housing costs into a similar index to infer
that willingness-to-pay in high-rent, high-wage (typically large) metro areas is much higher
than previous research implied. He regresses the agnostic quality-of-life index in a second-
stage regression to infer how much quality of life is predicted by observed amenities.4 We
use a similar methodology, refining it for sub-metropolitan analysis.
Most recent estimates of individual amenity values follow a more quasi-experimental or
structural approach. The quasi-experimental approach helps to eliminate problems with
unobserved variables, but may still be confounded by household sorting behavior.5 Fur-
thermore, quasi-experiments are unavailable for many amenities making this approach too
limited to provide an overall index of neighborhood desirability. Structural approaches offer
a wealth of methods to account for household sorting according to preferences and income,
as well as how this sorting may generate local amenities, such as the provision of local public
goods. Despite their strengths and flexibility, these models often require strong parametric
3Beyond amenity indices, the essential insight of equal indirect utility across areas has also been used
by McDuff (2011) to predict migration flows and Kim, Liu and Yezer (2009) to explain intra-city wage
differentials.
4A recent unpublished working paper by Bieri, Kuminoff, and Pope (2013) performs an analysis similar
to Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) at the county-level. They incorporate many of the features new in
Albouy (2008) regarding taxes and non-housing costs, and correct for selection from inter-state migration
using techniques adapted from Dahl (2002). While they find the Dahl correction important, we find it to be
negligible, perhaps as we used a larger set of worker controls in our wage equation. Bieri et al. use a set of
amenities larger than any similar study to determine relative amenity expenditures. Since many amenities
as well as worker and housing characteristics remain unobserved, this technique does not guarantee reduced
omitted variable bias. We prefer to use a more agnostic quality-of-life measure and explore how it is predicted
by a parsimonious set of amenities.
5For examples, see Davis (2004) for health, Chay and Greenstone (2005) for air quality, and Cellini et al.
(2010) for school facilities. Crime has also been valued using housing prices, see Linden and Rockoff (2008),
Pope (2008), or Gautier et al (2009). Crime has even been examined as a cause of misallocation of time at
work, see Hamermesh (2009). Over time, residents may re-sort across neighborhoods, causing issues with the
estimates, see Kuminoff and Pope (2013) and Banzhaf (2013). Studies that use spatial discontinuities, such
as district borders (Black 1999), may be subject to sorting effects (Bayer et al. 2007). Many amenities, like
climate or geography, change over long time frames, and so it is sensible to model sorting explicitly. Albouy
et al. (2013) do just that using the QOL measures here with the method of Bajari and Benkard (2006) to
examine the problem of climate change.
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identifying assumptions and computationally-intensive estimation procedures which make
their validity difficult to assess.6
Research on how commuting impacts local prices is focused on intra-urban gradients.
Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), and Muth (1969) predict rent gradients that fall with distance
to a central business district, as lower rents compensate households for higher commuting
costs. Hoehn, Berger, and Blomquist (1987) consider how a city-wide amenity affects wages
and prices in a monocentric city, and conclude “the amenity valuation results of Roback’s
pure inter-regional case carry over.” Muth (1969), White (1976) and Straszheim (1984)
theorize that wages should fall with distance from urban centers and sub-centers as workers
accept lower wages for shorter commutes.7
Empirical evidence on wage gradients (e.g. Eberts 1981, Madden 1985, Zax 1991,
McMillen and Singell 1992) often supports the above hypothesis. Evidence on rent gra-
dients is more mixed (e.g. Dubin and Sung 1987), at least over short distances, suggesting
the importance of confounding amenities. A stark example is metro Detroit, where central-
city land is often cheaper and less developed than suburban land, and much employment
is decentralized. Gabriel and Rosenthal (1996) provide a more decentralized theory, similar
to ours, but use it to address the spatial mismatch of employment for minorities.8 Busso
et al. (2013) demonstrate the practical importance of examining commuting behavior and
sub-metropolitan wage levels when examining the impact of the federal urban Empowerment
Zone program.
Estimates of local wage and rent levels may be biased by unobserved worker skills or
housing quality. Fu and Ross (2013) estimate a positive effect of employment density on
wages that is unaffected by detailed controls for place of residence, but is rendered insignif-
6See Kuminoff et al. (2013) for a review of this literature. Notable examples include Epple and Sieg
(1999) on levels of school funding, and Bayer and Timmins (2005) on equilibrium properties of sorting
models. Angrist and Pischke (2010) and Nevo and Winston (2010) provide debate on the pros and cons of
structural modeling and credible inference.
7Turnbull (1992) examines the role of leisure in a related model and concludes that it matters little for
examining wage gradients. “The introduction of leisure choice into the local employment location model
does not alter either the form of the location equilibrium location condition or the immediate implication for
the wage rate-distance relationship.” This occurs since households put the same value on work and leisure
on the margin.
8While racial segregation is of obvious importance, we defer most questions on race to existing and future
research. When we do examine worker heterogeneity, we focus on a single-index that aggregates observable
characteristics such race, age, education, and immigrant status according to how these factors impact wages.
94
icant when commuting is controlled for. This provides evidence that workers’ unobserved
earnings abilities are unrelated with where they work, even if they are related to where they
live.
3.3 A Model of Residential Choice with Commuting
3.3.1 Household Preferences and Constraints
We incorporate commuting into Rosen’s (1979) model, expanded by Albouy (2008).
Households are homogeneous, mobile, and have information about each community. They
consume a traded good, x, with price normalized to one, a non-traded home good, y, with
price (or rent) p, leisure time, l, commuting time, f , and a vector of amenities, Z. For
simplicity, we aggregate amenities into a single index, Q = Q˜(Z). Household preferences
are modeled by a utility function, U(x, y, l, f ;Q), which is quasi-concave and decreasing in
f and increasing in x, y, l, and Q.9
Households choose their place of residence, j, which differ in local prices, pj, and quality
of life, Qj. They also choose their hours, h, and place of work, k, which differ in wages, wk.
Commuting between home and work takes time f jk, and is assumed to have a proportional
monetary cost, c · f jk, where c ≥ 0 is a constant. Households receive income from wages,
wkh, plus non-labor income, I, from a diversified portfolio of land and capital. They pay
federal taxes τ(wjh+I), which are rebated lump-sum. State taxes and tax benefits to owner-
occupied housing are modeled in Appendix M.10 The resulting household budget constraint
9Note that the amenities of a location j may be physically located in adjoining areas, such as museums
within the metro area. By aggregating the amenities we impose that preferences for consumption goods
and amenities are weakly separable, which is unlikely to hold. Some amenities, such as beaches, may be
closer substitutes to leisure than others. Colwell et al. (2012) considers how amenities may impact behavior
with varying commutes. In such cases, the utility function would need to incorporate multiple Q or Z
arguments. In practice, these concerns could have a second-order importance on QOL estimates that our
measures ignore. For instance, in high amenity areas, residents may work less at their market job, and thus
put less importance on local wages.
10We do not model savings behavior explicitly, as the portfolio or return to savings do not depend on
where people live. A degree of household wealth is tied up in home equity, but with perfect capital markets,
this will not matter. In real life, homeowners in more expensive areas may have greater equity (or leverage)
in local land, but the rate of return on risk-adjusted savings should be the same. In a dynamic setting, it
could be interesting to look at income effects from windfall capital gains in local land markets. This would
then require us to distinguish individuals from where they used to reside to where they currently do. We
save this complex issue for future research.
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is then x + pjy + cf jk ≤ wjh + I − τ(wjh + I). The time endowment is normalized to one,
so that households satisfy the time constraint h + l + f jk ≤ 1. The following expenditure
function joins the utility function and two constraints to express the after-tax net expenditure
necessary for a household to obtain utility u:
e(pj, wk, f jk;Qj, u) = min
x,y,h,l
{x+ pjy − wjh− I + cf jk + τ(wjh+ I)
: U(x, y, l, f jk;Qj) ≥ u, h+ l + f jk ≤ 1},
This function, assumed to be continuously differentiable, increases in the urban-cost param-
eters pj and f jk and decreases in the local opportunity parameters wk and Qj, meaning
∂e/∂p, ∂e/∂f ≥ 0 and ∂e/∂w, ∂e/∂Q ≤ 0.
3.3.2 Equilibrium in Places of Residence and Work
Mobile and informed households do not choose a place-of-residence and place-of-work
combination (j, k) less satisfying than any other. When households are homogeneous, all
observed combinations (j, k) must provide the same level of utility, u. This equilibrium can
be characterized neatly with the expenditure function:
e(pj, wk, f jk;Qj, u) = 0, (3.1)
for all (j, k) combinations in the data. No one, on net, needs to be paid extra for where they
live and work; everyone is equally satisfied with the conditions they face.
To characterize differences in prices and wages, we implicitly differentiate condition (3.1).
By varying the place of residence, j, we find
∂e
∂p
dpj +
∂e
∂f
df j +
∂e
∂Q
dQj = 0. (3.2)
should hold for all observed residences and commutes. With some abuse of notation, df j
denotes the change in commuting time by varying residences. This expression generalizes the
rent gradient: higher rents may be associated with lower commute times or higher quality of
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life.
The urban-wage gradient is expressed by varying the place of work, k, requiring that
∂e
∂w
dwk +
∂e
∂f
dfk = 0. (3.3)
across all observed commutes and workplaces. Here, dfk is the change in commuting time by
varying workplaces. Workers will travel longer if they are compensated with higher wages.
The model so far is similar to that on rent and wage gradients (e.g. McMillen and Singell
1992) with amenities added in. The goal here is not to test whether these gradients hold.
Instead, we combine (3.2) and (3.3) to infer a local willingness-to-pay measure for changes in
quality of life, dQj. This yields the expression −(∂e/∂Q)dQj = (∂e/∂p)dpj + (∂e/∂w)dwk +
(∂e/∂f)df jk where df jk ≡ df j + dfk is the total difference in time spent commuting. We
apply the envelope theorem (i.e. Shepard’s Lemma) to the expenditure function (3.1) to
interpret the derivatives, which we evaluate at the national average. Accordingly, ∂e/∂p = y¯
is average housing consumption, ∂e/∂w = −(1− τ ′)h¯, average labor supply net of taxes, and
∂e/∂f = [c+ (1− τ ′)w¯ − α], the sum of monetary and after-tax opportunity cost of working
net of the “leisure-value” of commuting, α ≡ (∂U/∂f)/(∂U/∂x). Combining these, we solve
for the marginal willingness-to-pay for local quality of life in terms of local rents relative to
wages, adjusted for commuting:
pQdQ
j = y¯ · dpj − (1− τ ′)h¯ · dwk + [c+ (1− τ ′)w¯ − α] df jk, (3.4)
where pQ ≡ ∂e/∂Q is the marginal valuation of Q.11 If wages are rearranged on the left, the
expression relates how higher urban costs, y¯ · dpj + [c+ (1− τ)w¯ − α] df jk are paid to access
residential amenity opportunities, pQdQ
j, or employment opportunities, (1− τ ′)h¯ · dwk.12 In
11Since Q does not have natural units, neither pQ nor dQ
j alone have operational meaning, although their
product does as pQdQ
j is the marginal willingness-to-pay to enjoy the amenities in location j. Although the
approximation sets pQ at the national average, the price of amenities may change across locations.
12Timothy and Wheaton (2001) consider the situation when wages, wk, are fixed and exogenous. Then,
only in knife-edge cases will households commute from the same place of residence to more than one work
place . With endogenous wages, wages in further (closer) places may rise (fall) to allow for more varied
commuting behavior, as we see in the data. Moreover, in a more realistic model, workers may vary in their
transportation costs, preferences of location, or receive idiosyncratic wage offers from different locations,
each with mean wk, all of which could cause workers from the same residences to commute to a large variety
of workplaces. For an example of such a model which allows for income heterogeneity, see Gabriel and
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other words, high wages compensate workers for high urban costs or low amenities.
3.3.3 Applying and Parametrizing the Model
To operationalize the model, we divide (3.4) by average income m¯, re-express the level-
differentials in terms of log-differentials pˆj ≡ dpj/p¯, wˆk ≡ dwk/w¯, fˆ jk ≡ df jk/f¯ , and replace
the coefficients with share parameters. The marginal willingness-to-pay for local amenities,
expressed as a fraction of income, Qˆ ≡ pQdQj/m¯, is then
Qˆj = sypˆ
j − (1− τ ′)swwˆk +
[
sc + (1− τ ′)sw f¯
h¯
− α f¯
m¯
]
fˆ jk︸ ︷︷ ︸
cˆjk
, (3.5)
where sy = p¯y¯/m¯ is the expenditure share for home goods, sw ≡ w¯h¯/m¯ is the income share
from labor, sc ≡ cf¯/m¯ is share of income spent on commuting, and f¯/h¯ is the the ratio
of time spent commuting to time spent working. The last term on the right, cˆjk, is the
“commuting-cost differential,” which measures the full cost of commuting as a fraction of
gross income.
For the non-commuting parameters, we follow Albouy (2008). sw = 0.75 allows for
25 percent of income to come from non-labor sources. sy = 0.361 accounts for typical
expenditures on housing (22 percent) plus the costs of non-housing goods, which are strongly
related to rents, by raising the share another 14 percentage points. Marginal tax rates, τ ,
are based on average marginal income tax rates, a portion of payroll tax rates, and state
taxes insofar as wages vary within states. Tax advantages for owner-occupied housing are
also accounted for.13
For the commuting parameters, we use information from the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP) and National Highway Summary of Travel Trends. We take the
median percent of income spent on commuting by mode: sc = 0.049 for drivers, sc = 0.033
for transit-users, and sc = 0.00 for walkers. To determine time costs, we calculate that the
average worker in 2000 worked 1822 hours and spent 184 hours commuting (U.S. Census),
Rosenthal (1996).
13In Appendix M we explain how we adjust marginal rates by state as well as deductions for housing.
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roughly 10 percent of the working day, and thus f¯/h¯ = 0.10.14
The greatest uncertainty involves the parameter α: marginal commuting time is valued
as work time if it equals zero and as leisure time if it equals the after tax wage, (1 − τ ′)w¯.
Studies have suggested a range of values for this parameter, although we find the value of
α = 0 to be the most plausible and straightforward. This value is supported by evidence from
Small et al. (2005), from stated and revealed preference, and Fu and Ross (2013), from wage
gradients, that commuting is not preferred to working. Well-being data from Kahneman
and Krueger (2006) find that subjective affect while commuting is as low or lower than while
working, reinforcing this value. Alternative values of α may be accounted for easily.
3.3.4 Strengths and Limitations of the Model
The quality-of-life index proposed in (3.5) is based on a straightforward integration of
standard urban theories. The chosen parametrization of willingness-to-pay applies only to
a typical household. Particular households will vary in how they value wages relative to
housing and commuting costs. Households with fewer earners, such as retirees, place less
value on wages; households with children may value housing costs more. Implicit marginal
tax rates in taxes and transfers can also vary. It is straightforward to parametrize the model
differently to account for this heterogeneity. 15 While free mobility is a standard assumption,
in reality, households do not move unless the benefit merits the cost of moving. Declining
areas tend to keep households with greater moving costs, and thus may have inflated measures
of willingness-to-pay.
Households may vary considerably in their tastes for local amenities, such as schools or
climate. Nevertheless, Pew Research Center (2009) finds that individuals of different ages,
gender, income, and education often state similar preferences for which metro areas they
find most livable.16 Research using revealed preferences generally assumes that different
14Annual commuting time is the product of 418 commuting trips, averaging 26.4 minutes each way. Com-
mute time is assumed to be equal by mode.
15The quality-of-life index is also moderately robust to behavioral responses in leisure or consumption due
to differences in rents, wages, or commuting costs – because of the envelope theorem, such considerations
have only a second-order effect.
16For those making less than $30,000 a year, 13 percent state they would live in Detroit, 30 percent in
San Francisco. For those making over $100,000, the rates are 7 percent for Detroit and 48 percent for San
Francisco. The differences for most other cities, like Atlanta (24 and 26 percent) and New York (21 and 35
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groups pay the same rent and relies on differences in relative population frequencies to infer
different tastes (e.g. Bayer et al. 2007). While there is much evidence of sorting by race and
income across neighborhoods (e.g. Cutler and Glaeser 1997 and Ioannides 2004), converting
relative frequencies into willingness-to-pay measures has generally relied on strong parametric
assumptions.
With heterogeneous preferences, the supply and demand of amenities matters. For ex-
ample, the marginal bid for land on the coast should rise if the supply of coastline per
person falls. Although typical households may value car-friendly suburban developments, if
these are abundant relative to walkable downtowns, the latter may be costlier, as downtown
residences are allocated only to the highest bidders (Gyourko et al. 2013).
Tastes for different areas may depend considerably on the local population either directly
or indirectly for the “artificial” amenities they bring. Yinger (2014) finds considerable dif-
ferences in demand for neighborhood ethnic composition. Boustan (2013) estimates high
demand for high-income neighbors, as they provide high-quality schools relative to property
tax rates. Ultimately, neighborhood “quality” is a sensitive topic that depends on many
subjective factors.
As an example, consider a housing project built for low-income households in a low-wage
area, such as Decatur, IL. Even if subsidized residents prefer Decatur to their previous loca-
tion, say Chicago, they should still have a lower willingness-to-pay than previous residents,
who paid full price to be there. As the proportion of low-income households increases, the
local per-capita tax base may decline, causing public services to fall. Unless original resi-
dents prefer the new mix of residents to the old, or the change in local amenities it brings,
the introduction of public housing is likely to reduce local willingness-to-pay, although this
remains an empirical question.17
As another example, consider the impact of zoning restrictions meant to exclude low-
income households. If such zoning is binding, low-income households will have a limited
supply of neighborhoods to choose from, say in the central city. These limits may lengthen
commuting times and raise rents in those neighborhoods, artificially increasing measured
percent), are smaller, and there are very few cases of inversion.
17Diamond and McQuade (2015) estimate how different households value new construction from the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit Program.
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willingness-to-pay. If low-income households live in less desirable neighborhoods, zoning
would attenuate the quality-of-life differences we infer. The resulting segregation of rich
from poor could also reinforce differences in artificially produced amenities.
3.4 Wage, Rent, and Commuting-Cost Estimates
3.4.1 Units of Geography
We estimate wage, rent, and commuting-cost differentials from the 5 percent sample of
the U.S. Census in the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) for 2000 (Ruggles
et al. 2004).18 The public-use files identify households’ location of residence down to 2071
Public Use Microdata Areas. These areas have an average population of 135,887, and a
minimum of 100,000. The Census Bureau does not provide names for 2000 PUMAs; we
name them using the counties, municipalities, or neighborhoods they contain.
The geographic detail of the PUMAs increases with population density. 186 PUMAs
correspond exactly to counties. 1,266 PUMAs are entirely contained within a subset of
288 counties, and are often identifiable neighborhoods or municipalities. For example, in
Washtenaw County, MI, one PUMA corresponds to the city of Ann Arbor while the other
refers to areas in Washtenaw County outside Ann Arbor. In the borough of Manhattan (New
York County, NY), the PUMAs correspond to sub-boroughs, such as the Upper East Side.
2,654 counties are entirely contained within one of 526 larger PUMAs. For example, Clarke,
Madison, and Occonee counties in Georgia form a single PUMA around Athens, GA.
We aggregate our PUMA level estimates up to the level of Metropolitan Area, as defined
by the Office of Management and Budget (1999). These 276 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) are supersets of counties – such as the MSA for Athens, GA which coincides with
the three counties listed above. 19 of the largest MSAs are categorized as Consolidated
MSAs (CMSAs) which are in turn made up of 55 Primary MSAs (PMSAs). Thus, from
2071 PUMAs we may assemble the data into 3081 counties, 276 MSA/CMSAs, and 331
18We acknowledge that the quality-of-life estimates are slightly dated. Nevertheless, the 2000 Census offers
the last 5 percent snapshot of the U.S. More recent data on housing prices may not be driven by market
fundamentals due to the wake of the boom and bust cycle, as detailed in Ferreira and Gyourko (2011).
Furthermore, recent evidence in Lee and Lin (2013) highlights remarkable persistence in the desirability of
most neighborhoods, especially in areas with natural amenities.
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MSA/PMSAs (splitting the 19 CMSAs into 55 PMSAs).19
Within metro areas, the Census designates some places as central cities, typically the
largest population and employment centers. We separate these from other places within
MSAs, which we label suburban; places completely outside of MSAs are non-metropolitan.20
We also classify areas according to residential population density – calculated at the census-
tract level and averaged by population – using cut-offs of 1,000 and 5,000 residents per square
mile.
Panel 1 of Table 3.1 presents means of the estimated differentials and related statistics
for central city, suburban, and non-metro areas. The rent, wage, and commuting-cost differ-
entials are mapped in Figures 1A, 1B, and 1C. Panel 2 presents this information summarized
by the location’s average density. Panel 3 presents the standard deviations of the differentials
across the United States, and decomposes the variance within and across metro areas. In
Table 3.2, these statistics are presented for PUMAs in two well-known counties: New York,
NY (Manhattan), and San Francisco, CA. Table 3.3 contains the differential measures for
various levels of geography in 5 MSAs; Table A1 in the Appendix contains them of all 2071
PUMAs.
3.4.2 Housing Costs due to Location and Composition
We use both housing values and gross rents, including utilities, to calculate rent, or
“housing-cost,” differences, interpreted as the flow-cost of housing faced by households. To
impute owned housing rents, and make them comparable to gross rents for rental units,
we multiply housing values by a rate of 7.85 percent (Peiser and Smith 1985) and add
utility costs. We regress rents on place-of-residence indicators, µjp, and controls for housing
composition, denoted Xjpi – i.e., size, rooms, acreage, commercial use, kitchen and plumbing
19PUMAs can usually be assigned uniquely to counties or MSAs, but in cases where they overlap MSA (or
county) boundaries, the observations are subdivided and given a fractional weight according to the proportion
of the population that resides in each area. All of our aggregations use population-weighted averages of these
PUMA values.
20For instance, all of New York City, Bridgeport, Newark, and New Haven are deemed central city, but
none of Long Island is. The cities of San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, Berkeley, and Richmond are all
central city, but Fremont, Hayward, Union City, and all of Marin and San Mateo counties are not.
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facilities, type and age of building – each interacted with renter status.21 The resulting
regression equation is
ln pji = X
j
piβp + µ
j
p + ε
j
pi, (3.6)
where estimates of µjp are the rent differentials, pˆ
j, for location j. Remaining differences
in mean housing costs, ln pj − µp = X¯jpβj, are attributed to mean differences in observable
housing composition across areas, X¯jp , which we call “housing quality.” Since X involves
measures like the number of rooms, “quality” also refers to quantity of housing. We also
include corrections for rent control for New York City and San Francisco.22
Our estimates of rent differentials may be contaminated by differences in unobserved
housing quality not captured by the variables provided by the Census. For example, two-
bedroom apartments built in a 1960s-era Chicago suburb are likely to be more spacious than
similar ones built contemporaneously in the Chicago Loop. Biases in rent differentials bias
quality-of-life estimates in the same direction. Thus, “quality of life” can reflect unobserved
housing quality. If unobserved housing quality is biasing the rent estimates, it seems likely
that rent estimates would be correlated with measures of observed housing quality. As
shown in Appendix Figure A, the correlation between the two is almost zero, suggesting
that unobserved housing quality is not systematically correlated with willingness-to-pay for
local amenities.23
21We combine rent and imputed-rent measures to avoid potential problems created by local differences in
home-ownership (see Table A2). For instance, in Manhattan 80 percent of housing units are rented, whereas
in King William Co., VA, only 13 percent are rented. Using more recent data, Albouy and Hanson (2014)
calculate an average user cost for owner-occupied housing of 6.2 percent. With our controls for tenure status,
the rate used has only a minor effect.
22Pollakowski (2003) estimates that in core Manhattan areas, the lower 6 neighborhoods, prices for rent-
controlled units would be 37 percent higher without rent control. Using a similar method with Census data,
we determine that prices for rent-controlled units in San Francisco would be 22 percent higher in the absence
of rent control. To correct for this, we add the fraction of rent-controlled units in each PUMA times ln(1+a)
to the housing cost index, where a is how much prices for units would appreciate in the absence of rent
control.
23For instance, the compositional component of housing cost is very high in parts of suburban Atlanta
(e.g. Alpharetta), although the location is quite average. Meanwhile, the compositional component is quite
low where the locational rent is high, such as in Hawaii, Manhattan, and the San Francisco Bay Area.
Within Manhattan, units in lower cost Harlem have a higher value than units in Midtown, Downtown, or
the Upper East and West Sides. For homes of the very wealthy, possible biases are mitigated by the fact
that housing values are censored at $1 million. When density is flexibly controlled for, a one-point increase
in housing-cost predicts a 0.1 point increase in the value of housing composition. Nevertheless, Malpezzi et.
al. (1998) determine that rent indices derived from the Census using hedonic methods perform as well as
most other indices.
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Figure 3.1 maps the rent index across the United States. Appendix Table P.1 summarizes
the index and details the variables. In Table 3.1, we see rents are 2 percent higher, on
average, in the suburbs than in central cities. This fact runs contrary to standard rent-
gradient predictions, although from the maps we see that rents do eventually fall away from
city centers. Outside of metro areas, rents are 35 percent (42 log points) lower than in
suburbs. In Panel B, we see dense areas have the highest rents, as predicted by standard
urban models.
In column 3, we see that housing quality in central cities worth 14 percent less than in
the suburbs. Quality also falls by about 10 percent each time between high and medium,
and medium and low density areas. This is the case as units in denser, central areas are
older and smaller.
Panel C provides evidence that differences in housing quality are considerable, but smaller
than differences due to location. In addition, rent levels vary more across metro areas than
within them, while the opposite is true of housing quality.
3.4.3 Wage Levels Estimated by Residence and Workplace
To calculate wage differentials, wˆk, we use hourly wages from a sample of workers, ages
25 to 55, who worked at least 30 hours a week and 26 weeks a year. We regress log wages
on place-of-work indicators, µkw, and controls for worker composition, or skills, X
k
wi, – i.e.,
education, experience, race, occupation, industry, and veteran, marital, and immigrant status
– each interacted with gender. The regression equation is
lnwki = X
k
wiβ + µ
k
w + ε
k
wi. (3.7)
We calculate wage differentials for residents in location j by averaging µkw, according to the
proportion of residents of j who work in each place k. This is interpreted as the measure
of the wage opportunities, wˆk, available to residents, when they incur the commuting costs
estimated below. We map the wage index in Figure 1B. The Appendix summarizes related
worker measures (Table P.2), and details the variables. We also estimate differences in wages
due to average differences in observed characteristics or “skills,’ X¯kw, weighting them by their
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estimated return, βˆ.
In column 6 of Table 3.1 we see notable variation in observed skills: workers’ predicted
wages are 4 percent below average in central cities, and 4 percent above average in suburbs.
24 Observed skills are also 6 percent lower in high-density areas, and 4 percent higher in
medium-density areas. The typical standard deviation is 10 log points, with most of the
variation within metro areas. This highlights the importance of income-sorting at the sub-
metropolitan level.
The evidence of sorting on observed skills raises concerns about unobserved skills. This
problem may be mitigated within metros, by measuring wage opportunities by place of work.
This depends on evidence in Fu and Ross (2013) that workers do not sort across workplaces
according to their unobserved skills.25 Figure 3.4 graphs wage estimates by place of work
against those by residence; the former vary less than the latter.
Estimates of wage levels by residence vary much more than commuting costs. The enor-
mous gains workers could make by changing their commuting behavior suggests that residen-
tial choices correlated with unobserved skills is influencing those estimates. In Table 3.2, we
see that within Manhattan, the Upper West Side wages by residence are 54 percent higher
than in Washington Heights, even though the two areas are separated only by a 14-minute
subway ride, costing a $1.50 fare in 2000. Wages by workplace exhibit a much more plausible
5-percent spread. By residence, wages in the Long Island suburbs are often higher than in
Manhattan, but by workplace (the two have different PWPUMAs), wages in Long Island
are much lower.26
24This fact is consistent with sorting models when the income elasticity for housing is higher than that for
the costs of commuting.
25Note that place of work in the public-use files is only available at the Place of Work Public Use Microdata
Area (PWPUMA) level. These number 1240, and are made up of the 2071 standard PUMAs. Selection at
this coarser level should be no worse than at the PUMA level (used by Fu and Ross). However, the coarser
geography eliminates some wage differences mechanically. Appendix N has more details on PWPUMAs.
In Appendix Table P.2, we determine that half of the differences between the residential and workplace
estimates is due to coarser geography; the remaining half is due to actual commuting. The averaging effect
may still reduce potential biases, while introducing new ones if agglomeration effects are highly localized and
commutes are short. See Rosenthal and Strange (2001) for more about how agglomeration varies at different
levels of geography.
26Within San Francisco, wages by residence are 28 percent higher in the primarily residential Marina-
Northeastern area than in the skyscraper-filled Downtown. These areas are adjacent, connected by a walk,
short drive, or bus ride. Morning commuters head Downtown, contrary to the residential wage gradient.
Again, place-of-work wages are much more plausible, exhibiting a 1-percent difference.
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On average, residential wage measures indicate wages are lower in central cities; place-
of-work wages are equally high in both. Furthermore, they rise with density and eventually
fall in the distant suburbs.
Whether we measure wages by residence or workplace, Panel C of Table 3.1 implies that
wages vary far more across metro areas than within them. On the other hand, wages due to
observed skills vary much more within metros. This supports the hypotheses that residential
sorting is greatest within metro areas, while wage level changes across metros are due largely
to local firm productivity.
The differences between residence and workplace wage measures provides an index of
unobserved skills. In Figure 3.4, this index equals the rightward distance from the diagonal
to each PUMA’s marker, e.g. unobserved skills for workers is high in Alpharetta and low in
East Harlem. Across PUMAs, a one-point increase in observed skills predicts a half-point
increase in this unobservable skill measure, and is stronger within MSAs. In column 6 of
Table 3.2 both observed and unobserved skill levels are low in Harlem and Bayview, and high
in the Upper East Side and N.E. San Francisco. In conclusion, using wages by residence will
likely bias quality-of-life estimates upwards in areas with low-skilled workers, confusing them
for areas where jobs offer low wages.
3.4.4 Commuting Costs
We estimate commuting-costs using reported commuting times and modes from the same
sample used for wages. We regress the square root of commute time, with place-of-residence
indicators, µjf , and controls, X
j
fi. The controls are the same as in the wage equation, plus
controls for children, – each interacted with gender. Thus, the regression equation is
√
f ji = X
j
fiβf + µ
j
f + ε
j
fi. (3.8)
We use the square root as it fits the data well and accommodates reports of zero commuting
time. The differential is then constructed using fˆ j = 2µjf/
√
f , where
√
f is the average of
square-root commuting time.27
27The R-squared is 0.08 using the square root. Using powers of 0.25 and 1 (linear) caused even worse fits.
We forgo discussion of time predicted by observable characteristics, which have little predictive power.
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We assume that the time-cost of commuting, α, is independent of transportation mode,
and that transportation mode determines monetary costs. Using a linear probability model,
we calculate demographically-adjusted probabilities of using each mode of transportation,
ρjl , for modes l – own car, carpool, public transportation, and other methods (e.g. walking
and biking). The monetary cost of commuting, represented by scfˆ
jk, is the weighted average
of the mode costs multiplied by the time differential, plus the deviation in average monetary
costs:
scfˆ
jk =
∑
l
ρjl clfˆ
j +
∑
l
(
ρjl − ρ¯
)
cl.
Outside of New York City, these modal adjustments are minor since most people drive.28
The Appendix details these methods and summarizes the component measures in Table A4.
Column 7 in Tables 1 and 2 report the index of commuting costs, cˆjk, the last term of
(3.5), which depends primarily on commuting times, reported in column 8. Consistent with
standard urban models, these costs are lower in central cities than in the suburbs. These
costs are lowest in non-metro areas where labor markets are more dispersed. They vary
slightly less within metropolitan areas than across them. The map in Figure 1C, illustrates
these facts. In large metros like Atlanta, Dallas, and Houston, commuting costs exhibit a
remarkable annulus or “donut” pattern around their central cities. In other metros, the
patterns are more asymmetric: in Detroit they rise going north; in Boston they rise heading
south towards Cape Cod. The highest commuting times nationwide are on the outskirts of
New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and Washington D.C. The lowest costs are in remote areas,
particularly in the Great Plains.
Figure 3.5 plots commuting costs relative to rents within metro areas that contain multi-
ple PUMAs. A one-point increase in commuting costs is associated with a 3.5 point reduction
in rents, or a 2.8 point reduction when controlling for wage-levels by place of work. This nega-
tive relationship agrees with rent-gradient predictions that the slope should be -3.0 according
to our parametrization of equation (3.5), holding quality of life constant. This provides ev-
idence that our parametrization may be accurate and that rent gradients do reflect wage
opportunities and commuting costs, even if the gradients are not always mono-centric.
28Within the city borders of New York, San Francisco, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago, the monetary
costs of transit riders are independent of travel time, as their transit agencies charge a flat fare.
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3.4.5 Household characteristics
Table 3.3 reports how several household characteristics diverge spatially. Some char-
acteristics vary little. The proportion of children under 18 is 27 percent in central cities,
suburbs, and non-metro areas; it does not change with density density either. The standard
deviation is 4 percentage points across PUMAs. Those over 65 are located slightly more in
non-metropolitan and low-density areas. About 50 percent of the population is in the labor
force; this number is only 1 percent higher in the suburbs and in medium-density areas.
Household size also varies little. Marriage rates among adults are somewhat lower in central
cities relative to the suburbs and non-metro areas.
Differences related to education, race, and ethnicity are more substantial. College degrees
are relatively rare outside metro areas. Within metros, college attainment varies consider-
ably, although the difference between central cities and suburbs is small. Blacks are more
likely to reside in central cities, constituting 20 percent of the population there. Immigrant
status is also concentrated in urban and dense areas, and varies more across metro areas
than within. Home ownership rates are much higher in suburban and low-density areas,
although this is strongly related to the presence of single-family buildings.
3.5 Quality of Life across the United States
We combine the rent, wage, and commuting differentials to estimate average local willingness-
to-pay – or, “quality of life” – from equation (3.5).29 The geographic units provided by the
Census allows us to map quality of life with some detail: Figure 3.6 covers the continental
United States, and Figures 5A, 5B, 5C, and 5D cover areas around San Francisco, New York,
Detroit, and Atlanta respectively. Quality-of-life differentials for these four MSAs, and for
Honolulu, are presented in Table 3.7.30 In these locations, we aggregate our quality-of-life
estimates according to four levels of geography: MSA-equivalents, PMSA-equivalents, coun-
ties, and PUMAs. Each level of geography is given its own ranking by type, so there are
29The estimates include adjustments for state taxes and housing deductions. Refer to Appendix M for
details.
30We also estimated the quality-of-life differentials separately for whites and non-whites. The relationship
between the two was nearly one-to-one, with a correlation over 0.8. This is remarkable given possible noise
in the data as well as segregation within PUMAs.
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separate rankings for each of these four geographic levels.31 A table that ranks and list
quality-of-life differentials across all 2071 PUMAs is available upon request.
The highest quality-of-life PUMAs in the United States is the Upper East Side of New
York City, famous for its museums and proximity to Central Park. Second is a PUMA that
contains the affluent Los Angeles neighborhoods of Brentwood and Bel Air, at the base of the
Santa Monica mountains. The third PUMA contains Los Gatos and Cupertino, the home
of Apple Inc., in the heart of Silicon Valley. The fourth PUMA contains the communities of
East Oahu, including Waialae-Kahala – known for its secluded beaches and accessibility to
Honolulu and Diamond Head. Rounding out the top 5 is the PUMA containing the scenic
communities of Sausalito, Mill Valley, and San Rafael, just north of San Francisco and the
Golden Gate Bridge. To live in these places, households sacrifice the equivalent over 26
percent (30 log points) of real after-tax income relative to the national average.
The highest ranked county is Marin, CA, whose county seat is San Rafael. The second
and third ranked counties are San Mateo and San Francisco (see Figure 3.7). Together,
these three counties comprise the San Francisco PMSA, which ranks first among PMSA
equivalents. When San Francisco is combined with its nearby PMSAs, including Santa Cruz
(#3), San Jose (#4) and Oakland (#8), to form the CMSA it ranks second after Honolulu.32
New York City is another particularly interesting case. Manhattan, a 34 square-mile
island, is split into 10 quite different sub-boroughs (see Figure 3.8). While the labor mar-
ket on the island appears unified, the rents vary tremendously relative to commuting costs,
signalling major differences in quality of life. Five of the sub-boroughs rank in the top 25
PUMAs, while two are in the bottom 100. Most locals are quite aware of these often discon-
tinuous differences in neighborhood desirability, such as between the Upper East Side and
East Harlem. As these neighborhoods share the same geography, climate, and municipal-
ity, these contrasts raise the issues mentioned earlier regarding heterogeneous populations,
endogenous amenities, and sorting. Suburban areas in Long Island and New Jersey show
31All measures not at the PUMA level are population weighted means of PUMA estimates.
32Blomquist et al. (1988) found Alameda County, which contains Oakland, to be one of the best counties,
and Marin County, one of the worst, in the SF Bay Area. Among other things, this is probably due to their
use of wage levels based on residence rather than place of work, since unobserved skill levels in Marin are
high. As explained in Albouy (2008), the SF Bay Area fared badly in their article as they did not take into
account federal taxes and non-housing costs-of-living.
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considerable discrepancies in quality of life as well.
The lowest quality of life is found in southwest Detroit, in the area containing the neigh-
borhoods of Chadsey, Condon, and Vernor (see Figure 3.9). Households are compensated
with 25 percent (23 log points) higher real income to live here. The Detroit MSA is relatively
undesirable on average, though the suburbs of West Bloomfield and Birmingham are in a
top 100 PUMA. Detroit has two satellite PMSAs, Flint and Ann Arbor, with contrasting
central cities. Both have similar wages and commutes, but the higher rents in Ann Arbor
signal its greater attractiveness.
Quality of life discrepancies in Atlanta, GA (Figure 3.10) are less stark. The greatest
range is within the city limits: Buckhead is the highest and Center Hill/West Lake is the
lowest, with Midtown/Downtown in-between.
Each metro area has its idiosyncrasies, although some national patterns emerge in column
9 of Table 3.1. On average, the typical household prefers suburban areas to central cities,
as they pay 2 percent more in rents, and endure commutes 7 percent longer to get the same
wages. Quality of life in central cities is still 6 percent of income higher than outside of
metro areas altogether.
Quality of life is higher in denser areas. This does not prove that density is itself desirable:
more people should want to live in amenable areas, although local housing supply restrictions
may impede them. Twenty percent of suburbs have over 5,000 residents per square mile,
where quality of life is 7 percent above average. Some central-city areas have densities under
5,000, such as downtown Kansas City, MO: these areas offer a quality of life 2 percent below
average.
The results in Panel C reveals that there appears to be almost as much variation in
quality of life within metro areas as across them. The standard deviation in values is 5
percent within metros and 6 percent across.33 This variation is remarkable given that rents,
and especially wages, vary less within MSAs than they do across them. This suggests that,
geographically, a metro area’s labor market is more homogeneous than its amenities.
To highlight the importance of commuting, column 10 presents quality-of-life estimates
33While the variation within metro areas appears slightly lower than the variation across, it is probably
understated, since PUMAs obscure variation at lower levels of geography. Thus, there is likely to be even
more variation within metros than across metros.
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that ignore commuting costs and use place-of-residence wages. These estimates make central
cities look more desirable to typical households than the suburbs.34
3.6 Predictors of Sub-Metropolitan Quality of Life
The quality-of-life index should capture the value of all amenities, many of which may
be very difficult to observe, such as smells, beautiful gardens, friendly residents, or charming
architecture. Nevertheless, it is reassuring if the quality-of-life index has significant partial
correlations of the “correct” sign for ostensibly desirable amenities. We model this relation-
ship using the regression equation
Qˆj =
∑
k
piQk Z
j
k + ε
Qj, (3.9)
In a hedonic framework, where amenities are exogenous and households have the same pref-
erences, this relationship would be taken as causal. The regression coefficients would then
be pik = −(∂E/∂Q)
(
∂Q˜/∂Zk
)
/m¯ , i.e., the fraction of gross income a household is willing
to pay for one more unit of amenity k.35 The residual εQj results from measurement error,
unobserved amenities, mis-specification, and unobserved housing quality and worker skills.
In practice, the requirements needed for this regression to have an error term orthogonal to
the amenity measures are not met.36 Thus, the dollar values we give are merely illustrative.
More uniquely, we examine whether estimates within metro areas are similar to those iden-
tified across all areas by adding MSA indicators, or “fixed effects,” to the regression. This
reduces the identifying variation, but may provide some insights, particularly if confounding
effects are different within metro areas relative to across them.
Our amenity variables are described in Appendix L, and summarized in Table 3.5. The
three climate variables – measuring cold, heat, and sunshine – vary little within metros.
34They also lower rankings of large metro areas relative to smaller ones, and to non-metro areas. Without
commuting, the San Francisco CMSA drops from 2 to 3, New York from 12 to 36, Atlanta from 70 to 146,
and Detroit from 156 to 225.
35Multiplying this coefficient by average gross household income ($68,000 in 2000) produces a dollar value.
36Amenities are often collinear, making it hard to get precise estimates for a large set of variables. Un-
measured amenities may contribute to omitted variable biases. Artificial amenities may be endogenous to
other determinants of quality of life, including local populations with heterogeneous preferences. There may
also be important non-linearities in the hedonic equation.
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The geography measures – average slope of land and inverse distance to the coast – vary
more within. We also use three amenity variables that are largely endogenous to the local
population and available nationwide only at the county level. We proxy for safety using the
negative murder rate. It varies more within metros than across; murders are more common
in central and dense areas. The same is true of bars and restaurants, which is our proxy of
local entertainment. Public school revenues exhibit less variation within metros, much like
local wage levels, which are likely the main source of cost differences through salaries. These
revenues are higher in the suburbs. Because artificial amenities are largely produced by local
residents, they may reflect the desirability of the populations themselves.
Table 3.6 reports the estimates from the amenity regressions. The eight variables ex-
plain 40 percent of the variation in quality of life over all 2071 PUMAs. The finding that
households value areas with mild winters, mild summers, sloped land, sunshine, and coastal
proximity echoes those of Albouy (2008) for metro areas; Albouy et al. (2013) explore the
influence of climate in greater depth. The main observation here is that the coefficients for
temperature and slope are still relatively precise and larger within metros. The sunshine es-
timate becomes imprecise, mainly since there are fewer weather stations measuring sunshine
than metro areas. Fixed effects cause the estimate for coastal proximity to become small
and insignificant. This may be the result of how coastal proximity is measured, or because
residents in communities near the coasts find that “close is good enough,” in the words of
Schmidt and Courant (2006).
The estimates for artificial amenities do not change substantially when metro fixed effects
are included, with the exception of crime. Whether this is due to particular household sorting
within metro areas deserves further investigation.
Although crime rates are available nationally only at the county level, the regressions
here associate an increase in the murder rate from 10 to 20 per 100,000 residents – the
difference between Los Angeles and Philadelphia – with a reduction in willingness-to-pay of
$900 per household, or $1,800 with fixed effects.37 The geographic coarseness of the crime
measure suggests a downward bias, while murder’s correlation with other crimes and other
37It is worth noting that crime victims may not be residents of the neighborhood where the crime occurred,
although our measure is at the fairly broad county level.
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disamenities suggest an upward bias. The estimate is smaller than crime valuations in Bishop
and Murphy (2011), based on geographically finer data for the SF Bay Area.
The number of local bars and restaurants is strongly associated with willingess-to-pay.
Per 1,000, each establishment is associated with $190 rise in willingness-to-pay, or $190,000
total. This is just over a third of the average revenue of a restaurant. This large number
likely overstates the value of these establishments, as they are located near other retail and
entertainment establishments, in highly visited areas, where residents can afford to eat out.
The estimate also cannot reflect the value to residents outside the neighborhood.
The estimates reveal a strong association with school funding, despite the fact that local
taxes are not controlled for. An increase in funding of $1,000 per student (or, since there are
0.9 students per household, $900 per household) is associated with a quality-of-life increase
of about $700. This number is likely biased from well-funded areas being nicer or having
more desirable residents. Interpreting this number causally would indicate that schools are
underfunded, especially if, on the margin, households fund schools out of local taxes (see
Brueckner 1982). Yet, these estimates have the same order of magnitude as the Cellini et al.
(2010) estimates for the value of school facilities and the Black (1999), Bayer et al. (2007),
and Caetano (2010) estimates for the value schools with higher test scores.
3.7 Conclusion
Despite the common ranking of neighborhood quality in the popular literature, using a
single index involves many simplifications. Our index, based on the consumption “sacrifice”
a typical household makes to live somewhere does produce plausible results that should be
correlated to many households’ tastes. Analogously, it can be useful to characterize political
views along a single dimension from “liberal” to “conservative,” even though political views
are multidimensional. While people may differ on what makes a good neighborhood, it is
convenient to have a standardized quality of life measure that reflects “typical” tastes to
compare neighborhoods in separate metro areas.
By incorporating commuting and place-of-work wages, our simple quality-of-life model fits
in well with the standard model on local rent and wage gradients. The commuting adjustment
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reveals that willingness-to-pay to live in the suburbs or in dense areas is higher than simpler
measures imply. The place-of-work wage adjustment reveals that wages offered in central
cities are as high as in the suburbs, even though skill levels are not. Overall, neighborhood
quality within metro areas appears to vary substantially. Such nearby differences seem to
have less to do with natural amenities, and more to do with local residents and the artificial
amenities they produce.
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Table 3.1: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials across the U.S., 2000
Rents/Hous. Cost Wage Commuting Quality of Life
Location Compo- Index Index Compo- Index Time Workpla. Simple
Index or sition or by Work- by Resi- sition or of Full Diff. Adj. (not
Differential Population “Rent” “Quality” place dence “Skill” Cost Only Index used)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) 85,401,116 0.070 -0.099 0.033 0.012 -0.044 -0.003 -0.007 0.004 0.016
Suburban (in Metro) 141,255,868 0.088 0.050 0.034 0.053 0.035 0.006 0.058 0.019 0.004
Non-Metropolitan Areas 54,764,922 -0.335 0.026 -0.140 -0.156 -0.020 -0.012 -0.139 -0.054 -0.035
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 75,957,757 0.276 -0.138 0.110 0.087 -0.061 0.006 0.109 0.043 0.047
1,000-5,000 per square mile 126,073,690 0.010 0.051 0.004 0.022 0.040 -0.001 -0.026 0.001 -0.006
<1,000 per square mile 79,390,459 -0.280 0.051 -0.111 -0.117 -0.005 -0.005 -0.063 -0.043 -0.035
Panel C:Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 0.358 0.140 0.128 0.145 0.105 0.018 0.220 0.079 0.066
Across Metropolitan Areas 0.310 0.066 0.123 0.130 0.047 0.014 0.176 0.060 0.052
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.179 0.123 0.033 0.065 0.093 0.011 0.132 0.050 0.041
Fraction of Variance Within 0.250 0.772 0.066 0.201 0.784 0.373 0.360 0.401 0.386
In Panels A and B, the population numbers in column 1 are totals, while the rest are averages. Wage, housing price, and commuting data
are taken from the U.S. Census 2000 IPUMS for 2071 Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). Differentials are relative to the national
average. Housing-cost differentials are based on the average logarithm of gross rents or housing prices plus utilities, with the cost-index
determined by the indicitor for what PUMA it is located in, and the composition index by the predicted value based on other observable
housing characteristics. Wage differentials are based on the average logarithm of hourly wages for full-time workers ages 25 to 55, with
the “By workplace” differential estimated off of work-place indicators, averaged over resident workers, the “By Residence” estimated off
of residential indicators, and the “Composition” index by the wage predicted by observable characteristics. Commuting-cost differentials
for workers are estimated from monetary-cost and time-cost differentials explained in the text, the latter based on time to work. The
adjusted quality-of-life index is estimated from the housing-cost, workplace-wage, and commuting-cost indices in columns 2, 3, and 7,
according to equation (5), as calibrated in the text, while the simple index is estimated from the housing-cost and residence-wage indices,
only. In Panel C, non-metropolitan areas of each state are treated like distinct metropolitan areas, although the results do not change
substantially if they are excluded. See text for greater detail.
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Table 3.2: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials within Manhattan and San Francisco, 2000
Rents/Hous. Cost Wage Commuting Quality of Life
Location Compo- Index Index Compo- Index Time Workpla. Simple QOL
Index or sition or by Work- by Resi- sition or of Full Diff. Adj. (not rank
Area Name Population “Rent” “Quality” place dence “Skill” Cost Only Index used) from (9)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
New York Co., NY (Manhattan) 1,537,195 0.762 -0.528 0.255 0.282 0.002 -0.001 0.185 0.127 0.086 23
Upper East Side 217,063 1.409 -0.499 0.273 0.483 0.224 -0.003 0.159 0.327 0.191 1
Stuy Town/Turtle Bay 143,441 1.315 -0.556 0.270 0.434 0.194 -0.017 -0.014 0.284 0.176 7
Greeewich Vlg./Fin. District 125,567 1.284 -0.535 0.272 0.411 0.185 -0.018 -0.081 0.272 0.182 10
Upper West Side 192,213 1.223 -0.535 0.272 0.463 0.208 -0.002 0.142 0.268 0.139 12
Midtown West/Chelsea 122,241 1.078 -0.549 0.270 0.419 0.125 -0.022 -0.118 0.202 0.105 41
Washington Hts./Inwood 216,234 0.289 -0.564 0.225 0.052 -0.222 0.020 0.499 0.008 0.066 820
Morningside Hts./Hamilton Hts. 129,533 0.291 -0.510 0.235 0.110 -0.088 0.008 0.322 -0.008 0.040 993
Lower E. Side/Chinatown 166,379 0.353 -0.548 0.252 0.075 -0.132 -0.006 0.151 -0.009 0.031 996
Central Harlem 109,091 -0.039 -0.474 0.237 0.199 -0.186 0.011 0.305 -0.113 -0.106 1998
East Harlem 115,433 -0.053 -0.474 0.236 0.133 -0.199 0.01 0.352 -0.117 -0.081 2006
San Francisco City & Co., CA 776,733 1.031 -0.264 0.262 0.250 -0.002 0.008 0.185 0.218 0.186 3
Marina/North Beach/Nob Hill 107,285 1.225 -0.408 0.266 0.387 0.087 -0.002 0.105 0.267 0.179 13
Ingleside 105,194 1.137 -0.155 0.260 0.258 0.007 0.018 0.265 0.261 0.230 14
Sunset 105,532 1.105 -0.215 0.268 0.229 0.050 0.021 0.350 0.251 0.226 17
Beuna Vista/Central/Bernal Hts. 109,355 1.134 -0.266 0.266 0.255 0.077 0.006 0.165 0.247 0.210 21
Richmond/W. Addition 136,975 1.047 -0.269 0.265 0.266 0.053 0.011 0.217 0.225 0.179 30
Downtown/SOMA/Mission 107,054 0.880 -0.361 0.257 0.183 -0.109 -0.014 -0.037 0.152 0.154 103
S. Bayshore/S. Central 105,338 0.681 -0.166 0.248 0.169 -0.200 0.013 0.223 0.118 0.126 170
Differentials are relative to the national average and are expressed in logarithms or logarithm equivalents. The sub-county measures are
for Public-Use Microdata Areas, each containing over 100,000 inhabitants. Area names for the PUMAs here are based on sub-borough
and planning area names from the Census. To offset bias due to rent control, the fraction of units that are controlled was multiplied by
ln(1.37) in the six lower sub-broughs of Manhattan and by ln(1.19) in San Francisco. Quality-of-Life Rankings are out of 2071 PUMAs.
116
Table 3.3: Household characteristics, within, across, and outside U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2000
Percent Percent Percent House- College
Under Over of Adults hold In Labor Degree Race: Immi- Renter
18 65 Married size Force over 25 Black grant status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) 0.27 0.12 0.50 2.59 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.44
Suburban (in Metro) 0.27 0.12 0.62 2.68 0.51 0.32 0.09 0.12 0.27
Non-Metropolitan Areas 0.27 0.15 0.63 2.53 0.47 0.20 0.09 0.04 0.23
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 0.27 0.12 0.50 2.72 0.48 0.32 0.19 0.26 0.46
1,000-5,000 per square mile 0.27 0.12 0.60 2.60 0.51 0.33 0.11 0.09 0.28
<1,000 per square mile 0.27 0.14 0.64 0.257 0.48 0.22 0.09 0.04 0.22
Panel C:Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 0.041 0.042 0.091 0.329 0.055 0.137 0.170 0.126 0.142
Across Metropolitan Areas 0.022 0.029 0.035 0.200 0.035 0.076 0.095 0.101 0.069
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.035 0.029 0.060 0.259 0.042 0.156 0.143 0.077 0.129
Fraction of Variance Within 0.729 0.477 0.435 0.620 0.583 1.297 0.708 0.373 0.825
Data are taken from the U.S. Census 2000 IPUMS for 2071 Public-Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). See
Table 3.1 and text for greater detail.
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Table 3.4: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials for four levels of geography within five Metropolitan
Areas, 2000
Full QOL
Housing Wage by Comm- Rank in
Unit of Cost Work- ute QOL Geog.
Geog- Population Index place Cost Adj. Unit
Area Name raphy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Honolulu, HI MSA 876,156 0.618 0.017 0.001 0.195 1
East Oahu/Waialae-Kahala PUMA 102,724 0.958 0.017 0.005 0.306 4
Kaneohe/Kailua PUMA 117,994 0.761 0.016 0.009 0.249 18
Pearl City/Waimalu/W. Honolulu PUMA 144,481 0.646 0.016 -0.008 0.196 45
Waikiki/Alo Maoni/Kapiolani PUMA 109,509 0.700 0.018 -0.025 0.194 48
Waipahu/Mililani/Ewa PUMA 178,534 0.476 0.018 0.024 0.174 69
Downtown Honolulu PUMA 109354 0.526 0.018 -0.016 0.149 105
West Oahu/Midway Islands PUMA 113560 0.357 0.019 0.008 0.119 169
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA MSA 7,039,362 0.809 0.243 0.012 0.159 2
San Francisco, CA PMSA 1,731,183 1.078 0.266 0.008 0.230 1
Marin Co. County 247,289 1.138 0.231 0.017 0.273 1
San Rafael/Sausalito/Mill Valley PUMA 146,373 1.251 0.233 0.014 0.304 5
Novato/Lucas Valley/Point Reyes PUMA 100,916 0.974 0.228 0.022 0.227 29
San Mateo Co. County 707,161 1.109 0.283 0.006 0.230 2
San Francisco Co. County 776,733 1.031 0.262 0.008 0.218 3
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA PMSA 255,602 0.799 0.164 0.006 0.185 3
San Jose, CA PMSA 1,682,585 0.977 0.302 0.006 0.180 4
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 458,614 0.577 0.134 0.004 0.125 7
Oakland, CA PMSA 2,392,557 0.638 0.233 0.020 0.118 8
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 518,821 0.359 0.154 0.010 0.054 36
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Table 3.4: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials for four levels of geography within five Metropolitan
Areas, 2000
Full QOL
Housing Wage by Comm- Rank in
Unit of Cost Work- ute QOL Geog.
Geog- Population Index place Cost Adj. Unit
Area Name raphy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NYC, N. NJ, Long Is., NY-NJ-CT-PA MSA 22,767,645 0.430 0.198 0.023 0.067 12
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 2,753,913 0.541 0.185 0.030 0.117 9
New York, NY PMSA 9,314,235 0.473 0.202 0.027 0.086 20
Westchester Co. County 923,459 0.678 0.212 0.025 0.145 17
New York Co. (Manhattan) County 1,537,195 0.762 0.255 -0.001 0.127 23
Putnam Co. County 95,745 0.478 0.191 0.053 0.117 31
Queens Co. County 2,229,379 0.500 0.192 0.037 0.108 43
Richmond Co. (Staten Island) County 443,728 0.449 0.191 0.049 0.104 47
Rockland Co. County 286,753 0.491 0.182 0.024 0.097 54
Kings Co. (Brooklyn) County 2,465,326 0.361 0.184 0.031 0.061 117
Bronx Co. County 1,332,650 0.168 0.192 0.030 -0.006 525
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 1,373,167 0.551 0.220 0.012 0.083 22
Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 882,567 0.603 0.270 0.010 0.075 24
Danbury, CT PMSA 1,064,760 0.535 0.245 0.009 0.064 29
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 1,549,507 0.400 0.223 0.025 0.046 43
Newark, NJ PMSA 2,030,197 0.393 0.216 0.020 0.041 47
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 1,330,939 0.279 0.171 0.034 0.039 52
Bridgeport, CT PMSA 701,891 0.411 0.209 0.003 0.034 56
Dutchess County, NY PMSA 277,140 0.163 0.105 0.021 0.022 73
Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 477,918 0.095 0.079 0.030 0.021 76
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 612,562 0.345 0.235 0.019 0.017 79
Waterbury, CT PMSA 413,598 0.204 0.141 -0.001 -0.005 117
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 870,785 0.208 0.143 -0.002 -0.006 118
Trenton, NJ PMSA 350,093 0.249 0.197 0.005 -0.011 128
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Table 3.4: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials for four levels of geography within five Metropolitan
Areas, 2000
Full QOL
Housing Wage by Comm- Rank in
Unit of Cost Work- ute QOL Geog.
Geog- Population Index place Cost Adj. Unit
Area Name raphy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Atlanta, GA MSA 4,112,198 0.025 0.062 0.018 -0.002 70
DeKalb Co. County 665,865 0.133 0.076 0.018 0.026 267
Fulton Co. County 816,006 0.171 0.093 0.006 0.019 299
Cobb Co. County 607,751 0.092 0.079 0.022 0.016 313
Forsyth & Pickens Cos. County 121,390 0.015 0.042 0.023 0.006 440
Cherokee Co. County 141,903 -0.015 0.046 0.029 0.004 406
Gwinnett Co. County 588,448 0.023 0.067 0.023 -0.004 579
Coweta, Fayette, & Spalding Cos. County 238,895 -0.119 0.017 0.015 -0.030 905
Henry Co. County 119,341 -0.193 -0.004 0.021 -0.036 1185
Carroll & Douglas Cos. County 179,442 -0.201 -0.002 0.020 -0.044 1128
Bartow & Paulding Cos. County 157,697 -0.226 0.017 0.035 -0.046 1183
Newton & Rockdale Cos. County 132,112 -0.167 0.021 0.017 -0.047 1189
Barrow & Walton Cos. County 106,831 -0.221 0.009 0.026 -0.049 1260
Clayton Co. County 236,517 -0.119 0.056 0.012 -0.051 1304
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Table 3.4: Rent, Wage, Commuting-Cost, and Quality-of-life differentials for four levels of geography within five Metropolitan
Areas, 2000
Full QOL
Housing Wage by Comm- Rank in
Unit of Cost Work- ute QOL Geog.
Geog- Population Index place Cost Adj. Unit
Area Name raphy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI MSA 5,456,428 0.031 0.117 0.008 -0.039 156
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 578,736 0.141 0.079 0.003 0.009 93
Livingston Co. County 156,951 0.187 0.101 0.024 0.035 219
Washtenaw Co. County 322,895 0.220 0.096 -0.006 0.018 304
Ann Arbor PUMA 114,024 0.364 0.086 -0.021 0.054 453
Ypsilanti/Saline/Pittsfield Twp. PUMA 208,871 0.142 0.101 0.002 -0.002 915
Lenawee Co. County 98,890 -0.192 -0.009 0.001 -0.059 1467
Detroit, MI PMSA 4,441,551 0.045 0.129 0.009 -0.038 204
Oakland Co. County 1,194,156 0.277 0.146 0.012 0.032 242
Macomb Co. County 788,149 0.106 0.131 0.014 -0.015 652
St. Clair & Lapeer Co. County 252,139 -0.045 0.046 0.021 -0.018 690
Monroe Co. County 145,945 -0.025 0.072 0.008 -0.036 995
Wayne Co. County 2,061,162 -0.098 0.131 0.004 -0.091 2521
Flint, MI PMSA 436,141 -0.226 0.060 0.003 -0.099 322
Units of geography are MSA, PMSA, County, and PUMA. MSAs that contain several PMSAs, are also called “CMSAs”.
The PMSA ranking also includes MSAs that do not contain PMSAs. Counties may be larger, equal to, or smaller than
PUMAs. For example, one PUMA contains St. Clair & Lapeer counties, and so they are listed together. Only some
sub-geographies are shown. The rankings in column 6 are different for each type of geography, and are indented at the same
levels as the names. Our rankings are out of 3202 counties or equivalents (parishes, boroughs, independent cities, census
areas), 2071 PUMAs, 332 PMSAs, and 276 MSAs.
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Table 3.5: Selected amenities within, across, and outside U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 2000
Annual Annual Annual Rest- Public
Heating Cooling Sunshine Inverse Average Murder aurants School
Degree Degree Percent Distance Slope Rate and Bars Revenues
Days Days Possible to Coast of Land per 1,000 per 1,000 per Student
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) 3.98 1.40 0.62 0.13 0.01 0.09 1.80 0.81
Suburban (in Metro) 4.31 1.28 0.60 0.07 0.02 0.05 1.68 0.85
Non-Metropolitan Areas 5.15 1.13 0.59 0.02 0.02 0.04 1.68 0.75
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 3.71 1.28 0.63 0.19 0.01 0.09 1.80 0.88
1,000-5,000 per square mile 4.49 1.33 0.60 0.05 0.02 0.05 1.73 0.82
<1,000 per square mile 4.79 1.22 0.59 0.02 0.02 0.04 1.61 0.75
Panel C: Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 2.199 0.912 0.079 0.158 0.022 0.057 0.477 0.168
Across Metropolitan Areas 2.155 0.888 0.078 0.094 0.016 0.035 0.279 0.153
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.438 0.208 0.012 0.127 0.014 0.046 0.387 0.070
Fraction of Variance Within 0.040 0.052 0.023 0.646 0.405 0.651 0.658 0.174
Data are taken from sources described in the appendix. Murder rate, restaurants and bars and public school
revenues are at the county level. Cooling and heating degree days are from a 65F base. Revenues per student are
measured in $10,000 units. See text for greater detail.
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Table 3.6: Amenity predictors of local quality of life
All Within
QOL by MSA
Dependent Variables PUMA Adj QOL
(1) (2)
Minus 1000s of Heating Degree Days, 65F base 0.022*** 0.035***
(mean = 4.50, sd = 2.25) (0.001) (0.004)
Minus 1000s of Cooling Degree Days, 65F base 0.043*** 0.059***
(mean = 1.25, sd = 0.91) (0.003) (0.008)
Sunshine, percent possible 0.157*** -0.101
(mean = 0.060, sd = 0.078) (0.021) (0.098)
Inverse distance to coast 0.115*** 0.021
(mean = 0.71, sd =0.14) (0.017) (0.018)
Average Slope of Land, in percent 0.608*** 0.909***
(mean = 1.80, sd = 2.22) (0.068) (0.101)
Minus Murder Rate per 1,000 0.133*** 0.263***
(mean = 0.05, sd = 0.053) (0.033) (0.030)
Restaurants and Bars per Thousand 0.029*** 0.028***
(mean = 1.71, sd = 0.28) (0.004) (0.004)
Public School Revenues per Student, $10,000s 0.117*** 0.093**
(mean = 0.50, sd = 0.13) (0.010) (0.021)
R-squared 0.41 0.64
Number of Observations 1948 1948
Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01. Regressions weighted by population. Variables are described in
the Appendix, including Appendix Table A6.
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Figure 3.1: Residential Rents (Gross or Imputed) across the United States, 2000
Rent Levels Relative to the National Average, Difference in Logarithms
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Figure 3.2: Wage Levels by Workplace across the United States, 2000
Wages Levels Relative to the National Average, Differences in Logarithms
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Figure 3.3: Commuting Costs across the United States, 2000
Commuting Costs as a Fraction of Gross Income, Differential Relative to National Average
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Figure 3.4: Wages Estimated by Workplace or by Residence, 2000
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Figure 3.5: Rents and Commuting Costs, 2000
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Figure 3.6: Quality of Life across the United States, 2000
Fraction of Income Willing to Pay to Live in Area, Relative to National Average
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Figure 3.7: Quality of Life in the San Francisco Bay Area, 2000
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Figure 3.8: Quality of Life in and around Manhattan, 2000
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Figure 3.9: Quality of Life in Detroit and Southeast Michigan, 2000
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Figure 3.10: Quality of Life in and around Atlanta, 2000
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APPENDIX A
Examples using the model
For all the examples that follow I will assume that vj is uniformly distributed (0, .25)
across each value of sj which itself is uniformly distributed (0, 1) for mixed race individuals.
For simplicity, if individuals are indifferent between actions 1 and 0, I assume they choose
action 1.
Example 1: This example looks at identity choices in a location with no strong racial
bias where mixed-race identity is fairly common. We parametrize this situation by letting
CL = CLR = CR = 0, so there is no association between identity and action, and setting
(pL, pR) = (.25, .75) in this location, providing a wide identity measure range for mixed-race
identity.
The case where there is no tie between identity and action leaves trivial choices for
action and identity. Since there is a positive return to action 1, all individuals choose this
independent of identity choice. Each individual then chooses an identity based on endowed
phenotype, sj, according to where this falls on the identity measure line. This can easily
be seen from 1.6c and 1.7c, where after plugging in the parameters above, individuals will
choose L when sj < .25, LR when .25 < sj < .75, and R when .75 < sj.
I illustrate identity choices in Figure F.5 in two dimensional space with ability, v, on the y-
axis and skin tone, s, on the x-axis. It is clear that there should be twice as many mixed-race
individuals declaring identity LR than identity L and identity R. All individuals, regardless
of identity, choose action 1. We can calculate the average values of v, for all individuals
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choosing identity L, LR, and R, and denote these as v¯L, ¯vLR, v¯R respectively. For any given
sj, since vj is distributed uniformly (0, .25), the average value,v¯, will be
1
2
(.25 + 0) =
1
8
All individuals with sj < .25 will choose identity L, therefore we can calculate v¯L as the
weighted value of v divided by the area of individuals choosing L. This is the area denoted
by L in Figure F.5. First, the weighted value of v can be calculated as follows:
∫ .25
0
(.25− 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight
average v︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
(.25 + 0)ds =
1
128
Next we calculate the area of individuals choosing L:
∫ .25
0
(.25− 0)ds = 1
16
Therefore the average ability of individuals who choose identity L is
v¯L =
1
8
.
Trivially, as v¯ is the same for each value of sj, and each sj only maps to one identity,
v¯L = ¯vLR = v¯R =
1
8
. In this example where there is no association between action and
identity, we see then that everyone chooses action 1 and average ability, as measured by v,
is equal across all identity choices. With ranges of sj tied to identity as described above,
this results in 25% of mixed race individuals choosing identity L, 50% choosing identity LR,
and 25% choosing identity R. The combination of identity and action choice mapped over
possible values of ability and phenotype is shown in Figure 1.7.
In the case where identity is equally negatively associated with all identities, like CL =
CLR = CR = .1, we still have no change the the average ability across identity, or in the
range of phenotype that results in different identities. However, we would see a change in the
proportion of individuals that choose action 1 as illustrated in Figure F.7. Only individuals
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with ability higher than the identity cost, vj > .1, would choose action 1.
Example 2: This example looks at identity choices for mixed-race individuals in a location
where there is racial bias and a strong negative association for certain identities and actions,
but where mixed-race identity is still common.
We parametrize this situation by having both L and LR negatively associated with action
1; let CL = .2 > CLR = .1 and CR = 0. As in example 1, we set the phenotype range for
mixed-race identity as (pL, pR) = (.25, .75) and allow ability, vj to be uniformly distributed
(0,.25).
First, for a given sj we look at the choice between identity L and LR. We can plug in
our parameters into 1.6a,1.6b, and 1.6c and get the following:
sj > .25 if .1 > vj (A.1a)
sj > .35− vj if .2 > vj > .1 (A.1b)
sj > .15 if vj > .2 > .1 (A.1c)
We see for certain ranges of sj we again have individuals of all abilities, vj, choosing only
one identity. No matter the value of vj, when sj < .15 all individuals will choose identity L.
Likewise when sj > .25 all individuals will choose identity R.
The interesting choices occur when .15 < sj < .25. From A.1a, for values of vj < .1
in this range of phenotype, all individuals will choose LR, whereas from A.1c, for values of
vj > .2 in this range of phenotype, all individuals will choose R. In-between behavior is
governed by A.1b. This is perhaps best illustrated graphically in Figure F.6.
Here we can plainly see that for the boundary range of phenotype where .15 < sj < .25,
conditional on a particular phenotype value, individuals with higher relative values of vj
choose identity LR and those with lower relative values choose identity L. This can be
interpreted as positive selection into identity LR and negative selection into identity L.
Contrasting this with example 1, we see that individuals with high ability and phenotypes
close to pL = .25 are “switching” into identity LR. This is driven by the larger negative
association of identity L with action 1, relative to the negative association of identity LR
with action 1.
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Next, for a given sj, we can examine the choice between identity LR and R. Plugging
our parameters into 1.7a, 1.7b, and 1.7c we can examine when individuals choose identity R
over identity LR and get the following:
sj > .75 if 0 > vj (A.2a)
sj > .75− vj if .1 > vj > 0 (A.2b)
sj > .65 if vj > .1 > 0 (A.2c)
We see that no matter the value of vj, when sj < .65 all individuals choose identity LR and
when sj > .75 all individuals choose identity R.
The interesting choices occur over the middle range of phenotype .65 < sj < .75 where,
depending on vj, individuals with the same phenotype will choose different identities. From
A.2c, whenever vj > .1 these individuals choose R. A.2b shows that the range of vj that leads
to identity LR gets smaller as sj increases. We can refer again to Figure F.6 to illustrate
identity choices at the LR and R boundary.
As with choices of individuals near the phenotype boundary of L and LR, near the
phenotype boundary of LR and R, where .65 < sj < .75 we see what we can interpret as
positive selection into identity R and negative selection into identity LR. This is driven by
the larger negative association of identity LR and action 1, the value of CLR = .1, in contrast
to the lack of association between identity R and action 1, with CR = 0.
With positive selection into identity R, negative and positive selection into identity LR,
and negative selection into LR, we can now show that v¯L < ¯vLR < v¯R in this example.
First, we calculate v¯R. Since vj is distributed uniformly across each sj, we calculate the
average vj for each sj and sum over the weighted values of sj. We need to weight values of
sj as, for certain values, only a fraction of individuals with that phenotype choose identity
R. This weight is the height of the line segment of vj where individuals choose R. In this
range of .65 < sj < .75, this is .25− (.75− s) = s− .5. We must also calculate the average
value of vj for individuals choosing identity R, and in this range this also depends on sj. We
are calculating the average value of v for individuals in trapezoid labeled B in Figure 1.9.
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This gives us: ∫ .75
.65
(s− .5)︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight
average v︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
(.25 + (.75− s))ds = 71
24000
The area of trapezoid B where identity choice is R and .65 < sj < .75 can be calculated as∫ .75
.65
(.25− (.75− s))ds = 1
50
.
For individuals with phenotype sj > .75, these individuals all choose identity R, and we
calculated the weighted value of v in this range as
∫ 1
.75
(.25)
1
2
(.25)ds =
1
128
.
This area for R where sj > .75 is ∫ 1
.75
(.25)ds =
1
16
.
Now to calculate the v¯R we combine weighted averages of the trapezoid and square and divide
by sum of their areas. We are calculating the average v¯ of the shaded R area in Figure F.6
below.
v¯R =
47
360
≈ 0.1306 (A.3)
Now we calculate v¯L. First, the average v of the trapezoid area (see Figure 1.9, labeled A)
of individuals from .15 < sj < .25, some of whom switch to identity LR instead of staying in
identity L. This weight is the height of the line segment of v where individuals choose LR
instead of L. In this range of .15 < sj < .25, this is .25− (.35− s) = s− .1.
∫ .25
.15
(s− .1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight
average v︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
2
(.25 + (.35− s))ds = 47
24000
The area of the trapezoid A for identity LR where .15 < si < .25 is just the sum of the LR
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range over these values of s:
∫ .25
.15
(.25− (.35− s))ds = 1
100
Now to calculate v¯L we subtract the weighted average of the trapezoid from the weighted
average of the square and divide by the area of the entire shape. The square has identical
dimensions and same average v to the box calculated for R above. We are calculating the
average v of the shaded L area in Figure F.6.
v¯L =
281
2520
≈ 0.1115 (A.4)
Finally we can calculate the value of ¯vLR by taking the weighted average of trapezoid A,
adding that to the weighted average of the rectangle from .25 < sj < .75, subtracting the
weighted average of trapezoid B, and dividing the whole thing by the area of the dotted LR
area shown in Figure F.6.
¯vLR =
117
920
≈ 0.1272 (A.5)
We can also illustrate some interesting comparative statics, as the relationship between skin
tone, sj, ability, vj, behavioral norms captured by CR, CLR, and CL, and skin tone norms
captured by pL and pR dictate how individuals choose their actions. Figure 1.8 illustrates
individual choices of identity and action in this example. The y-axis shows endowed ability
and the x-axis shows endowed phenotype. Based on the calculations above, we illustrate here
the combinations of sj and vj) that lead to each identity. In contrast to Figure 1.7, which
illustrates example 1, where there is no relationship between action and identity, in example
2 we see that individuals from a greater range of s choose identity R, leading to a greater
proportion choosing identity R overall. We also see that those switching into identity R
have higher ability than those that stay in LR in the .65 < sj < .75 range. This is positive
selection into identity R and will bring up the average ability of individuals who choose
identity R.
We see the opposite for identity L. Again comparing Figure F.5 and Figure F.6, while
the range of phenotype of individuals choosing identity L has not declined, individuals with
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relatively higher ability in the .15 < sj < .25 range of phenotype switch into identity LR.
This leads to a lower proportion of mixed-race individuals choosing identity L overall. This
switching can be thought of as positive selection out of identity L, and will lead to v¯L being
relatively lower than in example one, and certainly less than v¯R.
Identity LR is the interesting intermediate case. On the left hand side we have an
expanded range of s where individuals choose identity LR, and relatively high ability types
will switch into LR from .15 < sj < .25, however, on the right hand side where .65 < sj < .75,
we see relatively high ability individuals select out of LR compared to those that stay in LR
conditional on sj.
From calculations performed above, we see that the parameters in example 2 result in
v¯L < ¯vLR < v¯R. Identity LR has, on average, higher ability types switching in from L than
switching out to R. Additionally we can calculate the area of v, s space of each identity
and see that the area gained from LR does not make up for the area lost from LR. This
means that compared to example 1, with these parameters we have more individuals choosing
identity R and less choosing both identity LR and identity L.
Figure 1.8 shows how different behavioral norms, values of CX can affect action choice.
In this example CR < CLR < CL leads to selection into identities with a lower identity/action
cost. Now individuals with vj < CI may still choose to work, by switching into a different
identity. These individuals choose this course of action if the decreased cost in C makes
up for the lower identity payoff. We also see that the proportion of individuals who choose
action 0 for each identity increases with the value of CX for that identity. Therefore the
fraction of individuals choosing action 1 is lowest for identity L, higher for identity LR, and
highest for identity R.
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APPENDIX B
Census and ACS Race Coding
The 2000 census uses a combination of questions to ask about a person’s racial/ethnic
identity. First individuals are asked about Hispanic identity, Figure 1.4. “Is this person
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino? Mark the ‘No’ box if not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.” Next, the
2000 census form asks about race, Figure 1.2, “What is this person’s race? Mark one or
more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.” There are places
for write-ins of specific tribe, other Asian or Pacific Islander, and some other race. The form
makes clear that individuals should answer both of these questions.
On a later, separate page individuals are asked about ancestry, Figure 1.3, “What is
this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?” There are two spaces for write-ins along with some
examples listed below like Italian, Jamaican, African American, etc. In the 1970 version of
the census this question asked about parents’ place of birth; this question has asked about
ancestry since 1980.
To construct measures of race by ancestry we follow a method based on the one used
by the Census Bureau to match write-ins to the race question to the major race categories:
White, Black, Asian, etc. This method is described in Farley (2004)1. I modify this slightly
1Roughly, individuals who wrote in answers for race were assigned to a major race category if 70% or
more of respondents in a previous Census year who used that write-in value for ancestry chose the same
major category for race. For example, if a person wrote in “French” for race in the 2000 Census, they would
be assigned to the “White” race category as more than 70% of individuals using “French” as an ancestry
term in the 1990 Census identified as “White.” Individuals that wrote in some Spanish-origin group were
classified as “Other” for race.
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and use race data from individuals who declare only a single ancestry from 2000 to 2012. If
80% or more of respondents with the same single ancestry declare the same race, this ancestry
is matched with this race. In the case that a single ancestry has more than 10% of respondents
declare in each of two separate single race categories, I associate this ancestry with “Other”
race. For example, using 2000 to 2012 Census and ACS data, 80% of respondents with the
single ancestry “South African” declare their race as “white” but 14% declare their race as
“Black.” We would match “South African” ancestry with “other” race in order to avoid
incorrectly assigning a respondent “Black” or “White” ancestry. We also appeal to Bureau
of the Census (2007), which documents some specific mappings between write-in answers
to the race question and the Census’s major race categories and we use these associations
for ancestry and race where appropriate, particularly for many Native and Pacific Islander
ancestry responses.
The Census recodes and cleans ancestry responses. There are two lines on the form,
but the number of responses allowed is open ended. However, the Census will only record
and code two ancestry responses.2 In addition, the Census has a priority system for coding
responses. If multiple responses are listed, but one response is considered a subgroup of
another, only the most specific response is listed. For example, an individual who listed
“French” and “European” would be coded as “French” only. Prior to the 2010 ACS, this
system treated Hispanic and Race responses as lower priority than ethnic origin responses,
with the justification being that Hispanic origin and Race were already captured through
other questions on the survey. Certain write-in responses were therefore only recorded in the
absence of any other response; “White/Caucasian” was recorded as an ancestry only when
it was the sole ancestry response of an individual. In other words, “White/Caucasian” was
not accepted as an ancestry response when provided in combination with any other ancestry
response prior to 2010. However, starting in 2010, Race and Hispanic responses have been
given the same priority as other ethnic origin responses.
The censorship in ancestry responses prior to 2010 results in systematic misclassification
of ancestry, pushing many mixed-ancestry respondents into single-ancestry categories. For
this study, the dropping of “White/Caucasian” when used in combination with another an-
2http://www.census.gov/population/ancestry/about/faq.html, retrieved 3/14/15.
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cestry response is most impactful. A natural question then, is whether individuals coded with
Black/White ancestry censored due to their white ancestry answer being “White/Caucasian”
are the same as those with a different White ancestry. Table 1.15 compares some charac-
teristics of individuals with “White/Caucasian” ancestry in combination with some Black
ancestry (Censored) to those with other Black/White ancestry (Uncensored). These groups
can only be fully compared for 2010-2013, as for 2009 and earlier, individuals who responded
with Black/White ancestry using the “White/Caucasian” ancestry response had this re-
sponse dropped and were classified as having Black only ancestry.
This change in ancestry coding greatly affects the counts of biracial Black/Whites and
biracial Asian/Whites as coded by ancestry. Figures F.9 and F.10 shows Black/White and
Asian/White ancestry over time. When I exclude responses of “White/Caucasian,” I see
a pattern that matches the 2000-2009 period where such responses were censored by the
Census Bureau. I gain around an additional 270 thousand Asian/Whites in 2011, 2012, and
2013 and roughly 440 thousand Black/Whites in 2011, 2012, and 2013. 2010 is an anomaly,
and the magnitude of increase here is significantly lower than in 2011, 2012, and 2013. This
data and discussions with staff at the Census suggests there was a incomplete transition in
coding for 2010 where some “White/Caucasian” ancestry responses were coded when used
in combination with other ancestries and some were not.
Figure F.8 shows the 6 most common mixed black/white ancestry categories between
2000-2013. This clearly illustrates that the jump in individuals with black/white ances-
try is largely driven by new coding of “White/Caucasian” in combination with “African-
American.” There is no reason to believe that this jump in responses is solely due to some
behavioral change; the text of the ancestry question is identical from the 2000 Census to the
2013 ACS.
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APPENDIX C
“Hidden” Mixed-Race Individuals
This project explores the potential endogeneity of racial classification among mixed-race
individuals in the United States. If all multiracial Americans, by our definition, self-report
as being multiracial Americans, there is no selection issue as all measures of being multiracial
are the same. In such a case, using self-reported race measures for multiracial individuals is
the same as using self-reported race measures for monoracial individuals and I can continue
to treat race as exogenous to various labor market outcomes, as it has usually been treated
in the labor economics literature. I provide evidence here that this in not the case, and that
the set of individuals who self-identify or are identified on the Census and ACS as mixed-race
are only a subset of the mixed-race population I wish to consider. For ease of notation, I refer
to this mixed-race population that chooses not to self-identify or is not identified as such
as the “hidden” mixed-race population. Again, I make no claims about how any individual
should express their racial identity, only that these individuals do not adhere to the same
rules I apply to construct the mixed-race population I wish to measure.
This “hidden” population is most easily seen with children, as surveys that involve chil-
dren often also document the self-reported race of parents, and this allows researchers to
see the difference between the reported race of children and their racial ancestry. Studies in
this vein exploit parents’ self-reported race since interracial couples have biological children
who have multiracial ancestry and who can be identified in this way regardless of how these
children are identified in surveys. Roth (2005) provides evidence from the 2000 Census that
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many mixed-race couples do not identify their children as mixed-race. Brunsma (2005) finds
evidence from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study that as socioeconomic status of par-
ents increases, so does the likelihood of identifying children as mixed rather than monoracial
for Asians, but the same is not true for biracial White/Blacks. Harris and Sim (2002) use
data from Add Health which has measures of race for the same child in multiple contexts.
The authors find that mixed race children identify as such consistently for White/Blacks
and White/Asians. Their findings also suggest that children from single parent households
are more likely to be multiracial than those from two parent households.
Using Census and ACS data, I find that there are still substantial amounts of “hidden”
mixed-race children in recent years. I construct a sample of mixed-children from individuals,
ages 18 and younger, in households with married parents from 2000 and 2008-2011, since I
can separate out probable biological children from adopted and step-children for these years
only1. This is not the full set of children that could identify as mixed-race as I can only
identify children in two parent, married households. Figures F.1 and F.2 show results for
probable biological children of interracial Black/White and Asian/White married couples
for various years. The percent of biological children of interracial Black/White couples has
increased from 49% to 62% in a little over a decade, but that around a quarter of these
children are identified as monoracial Black; much fewer are identified as monoracial White.
For biological children of interracial Asian/White couples, the percentage identified as mixed-
race has increased from 50% to 69% over that same time period, but the White monoracial
categorization is much more frequent than the Asian monoracial categorization. This makes
it clear that interracial parents do not always declare children as mixed race, and this is a
population that could clearly be identified as such. These results show how parents identify
their children, but does this carry over to how adults identify themselves?
To provide evidence that there are indeed a significant number of “hidden” mixed-race
adults in the Census, I compare Census data to birth data from the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS), another source of data on the race of Americans. Legal authority
for registering data on births is held by the 50 US states and 7 US territories (District
1The 2001-2007 ACS do not explicitly measure step-parent or adopted child status as these other years
do
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of Columbia, New York City, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands). The NCHS is required by federal law to produce national vital
statistics, such as those on birth records, and so compiles information that the states and
territories provide (Division of Vital Statistics, 2000). To assist in ensuring uniformity of
the data, the NCHS designs standard birth certificate forms with assistance and input from
States. The NCHS even assists by creating templates of “model” regulations that states
can choose to implement (Public Health Service, 1992). However, some studies reveal that
there are issues with the validity and reliability of the data (Northam and Knapp, 2006) as
they pertain to some health outcomes, which is somewhat unsurprising given that collection
methods and training of staff to assemble the data may vary within a state, let alone between
them (Northam et al., 2003). Fortunately for my purposes, a study on Californian mothers
shows the data on race and ethnicity for mothers is 94-95% accurate for racial groups besides
Native Americans (only 54% accurate) when comparing birth certificate data to later surveys
(Baumeister et al., 2000).
The most recent revision to the standard birth certificate occurred in 2003. In keeping
with the Office of Management and Budget’s new requirements for collecting race data, this
revision allows the race of child, mother, and father to be collected in the same way as in
the 2000 census, with “check all that apply.” In 2003, only 6 states adopted the form, and
only as of 2015 have all states adopted it.2
As I am interested in calculating an estimates of adults, I do not require the most recent
birth certificate data. I use data on US births compiled by the NCHS for births from 1970-
2000. This data has at least a 50% sample of all births in the United States for this time
period as well as data on the race of mothers and fathers. Since the birth data does not record
Hispanic identity over the entire 1970-2000 time period, I must compare to the full Census
sample including Hispanics for this analysis. With this data I construct an alternative count
of mixed-race individuals by looking at births that occur to fathers and mothers of different
races. I use the number of births in 1970 to predict the number of 30 year olds in 2000.3
This data may still under count the mixed-race population since I am unable to see
2Source: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/features/birth_certificate_goes_final.htm, retrieved on
2/27/2015
3I adjust these population estimates with survival rates.
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parents’ potential mixed-ancestry. If a multiracial parent self-reports as monoracial on a
birth certificate, I lose that person’s other racial background.
The increasing prevalence of children out of wedlock over this time period leads to an
increasing amount of missing race data on fathers, and previous research (Harris and Sim,
2002) suggests that children from single parent households are more likely to be mixed race.
Therefore, this data can be thought of as a lower bound on the number of individuals of
mixed-race. Comparing two of the most populous mixed-race pairings, Black/White and
Asian/White, Census 2000 self-report of race is much lower than the number of mixed-race
individuals estimated through birth data, see figure F.4.4 For individuals of Black/White
ancestry born in 1970, the ratio of those that declare Black/White race to the estimate of
those who could is 47.2%. This stays consistent at 47.0% for those born in 1982. For indi-
viduals of Asian/White ancestry born in 1970, the ratio of those that declare Asian/White
race to the estimate of those who could is high at 69.6%. This is lower at 65.0% for those
born in 1982. For both of these groups Census race counts show many fewer self-reported
mixed-race individuals than those that could declare as mixed-race, and the gap is sizable
and relatively consistent for the birth years reported. Individuals born between 1970 and
1982 are aged 18 to 30 by the time of the 2000 Census, so this analysis covers the self-report
of adults as well as parents’ report of their childrens’ race.5
To illustrate that this undercount is not merely an artifact of inconsistencies between
Census population estimates and population estimates from birth certificate data, figure F.3
shows the comparisons for monoracial Whites, Asians, and Blacks respectively. With the
exception of Blacks, there are only small difference between self-reported race counts from
the Census and those predicted from vital statistics births, unlike the very large differences
shown for some multi-racial groups. For monoracial Blacks, the underprediction of the Black
population from birth data seems to be largely driven by the amount of missing information
for the race of fathers on birth certificates of children with Black mothers. For children with
Black mothers this percentage of missing race data for fathers increases from 26% to 37%
4The pattern is very similar when comparing self-reported race data from the ACS 2001-2009 for this
same birth cohort of individuals born between 1970 and 2000.
5For individuals younger than 18, I recognize that their parents may be filling out the race response for
them
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from 1970 to 2000, compared to children with White or Asian mothers which increases from
4% to 10% over that same time period. When grouping children with Black mothers and
missing fathers with children with both Black parents races reported, the birth data matches
the Census population count more closely.6
6Adding missing father births for Whites and Asians does not significantly change the patterns in their
respective graphs.
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APPENDIX D
American Community Survey Design
The American Community Survey is particularly useful for summarizing demographic
characteristics of Americans because of its sample size and success in achieving a high re-
sponse rate. The survey is administered in monthly waves. A household will first be con-
tacted by mail and asked to complete the survey. In the following month, if this household
has not responded, the Census bureau will attempt to contact the household by phone.
If appropriate, a census representative will administer the survey over the telephone, also
known as computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI). In the third month, if the house-
hold cannot be contacted by phone or refuses to answer by phone, for a sample of these
non-responsive households, a field agent will be dispatched to attempt a computer-assisted
personal interview (CAPI). Throughout the entire 3 month period, the household may mail
back the completed survey at any time. Public use data groups survey response types into
mail and CATI/CAPI. Although we cannot verify this through publicly available data, Cen-
sus documentation (Bureau of the Census (2009)) indicates that there is roughly a 1:4 ratio
between CATI and CAPI.
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APPENDIX E
Birth and Mortality Data
The birth data in 1970 was a 50% sample for all states. Beginning in 1972 some states
were a full sample and by 1985 all states and Washington, D.C. were a full 100% sample
for births. The earliest year that Hispanics can be identified for most of the population, 47
states and Washington, D.C. is 1989. For this reason, self-reported race for Census counts
include Hispanics when compared to the birth data.
Arias et al. (2010) provide cohort survival data for individuals of Black and White race
by gender. I used these to adjust birth counts down for a more accurate comparison to
self-reported race numbers, matching individuals by race and gender. Black survival rates
are lower than other races for males particularly. Black survival rates were assigned to those
with a Black parent and White survival rates were assigned to all other races.
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APPENDIX F
Additional Tables and Figures for “Mark one or more”
Table F.1: Self-Reported Race by Hispanic Status and Ancestry
HISPANIC ANCESTRY, NON-HISPANIC
Not White/Black/Asian No Ancestry
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RACE
White 417,593 62.27 1,026,440 90.78 1,047,912 89.91
Black 14,127 2.11 82,626 7.31 83,712 7.18
Native 10,462 1.56 4,752 0.42 5,339 0.46
Asian 4,974 0.74 6,085 0.54 6,453 0.55
Other 189,754 28.29 2,225 0.20 11,806 1.01
White/Black 2,392 0.36 1,732 0.15 1,873 0.16
White/Native 5,377 0.80 3,327 0.29 3,524 0.30
White/Asian 2,292 0.34 1,231 0.11 1,350 0.12
White/Other 15,072 2.25 343 0.03 1,124 0.10
Black/Native 512 0.08 521 0.05 552 0.05
Black/Asian 180 0.03 174 0.02 202 0.02
Black/Other 1,792 0.27 119 0.01 229 0.02
Asian/Native 219 0.03 51 0.00 72 0.01
Asian/Other 1,277 0.19 70 0.01 129 0.01
Other/Native 1,393 0.21 23 0.00 89 0.01
Three or More 3234 0.48 965 0.09 1204 0.1
Total 670,650 100 1,130,684 100 1,165,570 100
Source: Pooled 2001-2013 ACS
The samples consists of native-born adults, ages 25-54
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Table F.2: Relative Risk Ratios of Race Compared to Black/White by Division of Birth and Residence, Adults Aged 25-54,
2001-2013 Sample
Division of Birth Division of Residence
Black White Black White
RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE RRR SE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Division (New England Excluded)
Mid Atlantic 1.089 (0.175) 1.004 (0.286) 0.955 (0.197) 0.630** (0.141)
East North Central 1.438** (0.233) 0.935 (0.241) 1.331 (0.256) 0.627** (0.137)
West North Central 1.117 (0.278) 1.221 (0.348) 1.037 (0.256) 0.854 (0.172)
South Atlantic 2.358*** (0.379) 2.060** (0.736) 2.125*** (0.435) 1.273 (0.443)
East South Central 3.270*** (0.763) 1.604* (0.457) 3.151*** (0.982) 1.498* (0.327)
West South Central 4.683*** (1.148) 3.005*** (1.134) 3.302*** (1.017) 1.768 (0.642)
Mountain 0.849 (0.188) 1.478 (0.512) 1.082 (0.253) 1.101 (0.243)
Pacific 0.976 (0.172) 0.872 (0.233) 0.857 (0.176) 0.673** (0.121)
Year Category (2001-2002 Excluded)
2003-2004 1.039 (0.139) 0.821 (0.178) 1.044 (0.136) 0.829 (0.175)
2005-2006 0.953 (0.192) 0.704 (0.177) 0.958 (0.190) 0.707 (0.173)
2007-2008 0.661** (0.123) 0.428*** (0.097) 0.655** (0.124) 0.427*** (0.095)
2009-2010 0.513*** (0.085) 0.440*** (0.104) 0.516*** (0.084) 0.444*** (0.101)
2011, 2012, 2013 0.482*** (0.079) 0.394*** (0.089) 0.474*** (0.074) 0.391*** (0.085)
Age (35-44 Excluded)
25-34 0.523*** (0.038) 0.653*** (0.067) 0.520*** (0.039) 0.658*** (0.065)
45-54 1.799*** (0.155) 2.020*** (0.199) 1.888*** (0.151) 2.089*** (0.202)
Education (Bachelor’s Degree Excluded)
No High School Degree 1.103 (0.198) 1.217 (0.197) 1.101 (0.203) 1.257 (0.200)
High School Degree 1.289*** (0.100) 0.951 (0.098) 1.303*** (0.102) 0.965 (0.097)
Master’s Degree 0.990 (0.138) 0.716 (0.160) 1.009 (0.159) 0.730 (0.174)
Professional Degree 0.684** (0.132) 1.103 (0.308) 0.695* (0.134) 1.098 (0.318)
PhD 1.076 (0.232) 1.031 (0.367) 1.057 (0.228) 0.982 (0.365)
Employment Fraction 0.884* (0.065) 1.041 (0.100) 0.868** (0.059) 1.029 (0.102)
Female 1.073 (0.076) 1.017 (0.096) 1.061 (0.074) 1.015 (0.095)
Observations 11,599 11,599
Pseudo R2 0.0699 0.0659
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the state level. Ancestry adjusted
for 2010-2013.
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Figure F.1: Racial Identification for Children of White/Black Married Couples
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Figure F.2: Racial Identification for Children of White/Asian Married Couples
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Figure F.3: Monoracial Birth and Population Comparison, 2000
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Figure F.4: Biracial Birth and Population Comparison, 2000
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Figure F.5: Identity Choices for Example 1
Figure F.6: Identity Choices for Example 2
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Figure F.7: Identity and Action Choices (cj, aj) with CL = CLR = CR = −.1
Figure F.8: Black/White Ancestry Categories
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Figure F.9: Black/White Ancestry
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Figure F.10: Asian/White Ancestry
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APPENDIX G
Alternative Specification
This alternative specification uses all 20 rounds of the trust game, but separates first
half control from second half control by category, rather than with a variable (secondhalf )
separating first half and second half behavior. In addition to majority/minority and new
majority/new minority, we have two new categories: consistent majority/consistent minority.
Individuals in the control in the second half of the experiment are referred to as consistent
majority/consistent minority as these individuals have the same majority/minority identity
in the first and second half of the experiment. Although we lose some power with this setup
compared to our preferred specification, we still see many of the same patterns for White
and non-White senders and receivers.
Regressions on senders using this alternative specification are shown in Appendix Table
J.4. Column 1 shows the results for our full sample of senders. As with our preferred
specification described in the main results, we find no consistent differences between our
group-size categories. We see evidence of ingroup bias, but no categorical differences between
majority/minority, new majority/new minority, or consistent majority/consistent minority
sending.
Column 2 shows the results of our alternative specification after restricting to White
senders. Here we see patterns that are almost the same as the patterns from our preferred
specification. White minority senders in the first half exhibit higher ingroup (p = 0.002)
and outgroup (p = 0.021) giving than their majority counterparts. White new majority
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senders still send more than new minority senders to ingroup matches (p = 0.0307) but
not to outgroup matches (p = 0.2520). When we compare consistent minority senders
with consistent majority senders we see that they weakly send more to ingroup matches
(p = 0.100) and more to outgroup matches (p = 0.034). These results support both the
White minority group effect as well as the persistence in behavior for White initial minority
group members; whether these initial minority group members are put in treatment or
control, they generally continue to send more than their initial majority group counterparts.
Results for non-White senders are displayed in column 3, and like in our preferred spec-
ification, we find no significant patterns among group-size categories.
We repeat the regression analysis with our alternative specification on receivers who start
with 61-80 tokens in Appendix Table J.5. Column 1 and Column 3 show the full sample
and non-White receivers respectively. Again, as with our preferred specification, we find no
significant patterns among group-size categories in these cases.
However, using this alternative specification we still find similar results to our preferred
specification with White receivers who start with 61-80 tokens. White minority receivers send
more to ingroup members (p = 0.016) and weakly more to outgroup members (p = 0.072)
than White majority receivers. White new majority senders send weakly more to ingroup
matches (p = 0.0831) and more to outgroup matches (p = 0.021) than new minority senders.
White consistent majority senders send more to outgroup matches (p = 0.042) but not
to ingroup matches (p = 0.123) compared to consistent minority senders. Together the
results for White senders and receivers in this alternative specification largely match with
our preferred specification providing evidence that our particular choice of categorization is
not driving our results.
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APPENDIX H
Experimental Instructions
Welcome!
This is an experiment in decision making. Your earnings for the experiment will be in
tokens, which will be converted to money. The number of tokens you earn will depend on
the decisions you make and on the decisions other people make. Every 50 tokens you
earn is worth $1 to you. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid your earnings plus
a $5 show-up fee in cash. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation
to tell others how much you earn.
Please do not communicate with each other during the experiment unless you are asked
to do so. We have provided you with a blank sheet of paper on your desk. If you need
to write anything, please do so only on this blank sheet of paper. Please do not use any
calculators or cell phones during the experiment. Also, if your computer screen asks you to
wait for the experiment to continue, please do not do anything else while you are waiting. If
you have a question, feel free to raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you.
On your payment form, please write your computer number (upper left-hand corner of your
station) in the space labeled “Study Subject ID.”
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Once we finish these instructions, you will be randomly assigned to either the Green team
or the Red team. These teams will always be unequally sized. You will make two types of
decisions during the experiment:
Decision 1 - Photo Task
For the photo task, you will work with your team members to identify locations displayed
in a series of photos. Everyone will be shown six pictures, three from each of two locations.
Each picture will be labeled with a letter and a number, such as picture “A1.” All photos
with the same letter are from the same location. You will be asked to identify which photos
come from which location.
For example, you could be given pictures “A1”, “A2”, “A3”, “B1”, “B2” and “B3.” You
would also be told that the two locations are “Europe” and “Asia.” Then, there are two
possibilities. The first is that “A1”, “A2” and “A3” all show European locations, and “B1”,
“B2” and “B3” all show Asian locations. The second is that “B1”, “B2” and “B3” all show
European locations, and “A1”, “A2” and “A3” all show Asian locations. You would then be
asked to identify which of these two possibilities is correct.
During this task, you will be able to work with the other members of your team using a
chat box that will be on the screen. Messages that are entered there will be shared with
the other members of your team and not with the people in the other team. Similarly, the
members of the other team will be able to share messages with each other that you will
not be able to see. You may enter any messages in the chat box except for the following
restrictions:
1. Please do not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to identify
you (e.g. age, race, professional background, etc.).
2. Please refrain from using obscene or offensive language.
3. Please do not discuss the other task.
If your messages violate any of these restrictions, your total earnings for the experiment will
be reduced by $5. You will have 5 minutes to submit your answer. In those 5 minutes, you
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will be able to change your answer as many times as you like. You will earn 75 tokens if you
answer the question correctly. We will reveal the correct answer to you at the end of the
experiment.
Decision 2 - Passing Task
For the passing task, you will either be a Sender or a Receiver. Once you are randomly
assigned to one of these roles, you will remain in that role for the rest of the experiment.
Your role will be revealed to you when you make your first decision for the task.
The Sender will be given 20 tokens and choose how many of these tokens to pass to the
Receiver. Before reaching the Receiver, the number of tokens passed will be multiplied by
4, so the Receiver will start with 4 times the number of tokens passed. The Receiver then
chooses how many of these tokens to pass back to the Sender. Each persons earnings will be
the number of tokens they have after this procedure.
For example, suppose that the Sender passes 13 of his or her 20 tokens to the Receiver.
The Receiver then starts with 13*4 = 52 tokens. Now suppose that the Receiver passes 15
of his or her 52 tokens back to the Sender. Then the Sender earns 7 + 15 = 22 tokens and
the Receiver earns 52 15 = 37 tokens.
Note that either the Sender or Receiver may choose to pass no tokens to the other per-
son. If the Sender chooses to pass no tokens to the Receiver, then the Receiver does not
make a choice.
You will be able to test your choice with an on-screen calculator before you submit it.
Once you submit your answer, you will not be able to change it.
Procedure
The experiment will proceed in two halves. For each half, you will make the photo task
decision once with your team and then make the passing task decision 10 times. Each time
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you make the passing task decision, you will be randomly rematched with a person in this
room. Since the teams will always have unequal size, you are more likely to be matched a
member of the larger team.
For each half, some of you will be asked to leave the computer lab and return to the waiting
room. These people are chosen at random. If you are one of these people, you will not be
making decisions for that half of the experiment. Instead of earning tokens from making
decisions for that half, you will be paid the average amount earned by the participants in
that half of the experiment.
Are there any questions? If not, please click the button to begin the experiment.
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APPENDIX I
Post-Experiment Survey
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answer will be used for this
study only. Individual data will not be released. (summary statistics in italics)
1. What is your age? (Mean 22.03, Std Dev 4.72, Median 21, Min 18, Max 60 )
2. What is your gender? (Female 61.46%, Male 38.54% )
3. Are you an undergraduate or a graduate student? (Undergraduate 71.53%, Graduate
20.14%, Neither 8.33% )
4. Which year of your current educational program did you complete in April/May of
2013? (1st year 18.40%, 2nd year 24.65%, 3rd year 25.69%, 4th year 12.85%, Higher
year 7.29%, N/A 11.11% )
5. Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background? (Asian/Pacific
Islander 44.44%, Black 4.51%, Hispanic/Latino 2.43%, Native American 0.69%, White
43.06%, Other 4.86% )
6. What is your marital status? (Never Married 95.14%, Currently Married 4.86%, Pre-
viously Married 0.00% )
7. How many siblings do you have? (Mean 1.44, Std Dev 1.14, Median 1, Min 0, Max 6 )
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8. How would you best describe your employment status? (Employed, Full Time 6.60%;
Employed, Part Time 41.32%; Not Employed 52.08% )
9. Who in your household is primarily responsible for expenses and budget decisions? (Self
30.21%, Spouse 1.04%, Shared Responsibility with spouse 3.47%, Parent(s) 63.19%,
Other 2.08% )
10. Have you ever voted in a government election (in any country)? (Yes 68.75%, No
31.25% )
11. Before today, how many times have you participated in any economics or psychology
experimental studies? (Mean 9.71, Std Dev 53.28, Median 5, Min 0, Max 900 )
12. In the past twelve months, have you donated money to or done volunteer work for
charities or other nonprofit organizations? (Yes 75.35%, No 24.65% )
13. On a scale from 1 to 10, please rate how closely attached you felt to your team through-
out the experiment, with 1 meaning ”not closely at all”. (Mean 3.67, Std Dev 2.36,
Median 3, Min 1, Max 10 )
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APPENDIX J
Additional Tables and Figures for “Intergroup
relations”
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Table J.1: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers with 1 to 20 Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.042
(0.027)
Female -0.007 -0.007 0.003
(0.025) (0.041) (0.032)
Second Half 0.027 0.078 -0.064**
(0.048) (0.051) (0.028)
Majority Outgroup 0.105 0.141 0.061
(0.069) (0.104) (0.050)
Minority Ingroup -0.041 -0.013 -0.078***
(0.027) (0.051) (0.027)
Minority Outgroup 0.018 0.072 -0.026
(0.045) (0.081) (0.027)
New Majority Ingroup -0.060* -0.064 -0.015
(0.035) (0.050) (0.016)
New Majority Outgroup -0.060 -0.074 0.014
(0.042) (0.065) (0.052)
New Minority Ingroup -0.094** -0.132*** -0.031
(0.038) (0.036) (0.025)
New Minority Outgroup 0.012 -0.004 0.076**
(0.051) (0.102) (0.033)
Constant 0.098*** 0.053 0.087*
(0.032) (0.041) (0.045)
Observations 211 115 96
R-squared 0.0923 0.1024 0.1248
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the session level. non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Table J.2: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers with 21 to 40 Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White 0.000
(0.032)
Female -0.049 -0.026 -0.057
(0.045) (0.068) (0.042)
Second Half 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.020) (0.028) (0.040)
Majority Outgroup -0.074 -0.053 -0.107*
(0.062) (0.091) (0.056)
Minority Ingroup 0.016 0.099** -0.081
(0.056) (0.048) (0.072)
Minority Outgroup -0.049 0.058 -0.159**
(0.044) (0.057) (0.077)
New Majority Ingroup -0.029 0.020 -0.105
(0.046) (0.065) (0.074)
New Majority Outgroup -0.016 0.142** -0.173*
(0.055) (0.056) (0.092)
New Minority Ingroup -0.053 - -0.074
(0.081) - (0.085)
New Minority Outgroup -0.064 -0.067 -0.101
(0.082) (0.060) (0.097)
Constant 0.256*** 0.187*** 0.319***
(0.056) (0.068) (0.067)
Observations 216 111 105
R-squared 0.0635 0.1322 0.1596
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. - indicates no
observations in this category. Standard errors clustered
at the session level. non-White race includes Asian,
Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Table J.3: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers with 41 to 60 Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.003
(0.039)
Female -0.017 0.032 -0.065
(0.071) (0.075) (0.090)
Second Half -0.030 -0.063 0.012
(0.019) (0.047) (0.024)
Majority Outgroup -0.056*** - -0.070***
(0.007) - (0.011)
Minority Ingroup 0.059 0.157** -0.037
(0.053) (0.062) (0.080)
Minority Outgroup 0.042 0.161** -0.093
(0.048) (0.068) (0.060)
New Majority Ingroup 0.047 0.092 -0.034
(0.059) (0.075) (0.080)
New Majority Outgroup -0.007 0.341*** -0.165*
(0.063) (0.086) (0.096)
New Minority Ingroup 0.120*** - 0.066***
(0.023) - (0.024)
New Minority Outgroup 0.031 - -0.031
(0.042) - (0.032)
Constant 0.295*** 0.222*** 0.369***
(0.070) (0.078) (0.072)
Observations 118 53 65
R-squared 0.0163 0.1107 0.1167
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. - indicates no
observations in this category. Standard errors clustered
at the session level. non-White race includes Asian,
Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Table J.4: Alternate Specification: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Senders
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.273***
(0.084)
Female -0.093 0.045 -0.064
(0.071) (0.112) (0.092)
Majority Outgroup -0.115*** -0.081* -0.145***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.053)
Minority Ingroup 0.056 0.373*** -0.095
(0.072) (0.118) (0.107)
Minority Outgroup -0.076 0.182 -0.194*
(0.077) (0.119) (0.104)
New Majority Ingroup -0.013 0.346*** -0.197*
(0.071) (0.130) (0.107)
New Majority Outgroup -0.159 0.099 -0.278**
(0.103) (0.174) (0.112)
New Minority Ingroup -0.017 0.075** -0.067
(0.064) (0.032) (0.083)
New Minority Outgroup -0.098* -0.142 -0.082
(0.059) (0.125) (0.055)
Control Majority Ingroup 0.043 0.009 0.095
(0.053) (0.068) (0.087)
Control Majority Outgroup -0.156** -0.089 -0.226**
(0.060) (0.073) (0.103)
Control Minority Ingroup 0.085 0.335** -0.035
(0.123) (0.158) (0.161)
Control Minority Outgroup -0.162* 0.239 -0.339***
(0.084) (0.194) (0.094)
Constant 0.712*** 0.499*** 0.500***
(0.078) (0.132) (0.098)
Observations 1440 560 880
R-squared 0.1514 0.1540 0.0940
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Standard errors
clustered at the session level. Non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Table J.5: Alternate Specification: % Tokens Passed, 20-Period Receivers with 61 to 80
Tokens
(1) (2) (3)
All White Non-White
Non-White -0.050
(0.044)
Female -0.010 -0.047 0.022
(0.051) (0.058) (0.066)
Majority Outgroup -0.024 0.020 -0.051
(0.035) (0.046) (0.042)
Minority Ingroup 0.014 0.147** -0.102
(0.049) (0.061) (0.081)
Minority Outgroup 0.018 0.158** -0.102*
(0.047) (0.070) (0.057)
New Majority Ingroup -(0.007) (0.078) -(0.090)
(0.046) (0.073) (0.076)
New Majority Outgroup (0.001) (0.115) -(0.114)
(0.066) (0.088) (0.085)
New Minority Ingroup (0.005) -0.064** (0.059)
(0.044) (0.032) (0.046)
New Minority Outgroup -(0.015) -(0.032) -(0.011)
(0.026) (0.054) (0.039)
Control Majority Ingroup -0.016 -0.002 -0.025
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
Control Majority Outgroup -0.048 -0.039 -0.039
(0.034) (0.027) (0.055)
Control Minority Ingroup -0.004 0.130 -0.115*
(0.053) (0.082) (0.066)
Control Minority Outgroup -0.028 0.103 -0.135*
(0.052) (0.065) (0.070)
Constant 0.350*** 0.296*** 0.332***
(0.048) (0.070) (0.051)
Observations 438 212 226
R-squared 0.0269 0.1090 0.0632
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors
clustered at the session level. non-White race includes
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Native American.
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Green RedWaiting Room
Green RedWaiting Room
Figure J.1: Subject movement at start of second half of experiment for the No Change (top)
and the Change (bottom) treatments.
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APPENDIX K
Wage, Housing-Cost, and Commuting-Cost Data and
Estimation
United States Census data from the 2000 Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS),
from Ruggles et al. (2004), are used to calculate wage, rent, and commuting-time differen-
tials.
Reported differentials are calculated using the logarithm of reported gross rents and
imputed rents from housing values. We use occupied units that are not farms or group
quarters. The rent differentials are calculated using a set of PUMA indicators and the
following set of co-variates
• 9 indicators of building size;
• 9 indicators for the number of rooms, 5 indicators for the number of bedrooms, number
of rooms interacted with number of bedrooms, and the number of household members
per room;
• 2 indicators for lot size;
• 7 indicators for when the building was built;
• 2 indicators for complete plumbing and kitchen facilities;
• an indicator for commercial use;
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• an indicator for condominium status (owned units only).
We run our regression with household weights. Housing cost rent and quality measures from
Table 1 are repeated in Appendix Table P.1 in columns 1 and 2, while column 3 adds the
two together to determine a “raw” index, similar to what would be available in an index
available from aggregated data. Columns 4 and 5 describe the variation from indices using
only or only imputed rents from housing prices or actual rented units: the two appear fairly
similar. Column 6 describes an index that weighs housing units by their observable quality.1
Column 7 reports time spent in dwelling, showing slightly higher numbers in non-metro and
low density areas. Columns 8 and 9 show how buildings in central and denser areas tend to
be older and have fewer rooms.
The wage differentials are calculated for workers ages 25 to 55, who report working at
least 30 hours a week, 26 weeks a year. The wage differentials are found by regressing log
hourly wages on individual covariates and indicators for which PWPUMA a worker works
in, using the coefficients on these indicators. The covariates consist of
• 12 indicators of educational attainment;
• a quartic in potential experience, and potential experience interacted with years of
education;
• 9 indicators of industry at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 9 indicators of occupation at the one-digit level (1950 classification);
• 4 indicators of marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated);
• an indicator for veteran status, and veteran status interacted with age;
• 5 indicators of minority status (Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, and other);
1We calculate a value-adjusted weight by multiplying the census-housing weights by the predicted value
from this first regression using housing characteristics alone, controlling for PUMA. A second regression
is run using these new weights for all units, rented and owner-occupied, on the housing characteristics
fully interacted with tenure, along with the PUMA indicators, which are not interacted. The house-price
differentials are taken from the PUMA indicator variables in this second regression. As with the wage
differentials, this adjusted weighting method has only a small impact on the measured price differentials.
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• an indicator of immigrant status, years since immigration, and immigrant status inter-
acted with black, Hispanic, Asian, and other;
• 2 indicators for English proficiency (none or poor).
All covariates are interacted with gender.
We run our regression with census-person weights. In columns 1 through 3, Appendix
Table P.2 repeats the three wage measures from Table 1. Column 4 reports the differ-
ence between the workplace and residential measures, showing them be negative in central
cities and in non-metro areas and positive in the suburbs, suggesting selection according to
unobserved skills in the same direction. Column 5 describes raw variation in wages, not
controlling for skills. Raw wages are higher in the more skilled suburbs, even though the
wage effects are the same. Column 6 reports the variation that would occur if PWPUMAs
are used instead of regular PUMAs: this accounts for roughly half of the variance between
the workplace and residential measures. Column 7 reveals that almost half of commuters
work in a PWPUMA outside the one they reside in; this is especially true if they live in the
suburbs. Column 8 measures the wage index weighting workers by the wage predicted by
their non-location characteristics, producing nearly identical results.2 Column 9 corrects for
inter-state migration using the methods outlined in Dahl (2002), which changes the numbers
only slightly.3
We calculate commuting-time differentials in a similar manner. The sample restriction
is the same as that used for the wage differential calculation, except that those with missing
commute time are dropped from the sample. The individual covariates for the commute
time regression are the same as those used for wages, except that they include four variables
2We weight using the single-index of ”skill” that a worker has. From the regressions, a predicted wage is
calculated using individual characteristics alone, controlling for PWPUMA, to form a new weight equal to
the predicted wage times the census-person weight. These new income-adjusted weights are used so workers
can be weighted by their income share. The new weights are then used in a second regression, which is used
to calculate the PUMA wage differentials from the PWPUMA indicator variables.
3To correct for selection effects on our wage estimates due to inter-state migration we control for the
probability of moving from the state of birth to the current state, as well as the probability of staying in the
state of birth, by category according to various demographic characteristics. We use the exact same categories
as Dahl for movers (20 for each state) and stayers (70). We also add a separate mover category/”birth-state”
for those born outside the US. As Dahl only used male, white, and ages 25-34, we create 12 times the number
of original categories to account for female, non-white, and age categories 35-44, and 45-55. To identify the
constants across states, we constrain the coefficients to be the same across states, unlike in Dahl. Accounting
for selection through inter-state migration had only tiny effects on our wage estimates.
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for the presence and number of children, total and under 6. We calculate PUMA commute-
time differentials from the coefficients of the PUMA indicator variables, using the proper
transformation for square roots to get the analog of df/f.
Commuting mode proportions are estimated for all PUMAs using a linear probability
model with US Census Data. Mode of transportation to work is split into four broad cat-
egories; travel to work by own automobile, carpool, public transportation, and a no-cost
method. The public transportation category includes bus, streetcar, rail, subway, and ferry.
The no-cost methods are working from home, walking, biking, and other. Binary variables
for these four categories are separately regressed on 2071 PUMA dummies and the same set
of variables used for commute times.
The resulting estimated probabilities fall between 0 and 1 except for a small number
of PUMAs all in Texas, which have tiny negative numbers. We decided against making
any adjustments to negative numbers as they were tiny and had negligible effects on the
estimates.
Table A4 reports various measures of commuting and associated statistics. Column 1
reports the full cost of commuting. The cost is highest in the densest areas and higher in the
suburbs compared to central city and non-metro areas. Column 2 shows the same pattern in
time costs. Furthermore, column 3 shows there is little variation in commuting time across
areas predicted by the workforce composition, making the raw differential in column 4 not
much different than that in column 2. When the full cost of commuting is broken down, we
see that material costs, in column 6, tend to be higher in the suburbs. This partly reflects
the higher proportion that drive relative to those who use transit, seen in columns 7 and 8.
Variations in those driving and using transit are due more to variation across metros than
within them. This reinforces ideas of certain cities being more car friendly than others.
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APPENDIX L
Amenity Data
Heating and cooling degree days are measurements used to estimate amounts of en-
ergy required to maintain comfortable indoor temperature levels. Daily values are
computed from each day’s mean temperature (max+min
2
). Daily heating degree day
values are equal to max{0, 65 − meantemp} and daily cooling degree day values are
max{0,meantemp − 65}. Annual degree days are the sum of daily degree day values
over the year. The data here refer to averages from 1970 to 2000 (National Climactic
Data Center 2008).
Sunshine is measured as average percentage of possible. This data set contains information
on sunshine as percent of possible sunshine received, by month, for 156 stations in the
contiguous United States. The total time that sunshine reaches the surface of the earth
is expressed as the percentage of the maximum amount possible from sunrise to sunset
with clear sky conditions. (National Climactic Data Center 2008)
Inverse Distance to Coast is equal to one over the distance in miles from the population-
weighted centroid of the PUMA to the nearest coastline of an Ocean or Great Lake.
Coded by author.
Average Slope of Land measures the average slope of the land according to census tract
data. We used high-resolution elevation data from the Global 30 Arc Second Elevation
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Data (GTOPO30) digital elevation model (DEM) available from the United States
Geological Survey. These data are set on a high resolution grid of roughly 11 kilometers.
We mapped the girded elevation data to our PUMA geography averaging the value of all
grid points falling within the boundary of each geography. The slope is computed using
the average maximum technique, where the slope at each grid point is the maximum
rate of change of elevation from that grid point to its eight neighbors. Due to the
high resolution of the data, all geographic units had at least one grid falling inside its
boundary. (United States Geological Survey)
Murder Rate is the average number of murders per 1,000 inhabitants. It is reported at
the county level. (FBI 2000 Uniform Crime Reports)
Bars and restaurants data are the number of establishments classified as eating and
drinking places, NAICS 722. (County Business Patterns 2000).
School Revenues per Student data is at the county level and applies to public schools.
(2000 Common Core)
Table 5 reports how these amenities are distributed by area type and density classifica-
tions. Panel A shows that central city areas are closer to the coast, have higher murder rates,
and more restaurants and bars. Suburban areas have higher public school revenues per stu-
dent. Panel B splits the US by population density and shows that denser areas have higher
school revenues per student, higher murder rates, a greater frequency of restaurants and
bars, and are located closest to the coasts. Panel C compares how different amenities vary
across and within metropolitan area. Unsurprisingly, because climate is strongly correlated
spatially, natural climate related amenities vary more across metros than within. The higher
variation within than across metropolitan areas in restaurants and bars reflects a number of
splits, including that between residential and commercial areas. Similar variation pattern in
the murder rate suggests that there are unsafe areas in many metro areas, rather than being
wholly safe and unsafe metros.
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APPENDIX M
Additional Tax Details
Tax Advantages for Housing and Local Taxes
We model tax advantages for owner-occupied housing by allowing households to deduct
a fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] of home-good expenditures, py, from their federal income taxes, so that
taxes paid are τ (mj − δpjy). δ should be less than 1 as these advantages do not apply to
certain taxes (e.g. payroll) or to certain home goods, such as haircuts or restaurant meals.
Nor are these advantages available to all workers: many renters and home-owners do not
itemize deductions for mortgage interest or local taxes. Ignoring for now commuting and
leisure, incorporating the home-good deduction into the income tax, τ (m− δpy), changes
the expenditure function to e(p, u, τ(m−δpy);Q) ≡ minx,y{x+py+τ(m−δpy) : U (x, y;Q) ≥
u}. Differentiating the mobility condition and using the envelope theorem yields the log-
linearized mobility condition
Qˆj = (1− δτ ′) sypˆj − (1− τ ′) swwˆj (M.1)
which replaces (3.5). As calibrated in Albouy (2008), this reduces the weight on pˆj from
0.36 to 0.33.
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Including State Tax Differences
Differences in within-state tax burdens are worth considering as wages and prices can
often vary significantly within a state, while state services largely do not. We compute
state-tax differentials by multiplying state tax and deduction rates by the wage and price
differentials within state
dτ jS/m = τ
′
S[sw(wˆ
j − wˆS)− δSsy(pˆj − pˆS)] (M.2)
where τ ′S and δS are are marginal tax and deduction rates at the state-level, net of federal
deductions, and wˆS and pˆS are the differentials for state S as a whole relative to the entire
country. These state tax rates incorporate sales as well as income taxes, since sales taxes
reduce the buying power of labor income. This tax differential is added to (M.1) above to
determine local quality of life.
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APPENDIX N
Note on Geography
The 5-percent Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 Census contains
detail for geographic areas known as Public Use Microdata Areas(PUMAs). These PUMAs
are required to contain a minimum population of 100,000 and not cross state boundaries.
Any collection of counties, census tracts, minor civil divisions (MCDs) can be defined as a
PUMA as well as large incorporated places with a minimum population of at least 100,000.
Place of Work Public Use Microdata Areas (POWPUMAs or PWPUMAs) were created to
publish information about work location. These areas use the 5-percent PUMAs as building
blocks and contain one or more whole PUMAs. Published information from the Census
Bureau claiming that PWPUMAs must include entire counties, outside the New England
States, is incorrect. 1 Examples include Washtenaw county in Michigan that contains two
place-of-work PUMAs: 03200 containing Ann Arbor and 03300 mapping surrounding areas
and Hamilton county in Ohio that contains two place of work PUMAs, 04500 containing
Cincinatti, and 4400 the surrounding areas.
In application, many densely populated urban areas are split into multiple PUMAs as
the minimum population restriction of 100,000 allows, but may be encompassed by only one
or two populous PWPUMAs. For example, NY PWPUMA 03800 encompasses New York
1Phone and email correspondence with the Geographic Standards & Criteria Branch of the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau verified that this PWPUMAs definition, that PWPUMAs are constructed to encompass whole
counties, is present in several of their publications and is incorrect.
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county, Manhattan, but is made up of 10 different PUMAs 03801-03810. Cincinatti is one
PWPUMA 04500, while the same area is split into three PUMAs 04501-04503.
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APPENDIX O
Rankings in Popular Media
“Livability” rankings are common in popular media. These rankings are typically pre-
sented as references to assist people making decisions about where to live or buy real estate.
The comparisons are usually performed at a sub-metropolitan level acknowledging the varia-
tion in amenities and prices within cities. Streetadvisor.com1 relies on crowdsourced reviews
written by users for streets, neighborhoods, and cities. Areavibes.com2 and Silver (2010)
apply weighting algorithms to various observable amenities; Silver focuses solely on neigh-
borhoods around New York City.
Somewhat surprisingly, rankings from these various methods sometimes match rankings
the approach used here. Streetadvisor ranks Carnegie Hill and Roosevelt Island as the two
best neighborhoods in New York City. These two neighborhoods are located in NY PUMA
03805, the Upper East Side, which is the 6th highest rated PUMA in the country in our
rankings. Areavibes has Springfield MA, Hartford CT, Detroit MI, and Flint MI as the
worst cities to live in; each of the PUMAs that contain these areas are in the bottom 10
percent of our rankings, with the PUMA containing Southwest Detroit being our lowest
rated PUMA overall. Silver’s (2010) ranking are more difficult to compare to ours as he
defines neighborhoods at a much finer level of detail than our PUMA analysis will allow.
1“Best cities in New York City,” http://www.streetadvisor.com/search/cities-in-new-york-
city-new-york, retrieved 2/2/14.
2“Top 10 Cities - Best Place To Live 2013,” http://www.areavibes.com/library/top-10-best-
cities-to-live-2013/, retrieved 2/2/14.
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In his write-up, Silver does point out the difficulty of constructing a ranking with weights
on observable amenities; he admits that his rankings are quite sensitive to the weights he
chooses. With the crowdsourced reviews on Streetadvisor, the concern is not the weighting
but selection, as it is unclear what population decides to take the time to write reviews of
neighborhoods. While we are satisfied that our PUMA rankings align with some popular
measures, we are partial to our methodology which avoids these issues.
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APPENDIX P
Additional Tables for “Driving to opportunity”
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Table P.1: Rent/Housing cost differentials across the U.S.: Alternative measures and related statistics, 2000
Housing Owned Years
Rental Compo- Raw Rent Units/ Actual Weighted in Number Age of
Cost sition Differential Imputed Gross Rent Resi- of Building
Index ”Quality” (1) + (2) Rents Rents Index dence Rooms in Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) 0.060 -0.100 -0.030 0.100 0.057 0.071 10.11 5.0 38
Suburban (in Metro) 0.083 0.057 0.138 0.073 0.105 0.092 10.59 5.7 30
Non-Metropolitan Areas -0.329 0.009 -0.309 -0.343 -0.359 -0.347 11.74 5.6 33
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 0.276 -0.138 0.138 0.343 0.218 0.281 10.50 4.8 41
1,000-5,000 per square mile 0.010 0.051 0.061 -0.023 0.053 0.012 10.31 5.7 30
<1,000 per square mile -0.280 0.051 -0.229 -0.292 -0.292 -0.288 11.40 5.7 31
Panel C:Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 0.358 0.140 0.361 0.417 0.315 0.370 2.17 0.68 10.0
Across Metropolitan Areas 0.310 0.066 0.283 0.358 0.273 0.319 1.70 0.39 7.0
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.179 0.123 0.224 0.215 0.157 0.188 1.35 0.55 7.2
Fraction of Variance Within 0.250 0.772 0.385 0.266 0.248 0.258 0.387 0.667 0.512
Columns 1 through 6 report deviations from the national average. See Table 1 and Appendix for more detail.
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Table P.2: Wage differentials across the U.S.: Alternative measures and related statistics, 2000
Wage by Wage by Wage by Workplace Raw Wage By Resi- Commute By Work By Work
Work- Resi- Compo- minus Differential dence out of place place
place dence sition Residence (1) + (3) PWPUMA PWPUMA Weighted (Dahl)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) 0.033 0.012 -0.044 -0.022 0.028 0.020 0.352 0.032 0.031
Suburban (in Metro) 0.034 0.053 0.035 0.019 0.041 0.043 0.487 0.032 0.031
Non-Metropolitan Areas -0.140 -0.156 -0.020 -0.016 -0.152 -0.154 0.310 -0.140 -0.138
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 0.110 0.087 -0.061 -0.023 0.095 0.099 0.439 0.109 0.108
1,000-5,000 per square mile 0.004 0.022 0.040 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.412 0.003 0.003
<1,000 per square mile -0.111 -0.117 -0.005 -0.006 -0.119 -0.115 0.380 -0.110 -0.108
Panel C:Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 0.128 0.145 0.105 0.055 0.140 0.135 0.206 0.125 0.124
Across Metropolitan Areas 0.123 0.130 0.047 0.015 0.132 0.127 0.157 0.121 0.119
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.033 0.065 0.093 0.053 0.045 0.046 0.133 0.034 0.033
Fraction of Variance Within 0.066 0.201 0.784 0.929 0.103 0.116 0.417 0.074 0.071
Columns 1 through 6, 8 and 9 are log differences relative to the national average. Column 7 is a proportion. See Table 1 and
Appendix for more detail.
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Table P.3: Commuting differentials across the U.S.: Alternative measures and related statistics, 2000
Commute Division of Full Cost
Full Time Compo- Raw Time Material Fraction Fraction
Cost Differential sition Differential Cost Cost Driving Transit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Central City, Suburban, or non-Metropolitan Area
Central City (in Metro) -0.003 -0.007 0.005 0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.848 0.098
Suburban (in Metro) 0.006 0.058 -0.001 0.065 0.003 0.004 0.933 0.031
Non-Metropolitan Areas -0.012 -0.139 -0.005 -0.137 -0.007 -0.006 0.948 0.008
Panel B: By Residential Population Density
>5,000 per square mile 0.006 0.109 0.006 0.123 0.005 0.001 0.814 0.129
1,000-5,000 per square mile -0.001 -0.026 -0.001 -0.020 -0.001 0.001 0.941 0.022
<1,000 per square mile -0.005 -0.063 -0.004 -0.060 -0.003 -0.002 0.953 0.008
Panel C:Standard Deviations
All PUMAs 0.018 0.220 0.012 0.225 0.010 0.008 0.118 0.100
Across Metropolitan Areas 0.014 0.176 0.007 0.180 0.008 0.006 0.078 0.070
Within Metropolitan Areas 0.011 0.132 0.010 0.134 0.006 0.006 0.088 0.072
Fraction of Variance Within 0.373 0.360 0.694 0.355 0.360 0.563 0.556 0.518
Columns 1 through 6 are deviations from the national average; 7 and 8 are proportions. See Table 1 and Appendix
for more detail.
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